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Abstract 
 
Employee ownership has the potential to reduce the growing wage disparity 
experienced in recent years, however research into employee ownership is 
limited. The purpose of this thesis is to explore organisational culture within for-
profit employee owned businesses (EOBs) in the UK. Specifically, it looks to 
compare how different ownership types might influence the culture. Three types 
are researched: cooperative (enterprises where workers jointly own and control 
a co-operative business), directly owned (where shares are personally owned 
by employees) and trust ownership (where shares are owned on behalf of 
employees through a trust). Performance management and reward 
management were researched as conduits to expose the underlying culture. 
Insights into these two areas of management within employee ownership are 
also exposed. As a cross comparison of culture within ownership types, it has 
not been done before so this research provides a unique contribution to 
knowledge. This study has implications for those organisations considering the 
transfer into employee ownership as well as those who are already employee 
owned. 
A qualitative, inductive and interpretive approach was taken. The research was 
carried out in two phases. Firstly, semi-structured interviews were performed 
with senior managers or human resources representatives of EOBs 
representing all three ownership types across the UK. This was followed by a 
more in-depth ethnographic phase within an example of each type, consisting of 
planned and informal interviews as well as participant observations involving 
employees from all levels of the organisations; managing directors through to 
"shop floor" workers. The data was analysed using a general thematic 
approach. 
The main outputs from this research are models of organisational culture for 
each of the three ownership types, as well as what is common to all the types of 
employee ownership observed. A shared theme of a high commitment culture, 
based on trust, openness and fun was seen in all the types. The research also 
adds to the understanding of performance and reward to show how the 
ownership types influence them. From this, advice to HR personnel is 
suggested for working in each of the distinct types. 
The research was carried out during a period of economic growth (late 2013 to 
early 2014), hence the findings may be affected by more severe economic 
pressure and more time could have been spent within a greater number of 
organisations. Hybrid forms of ownership are acknowledged and further 
investigation into them would be beneficial. 
 
  
 ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I thank God for the opportunity to carry out my PhD; it has been a truly 
challenging experience that has helped me to grow. 
I am deeply indebted to my supervisory team, Dr Rory Ridley-Duff and Dr 
Murray Clark. They bring together world class knowledge of the subject area as 
well as enormous experience of the PhD process. I look back on the 
supervision sessions where their passion for my PhD was utterly infectious. 
Whatever despondency or doubt I held, was blown away by the whirlwind of 
passion they expressed. They truly are the "dream team" of supervisors! 
This research would never have taken place without the support of the 
organisations and employee owners that very kindly gave access. I was blown 
away by their openness and generosity of help. For obvious reasons I cannot 
name them, but I am truly grateful and humbled by their contribution. 
One of the joys along the long road of doing a PhD has been the people who 
journey it with you and the encouragement that a shared toil brings. For this I 
am grateful for the "Unit 5" PhD students at the business school, who are 
always willing to debate, challenge and inspire, as well as eat plenty of 
doughnuts! Sheffield Business School have also provided fertile ground for me 
to nurture my understanding and I am grateful for their stance on teaching 
responsible management that embraces my work. 
I am grateful for the patience shown by our children Hannah, Lucy and Joshua 
whilst I wrote "my little book". Lucy created the diagrams for me. 
Finally, my greatest thanks have to go to my wife, Mary. She has been my rock 
of encouragement throughout the process, as well as giving so much of herself 
to enable me to spend my time doing this. I will always be grateful to her. 
 
  
 1 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 1 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................ 3 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................... 3 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 5 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ................................................................................................ 6 
1.1 Purpose of research ....................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Rationale for research .................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Personal interest ........................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Aims and objectives ...................................................................................... 13 
1.5 Structure of thesis ......................................................................................... 15 
1.6 Summary ...................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 2 - Literature review....................................................................................... 18 
2.1 Introduction. ...................................................................................................... 18 
2.2 Employee ownership ......................................................................................... 18 
2.3 Organisational culture ....................................................................................... 42 
2.4 Performance and reward management ............................................................. 52 
2.5 Combined literature ........................................................................................... 64 
2.6 Summary ........................................................................................................... 65 
Chapter 3 - Research methodology ............................................................................ 67 
3.1 Introduction. ...................................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Research philosophy ......................................................................................... 67 
3.3 Research strategy ............................................................................................. 70 
3.4 Research method .............................................................................................. 71 
3.5 Methodological reflexivity .................................................................................. 83 
3.6 Reporting method .............................................................................................. 85 
3.7 Ethics ................................................................................................................ 85 
3.8 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 86 
3.9 Risks ................................................................................................................. 88 
3.10 Timescale ........................................................................................................ 89 
3.11 Research evaluation ........................................................................................ 89 
3.12 Summary ......................................................................................................... 92 
Chapter 4 - Analysis ................................................................................................... 93 
4.1 Introduction. ...................................................................................................... 93 
 2 
 
4.2 How the data was analysed. .............................................................................. 93 
4.3 Background information about the organisations involved ............................... 104 
4.4 Summary ......................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 5 - Cooperative ownership findings ............................................................. 125 
5.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................... 125 
5.2 Performance and reward management within coops. ...................................... 125 
5.3 Organisational culture within the cooperative ownership model ....................... 139 
5.4 Conclusion. ..................................................................................................... 151 
Chapter 6 - Direct ownership findings ....................................................................... 153 
6.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................... 153 
6.2 Performance and reward management within directly owned EOBs. ............... 153 
6.3 Organisational culture within the directly owned model ................................... 163 
6.4 Conclusion. ..................................................................................................... 172 
Chapter 7 - Trust ownership findings ........................................................................ 173 
7.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................... 173 
7.2 Performance and reward management within trust owned EOBs. ................... 173 
7.3 Organisational culture within the trust owned model ........................................ 184 
7.4 Conclusion. ..................................................................................................... 193 
Chapter 8 - Employee ownership common findings .................................................. 195 
8.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................... 195 
8.2 Performance and reward management common within EOBs. ........................ 195 
8.3 Organisational culture common within EOBs ................................................... 207 
8.4 HR role in an EOB ........................................................................................... 241 
8.5 Conclusion. ..................................................................................................... 245 
Chapter 9 - Dimensions of cultural difference ........................................................... 247 
9.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................... 247 
9.2 Salary .............................................................................................................. 249 
9.3 Financial reward from possession ................................................................... 252 
9.4 Organisation .................................................................................................... 257 
9.5 Employee lifecycle ........................................................................................... 259 
9.6 Influence ......................................................................................................... 263 
9.7 Conformity ....................................................................................................... 264 
9.8 Trust ................................................................................................................ 265 
9.9 Implications for HR practitioners’ summary...................................................... 266 
9.10 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 273 
Chapter 10 - Contributions to knowledge .................................................................. 274 
10.1 Introduction. .................................................................................................. 274 
 3 
 
10.2 Culture within EO contribution ....................................................................... 276 
10.3 Performance within EO contribution .............................................................. 282 
10.4 Reward within EO contribution ...................................................................... 284 
10.5 Methodological contribution ........................................................................... 285 
10.6 HR practice contribution ................................................................................ 285 
10.7 Reflection on limitations ................................................................................. 286 
10.8 Future research ............................................................................................. 287 
10.9 Personal reflection ......................................................................................... 288 
References ............................................................................................................... 289 
Appendix 1 - Systematic literature review ................................................................. 311 
A1.1 EO and performance management ............................................................... 311 
A1.2 EO and reward management ........................................................................ 312 
A1.3 EO, performance, reward and culture ........................................................... 312 
Appendix 2 - Phase 1 interview questions ................................................................ 313 
Appendix 3 - Phase 2 interview questions ................................................................ 315 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of ownership types ...................................................................... 38 
Table 2.2 Depths of participation (Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013, p13 & p24)). .......... 41 
Table 2.3  Handy's culture typology (2009). ................................................................ 51 
Table 3.4 Summary of contact time with EOBs during phase 2. .................................. 82 
Table 3.5 Timeline of research .................................................................................... 89 
Table 4.6 Organisations within type. ......................................................................... 101 
Table 4.7 Repetition of nodes across types. ............................................................. 102 
Table 4.8 Summary of Phase 1 organisations contacted .......................................... 106 
Table 8.9 Summary of ownership types (revised) ..................................................... 195 
Table 8.10 Top 5 benefits offered to all staff CIPD (2015b, p7). ................................ 199 
Table 8.11 Risk factors of trust applied in EOBs (Hurley 2006). ................................ 216 
Table 8.12 Models of trust compared. ....................................................................... 217 
Table 8.13 Labour Turnover rates (CIPD 2015c). ..................................................... 232 
Table 8.14 Labour turnover rates by sector in 2014 (Murphy 2015). ......................... 232 
Table 8.15 High/Low Commitment HRM applicable to EOBs (Watson 2006, p425) .. 239 
Table 8.16 HR Best practice (Pfeffer 2008)............................................................... 240 
Table 8.17 HRM implementation within EOBs (Davies 2004, p3) .............................. 244 
Table 9.18 Different implementation of common themes across ownership types. .... 249 
Table 9.19 Summary of HR involvement in EO by type. ............................................ 269 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 “Cultural web” (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 2008). .......................... 44 
Figure 4.2 Initial sources loaded into Nivivo. ............................................................... 97 
 4 
 
Figure 4.3 Themes derived from Nvivo model ............................................................. 99 
Figure 4.4 Representation of initial themes from Nvivo model................................... 100 
Figure 4.5 Spreadsheet showing comparison of nodes within ownership types. ....... 102 
Figure 5.6 Performance and reward in cooperative EOBs. ....................................... 140 
Figure 5.7 Cooperative culture values ....................................................................... 142 
Figure 6.8 Values printed on internal wall (Direct1). .................................................. 155 
Figure 6.9 Performance and reward in direct EOBs. ................................................. 164 
Figure 6.10 Direct culture values .............................................................................. 165 
Figure 7.11 Performance and reward in trust EOBs. ................................................. 185 
Figure 7.12 Trust culture values ................................................................................ 186 
Figure 8.13 Performance and reward in the combined culture of EOBs. ................... 208 
Figure 8.14 Combined EOB culture values ............................................................... 209 
Figure 8.15 High commitment culture of EOBs ......................................................... 210 
Figure 8.16 Types of trust (Galford and Seibold Drapeau 2003). .............................. 211 
Figure 8.17 Sales figures freely available to employees on canteen table. ............... 220 
Figure 9.18 Employee work allocation rota for Coop1. .............................................. 262 
Figure 10.19 Combined EO culture with different types illustrated. ........................... 282 
Figure A.20 Library search for EO and performance management ........................... 311 
Figure A.21 Library search for EO and reward .......................................................... 312 
Figure A.22 Library search for EO, performance, reward and culture ........................ 312 
  
 5 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CIPD  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
EI    Employee involvement 
EO    Employee ownership 
EOA  Employee Ownership Association 
EOB    Employee owned business 
EP    Employee participation 
ESOP  Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
ESPP  Employee Stock Purchase Plan 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
HR    Human resource 
HRM  Human resource management 
ICA  International Co-operative Alliance 
MSV  Maximised Shareholder value 
 
  
 6 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of research 
The purpose of this research is to investigate organisational culture in employee 
owned businesses (EOBs) in the UK. More specifically this study seeks to 
develop an understanding of how the different forms of ownership might 
influence culture in EOBs using performance and reward as the conduit to 
illuminate culture. Three specific types of ownership are researched, namely, 
cooperative (enterprises where workers jointly own and control a co-operative 
business), direct (where shares are directly owned by employees) and trust 
(where shares are owned on behalf of employees through a trust) (Pendleton 
and Robinson 2015). The research looks to see if there are distinct cultures in 
the individual types as well as any underlying features that are common across 
all types of EOBs. 
1.2 Rationale for research 
The ultimate starting point for this thesis is a personal desire for increased 
social justice within the workplace. Employees typically contribute a significant 
proportion of their life to work to receive a wage but does that lead to a fair 
distribution of the benefits of the enterprise? Should employment simply be an 
activity where employees are told what to do without any influence or 
involvement in how the organisation is run and how they are managed? (Ridley-
Duff and Ponton 2013). Employee ownership (EO) provides an alternative to the 
dominant organisational form that has been linked to powerlessness, income 
inequality and secrecy (Erdal 2011) by providing a share of the possession, 
influence and information (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). 
 Although there has been a “massively increased interest” (Storey, 
Basterretxea and Salaman 2014, p627) in employee ownership in recent years, 
it is less well known and understood. According to a UK government initiated 
report (Nuttall 2012) this is a direct barrier to the expansion of the EO sector 
and hence helping to create a fairer society in the UK (Lewis 1954). In 2012, the 
then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the Rt Hon Dr 
Vince Cable (2012) said  
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"This then, is the government’s clear priority - ensuring we have a market 
economy rooted in a system of responsible capitalism".  
The US economist Stiglitz (2013) pinpoints a link between income inequality 
and economic downturn, causing problems for everyone except the “1%”. 
Norton and Ariely (2011) suggest that the top 1% of the population in the USA 
own nearly 50% of the wealth. Similarly, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) link 
income inequality to a variety of social and health problems. Employee 
ownership can be a part of responsible capitalism (Copeman, Moore and 
Arrowsmith 1984) by enabling a wider distribution of wealth. 
 Bratton (2015, p383) points out   
“the logic of capital accumulation - profit maximization - necessitates that 
managers relentlessly minimize costs, including labour costs, and 
maximize control of the manufacturing or service process…. Thus 
conflict is intrinsic to the capitalist employment relationship.”  
EO can bring an alternative set of values to the employment relationship; one 
that does not have to be built on conflict but on cooperation instead (ICA 2014). 
Employee owners can collaborate with management, whilst still enabling them 
“to exercise almost complete control over their jobs and to participate in a wide 
range of decision making, without any loss in productive efficiency" (Pateman 
1970) thus demonstrating that EO can be an effective way of working. 
 Cathcart (2009, p3) scathingly suggests that  
“For many people work is boring, oppressive, unjust, inequitable, 
alienating, divisive and poorly recompensed”. 
If so, why would anyone choose to work in that way if they could do something 
about the running of the organisation? EO is put forward as an alternative 
business model that values the opportunity for employees to have a voice in the 
company that they work for as well as benefit from a stake in its equity (Erdal 
2011). How do these different value sets influence the culture of EOBs? 
 A key aspect of being an employee owner is the financial reward gained 
from the fruit of their labour; that a share of the profit goes to those who helped 
to create it.  Allied with reward is how people are managed to create the 
necessary profit and how performance management is carried out when the 
workers and managers are both co-owners (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 
1991). Out of the entire tool box of human resource management (HRM) 
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practice (CIPD 2016a), performance and reward management have been 
chosen to be investigated because organisational culture is expressed through 
the way people are managed and rewarded. It also limits the scope of the study 
to make it achievable. 
 Within EO, there are, however, different models of ownership, of how 
employees actually “own” the organisation (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
What differences do the ownership types bring and is there an underlying 
culture that spans EO, regardless of the type? 
 Increasing the knowledge pool and awareness of EO is therefore of 
benefit to the expansion of the EO sector and potentially enhances social justice 
in the UK (Erdal 2011). Hence increasing awareness and understanding of an 
under-researched area (Wright 2010, Nuttall 2012), namely organisational 
culture and subsequently performance and reward cultures within EOBs, is of 
benefit to that end. It benefits EOBs seeking to understand how the ownership 
type influences the culture as well as organisations that are considering the 
transition into EO and deciding on which form to take. The knowledge will also 
benefit personnel responsible for HR practices, to appreciate the different 
emphasises and requirements that each of the ownership types brings. 
 The study is focused on EO entirely within the UK, however it draws on 
secondary literature to explore lessons learnt and experiences from around the 
world. This was to simplify the task logistically (in terms of time, cost and 
language), as well as reduce the impact of national influences which Hofstede 
(2001) suggests are the most significant on culture and could overrule more 
subtle differences due to ownership. This research does not look to compare 
the advantages or disadvantages of EO with traditionally owned businesses (for 
that see Matrix Evidence (2010), Lampel, Bhalla and Jha (2012), EOA (2014)). 
Instead it looks entirely within the EO sector to see how the different types of 
ownership compare with each other regarding organisational culture, 
performance and reward management.  
1.2.1 Why study employee ownership? 
Sauser (2008, p163) said “One thing is certain though: the employee owned 
company is a concept whose time has come”. Currently we are in a “Decade for 
Employee Ownership” (Nuttall 2013) and in January 2012, at the start of the 
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United Nations’ “Year of the Cooperatives”, the then, UK Deputy Prime Minster, 
Nick Clegg, declared a desire to increase the level of businesses that are 
employee owned. In 2010, EOBs accounted for £30bn of the UK economy or 
2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (EOA 2010) and the target was to 
increase that to £100bn (or 10% of GDP) by 2020 (EOA 2013a). Following an 
All Party Parliamentary Report (Knell 2008) into EO, the government initiated a 
report, “The Nuttall Report into Employee Ownership” (Nuttall 2012) to 
investigate the barriers to employee ownership. It concurred that the two main 
obstacles were a lack of awareness of EO and disadvantageous tax 
implications. However, it also highlighted a lack of research (Recommendation 
N) into EOBs. This thesis is a timely contribution towards helping to fill the 
research void. 
1.2.2 How does it add to existing theory? 
This research recognises that there is a wealth of knowledge on organisational 
culture; however, with its focus firmly fixed on EO, there is a lack of research in 
this niche area. Although much has been written on culture and HR practice, its 
application within EOBs is less known (Wright 2010, Nuttall 2012), therefore 
there is scope to add to the knowledge corpus. Pierce and Rodgers (2004), and 
later still, Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan (2009, p124) pointed out that there 
was a lack of research “that compares and contrasts… across forms of 
ownership”. Kalmi (2007) concurs that alternative forms of shareholding are 
being neglected in academic books. A review of the limited literature on the 
subject is explored in chapter two about the relationship between EO and 
culture, and performance and reward management. 
1.2.3 What is EO? 
To research EO an understanding of exactly what it is, is first required. This 
section provides an initial explanation which is greatly expounded on in chapter 
two. 
 The UK government defines EO to be  
"where employees have both a voice in how the business is run through 
employee engagement and a stake in the success of the business." (BIS 
2013, p2).  
Hence both the governance and a stake in the equity of the organisation are 
important. Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991, p125) go further and suggest, 
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in their conceptual model of employee ownership, that the rights of ownership 
are made up of three strands: possession, influence and information. They 
expand these as: 
“(1) The right to possession of some share of the owned object's physical 
being and/or financial value,  
(2) The right to exercise influence (control) over the owned object, and  
(3) The right to information about the status of that which is owned.” 
Other authors clarify further that possession can include both a portion of the 
capital as well as a share of the surplus (for example Kaarsemaker and 
Poutsma (2006)). However, this is similar to the statement by Lewis (1954), the 
founder of the John Lewis Partnership, the largest EO business in the UK by 
employee size (EOA 2012a) that the benefits of EO are "Gain, knowledge and 
power” although knowledge is much more useful than just information. Gain can 
include both a share in the annual profits as well as a share in the equity of the 
organisation if it were to be sold off. Different organisations allow power to be 
exercised in a variety of ways, with varying levels of participation (Ridley-Duff 
and Ponton 2013). Exactly how these three strands are operationalised brings 
significant diversity to the way that EO businesses can be organised.  
 Pendleton and Robinson (2015) quoting Kruse and Blasi, identify four 
dimensions of ownership: 
1. The proportion of shares owned by employees - is it a token gesture, 
minority or majority holding? 
2. The proportion of employees owning shares - what percentage of 
employees hold shares compared to the whole? Is it restricted to an elite 
managerial group? 
3. The distribution of ownership amongst employees - not all employees 
may hold the same amount. Do a small, limited number of senior 
executives hold a disproportionate amount or are they uniformly spread 
amongst all owners? 
4. The nature and extent of rights associated with ownership. Do shares 
have special privileges - voting or non-voting shares? What rights does 
ownership give? 
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 In line with the Employee Ownership Association’s (EOA) understanding 
of Employee Ownership (EOA 2010) and for the purpose of this research, EO is 
where ownership is shared wider than founding partners or just within senior 
executives as a form of reward (Oxley 20131). Ownership must be available to a 
broader spread of employees. In addition, having 25% of equity shared 
amongst employees is considered to be the entry point (Great Britain, HM 
Treasury 2013). However the actual distribution of ownership is not necessarily 
defined, such that, there is no expectation that ownership is shared equally 
amongst employees, although this can be the case. Some ownership can also 
be held externally by shareholders who are not directly linked to working in the 
organisation.  
 Gates (1998) sees ownership as providing rights that can be written into 
the articles of association. These include Liquidation (the right to receive the 
proceeds of an organisation if it is liquidated); Appreciation (the right to gain 
from an increase in the value of the organisation); Transfer (the right to transfer 
some or all the business to an external body); Income (the right to gain income, 
rather than just a wage); Voting (the right to take part in decisions) and 
Information (the right to have access to information). EO potentially provides 
employees with more meaningful rights, and responsibilities, than a traditional 
organisation, which can then have a significant effect on the running of the 
organisation and the culture.   
 Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2001) state that ownership is more than just 
physical and has a psychological component, both of which have a bearing on 
the attitudes and behaviours of the employees. Simply owning shares is not 
enough, feeling like an owner is important too, as the Chairman of the John 
Lewis Partnership pointed out  
“it is the culture of ownership that matters most when it comes to 
employee share ownership. Without that, employee ownership is simply 
an extension of the benefits package” (John Lewis Partnership, 2008). 
 This section has provided a rationale as to why research into EO should 
be carried out and as well as giving a high-level introduction into what EO is. It 
                                               
1
 D. Oxley, Director of Membership, Employee Ownership Association (EOA). 1 
October 2013. pers. comm.). In 2015 Ms. Oxley became the chief executive of the 
EOA. 
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explains the use of performance and reward management as conduits to 
illuminate the underlying values that make up the organisational culture (Schein 
1992). 
1.3 Personal interest  
My personal interest in organisational culture was originally born out of my 
employment experience, where I encountered an overnight cultural shift, 
something that Schein (1992) says does not normally happen. Around 2001, I 
had been working for Royal Mail for 14 years, a company, at the time, wholly 
owned by the UK government. It was losing around £1m a day so the decision 
was taken to out-source the whole of the IT department (in excess of 1000 
people I recall) to a large multi-national, American based organisation and I was 
transferred across in June 2003. Ultimately this meant that I was still doing the 
same job, from the same desk, with the same team for the same end customer 
however my perception of the new organisation's values was that they were 
very different to those of the Royal Mail. Instead of high quality customer 
service, it now became the minimum service required under the contract; 
instead of developing employees through training, it was only provided if the 
customer were to pay for it. Secrecy became more prevalent as previously 
published pay scales became confidential. The building was refurbished, turning 
a somewhat messy but homely feel into a large, clinical barn of grey and white 
that looked like a battery farm for computer workers. This maximised the 
accommodation usage at a cost to the employees' well-being. I concluded that 
no matter how hard I worked, the only person to benefit from it was a faceless 
managing director in America who, as I said to myself, “could afford a larger 
yacht this year than he had last year”. In this environment, I felt like my values 
were no longer in line with the organisation and after two years I chose to take 
voluntary redundancy (2005). 
 It was not until 2010, whilst doing an MSc in Human Resource (HR) 
Management, that I was introduced to the concept of organisational culture2 and 
this helped me to understand what had happened to me, as well as giving me a 
vocabulary to describe it. During my MSc. dissertation on employee induction 
(Wren 2011), purely by accident I did some research at a local EOB, which 
                                               
2
 I remember being struck by Schein's (1992) book and relating to his experience within the IT 
industry. 
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opened my eyes to a different way of working that I had not seen before. After 
graduating I found myself back in the position of looking for work but reluctant to 
commit to organisations that had the same ethos of wealth creation for a limited 
group that I had stepped away from.3  
 My Christian faith and political understanding lead me to prefer all 
members of society and not just the rich; that all people are of value and should 
have the opportunity to benefit from work and contribute to society, and hence 
my desire to see greater social justice. David Erdal’s (2011) book "Beyond the 
Corporation. Humanity Working" enlightened me with its comparison of the 
employment contract to servitude but also inspired me to seek to investigate 
how to shape a better world, with stories of hope and a fairer system. In 
particular, with regard to the effects of employee ownership not just on 
employee owners and their pay but on the benefits to the wider community as 
well, for example, in improved health (Erdal 2011). 
 I am a keen traveller and I have been fortunate to visit many countries 
around the world. I enjoy observing and joining in with the local communities to 
experience their way of life. As Hatch and Cunliffe (2010) point out, by seeing 
alternative cultures it helps you to “understand your native culture more deeply 
as well”, which I try to do. These different experiences and understandings then 
became the seed bed for my PhD alongside the guidance of my supervisors. 
Studying at Sheffield Hallam University was appropriate due to the in depth 
academic knowledge within the staff and the university’s desire to research 
alternative forms of management under its participation of the UN’s “Principles 
of Responsible Management Education” (Prme 2016). Hence I started on the 
long road to understand more about culture within EOBs. 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
The “grand question” that this research is looking to answer is: “What effect 
does employee ownership have upon organisational culture?” Hence the 
aim of this research is to gain a better understanding of organisational culture 
within EOBs and specifically how the different forms of ownership influence the 
culture. EO is a legal form of ownership which then has a bearing on how the 
                                               
3
 I did apply to work at Waitrose, part of the John Lewis Partnership, an EOB, only to be told on 
the day of my interview that there had been a ban on external recruitment as of the previous 
day, so the interview could not go ahead. 
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organisation is run and who the organisation is run for. The HR practices 
utilised are relevant with regard to culture; however researching the whole of 
HR within an organisation would provide too wide a field of research and take 
too long, so only two aspects, namely performance and reward management 
are the subject areas. This is explained more fully in chapter two. 
 The objectives of this research are: 
1. To promote deeper awareness and provide guidance to HR 
professionals and managers with regard to performance and reward 
management practice within EOBs. 
2. To inform academic and practitioner debates, within the context of the 
proposed expansion of the EOB sector, with regard to organisational 
culture. 
3. To promote academic awareness of the dialectical relationship between 
performance and reward management practice and organisational 
culture in the different ownership types of EOBs.    
 The research will benefit members of 'partnership councils' (in trust / 
directly owned EOBs) and 'management committees' (in EOBs structured as 
worker cooperatives) by providing a theoretically grounded exploration of the 
relationship between culture and HR practice in EOBs.  I expect these findings 
to have similar benefits for managers and governing bodies in EOBs.  In 
addition, the theoretical conclusions will be of interest to professional bodies 
(like the CIPD) and academics with a research or teaching interest in EO 
approaches to HR management. The knowledge will also be of benefit to the 
government (BIS) as it seeks to expand the EOB sector. 
 The ethnographic research provided rich data from a number of EOBs to 
be able to investigate the potential influence of performance and reward 
management used in the different ownership types on organisational culture. 
The resultant output has provided a contribution to knowledge in an otherwise 
under researched area. Sandberg and Alvesson (2011, p31) refer to this type of 
research as “neglect spotting” where, 
“It tries to identify a topic or an area where no (good) research has been 
carried out. There is virgin territory—a white spot on the knowledge 
map—that produces an imperative for the alert scholar to develop 
knowledge about the neglected area(s).” 
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 To be able to observe the contribution EO made to the employees, 
regarding receiving a share of the profit, only profit making organisations were 
included in this study. If there were no profit to share, then it would have a 
profound effect on the reward management strategy of an organisation. 
Therefore the results of the study will also be of interest to the growing number 
of more-than-profit social enterprises currently being created (Ridley-Duff and 
Bull 2015).  
1.5 Structure of thesis 
The following section explains on a chapter by chapter basis, how the thesis is 
structured. 
1.5.1 Chapter one - Introduction 
Chapter one has introduced the thesis. It outlined the research topic and 
provided a background to the subject area. It explained why it is a relevant field 
to study, both academically and personally, and highlighted the research gap to 
be filled. 
1.5.2 Chapter two - Literature review 
Chapter two provides a more detailed explanation of employee ownership, its 
history and reasons for adopting it. The chapter then continues with a review of 
the limited literature that is currently available regarding employee ownership 
and how it relates to organisational culture, performance and reward. From this 
a theoretical framework is built that forms the basis for the thesis, defining 
relevant concepts that are required. The knowledge gap is identified and from 
this, the overall research questions are identified and refined. 
1.5.3 Chapter three - Research methodology 
Chapter three presents the research strategy and the justification for the 
methodology adopted to obtain the data, which was an ethnographic, inductive 
approach. Data collection was split into two distinct phases. It includes 
limitations, risks, timescales and ethics of the research and how the results are 
to be presented. 
1.5.4 Chapter four - Analysis 
Chapter four explains in detail the process of analysing the data (a general 
inductive approach) that was collected during the research fieldwork proposed 
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by the methodology. It also includes an introduction and brief history of the 
participating organisations from both phases. 
1.5.5 Chapter five - Cooperative ownership findings 
Chapter five provides details of findings from the worker cooperative EOBs 
researched, specifically what was observed regarding performance and reward, 
leading to an understanding of worker cooperative culture. 
1.5.6 Chapter six - Direct ownership findings 
Chapter six provides details of findings from directly owned EOBs researched, 
specifically what was observed regarding performance and reward, leading to 
an understanding of directly owned culture. 
1.5.7 Chapter seven - Trust ownership findings  
Chapter seven provides details of findings from trust owned EOBs researched, 
specifically what was observed regarding performance and reward, leading to 
an understanding of trust owned culture. 
1.5.8 Chapter eight - Employee ownership common findings 
Chapter eight provides details of findings that were common across all three 
types of EO (cooperative, direct and trust) regarding performance and reward 
leading to reflections of organisational culture that were apparent in EOB in 
general. 
1.5.9 Chapter nine - Dimensions of cultural difference 
Chapter nine builds on chapter eight, whilst there is much that is in common 
across the different types, there are differences in the implementation 
depending on the ownership type, these are highlighted and explored here. 
From this, suggestions regarding how HR practice is enacted within the different 
types are discussed. 
1.5.10 Chapter ten - Contributions to knowledge 
Chapter ten brings together the contributions to knowledge that have been 
made from this research. With the passing of time, it retrospectively reflects on 
the limitations of the research, discussing what could have been improved as 
well as suggesting opportunities for further research in this area. 
1.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the topic of the research, provided a rationale for its 
importance and why it is relevant to UK society, especially the timeliness of the 
 17 
 
thesis. This included an academic and personal justification for carrying out the 
research and given an overview of how the thesis is presented. The following 
chapter provides a more detailed explanation of employee ownership and 
reviews the current literature that is available regarding the intersection of EO 
with specific HR practice.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
2.1 Introduction.         
Chapter 1 explained the focus for this research, which is an investigation into 
the organisational culture of EOBs and specifically how the ownership type 
affects the culture (Schein 1992). It also provided a rationale for studying 
employee ownership and how the outputs can benefit the EOB sector as well as 
society in general.  As Pierce and Rodgers (2004, p594) said “To date, very 
little effort has been directed towards understanding the effects of employee 
ownership by taking its many differences into consideration” and similarly 
Kaarsmaker, Pendleton and Poutsma (2010, p326) recently pointed out that "no 
studies have compared the attitudinal effects of different types of employee 
ownership (ESOPs, share options, direct ownership, etc.)". This thesis helps by 
addressing this neglected area.  
 To develop the research questions an initial understanding of the existing 
literature of the relevant areas was required. Starting with employee ownership 
this chapter provides a contextual background of what it is and its importance to 
the UK economy in a challenging economic period (CIPD 2014a). It then turns 
to organisational culture, and the lense through which it is viewed, that of an 
integrationist perspective. Then the intersection between EO and performance 
and reward management are highlighted and finally all four (EO, culture, 
performance and reward) combined. It seeks to identify the theoretical 
understanding of what is currently available and therefore to identify where this 
research fits in. As an inductive piece of research, the body of literature will be 
built up throughout the research process as themes become apparent and 
relevant, hence it is an initial start and further literature is then included in the 
findings chapters (5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). 
2.2 Employee ownership 
A brief introduction to EO was given in chapter one. This chapter expands on 
this, in addition providing a history, global perspective and relevance for the UK. 
It then further develops Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan’s (1991) conceptual 
model regarding the right of possession, the right to influence and the right to 
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information.  The purpose of this is to clarify necessary concepts and illuminate 
societal issues that can influence the culture of the EOBs. 
2.2.1 Context - an introduction to employee ownership 
Employee ownership is the underpinning empirical context for this research. As 
such an understanding of its global roots, benefits and reasons for creating an 
EOB are presented below. This also includes an insight into the growing 
relevance of EO to the UK economy at the time of writing. 
2.2.1.1 Employee ownership - a global phenomenon 
According to Hofstede (2001), the country an organisation operates in has a 
significant influence on the organisational culture of that site. Examples of 
employee ownership are present around the world. However, the uptake and 
dominant form of ownership varies from country to country. This section looks at 
the development of employee ownership across the world, progressively 
narrowing down to the UK where this study takes place. The purpose of this is 
to demonstrate that EO is a worldwide phenomenon with significant impact on 
employees and not simply a recent spectacle of little value, hence it is worthy of 
research. 
 In America, a significant form of employee ownership is the Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). This concept was first implemented by Louis 
Kelso in 1956 when the employees of the Peninsula Newspaper in Palo Alto 
purchased the company from the retiring owner. It was achieved through 
securing a loan against future profits and the shares were then held on trust. 
Subsequently Kelso was involved in securing tax benefits for ESOP employees 
and the plans are now frequently seen as a form of retirement provision, 
providing significant tax benefits for the organisation and the employee (Rosen, 
Case and Staubus 2005). In 2011, there were approximately 11,400 ESOPS, 
with 14 million employee-owners holding a total value in excess of $900bn 
(Erdal 2011). ESOPs primarily, but not exclusively, hold shares only in their 
associated organisation and there still may be external ownership.  Employees 
cannot buy shares but receive an allocation, which is then available to all 
employees irrespective of grade. On retirement, the ESOP will then buy the 
shares back from the employee which is then used to fund the employee’s 
retirement plan, again under beneficial tax arrangements. An alternative method 
is the Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) where the employee buys the 
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shares directly, often at a discounted rate and it comes with different tax 
allowances (Rosen, Case and Staubus 2005). The ESOP and ESPP are akin to 
the UK trust and direct models of ownership, where the employees are gifted 
shares in the first case and can buy them in the second. 
 Blasi and Kruse (2006) present a political history of employee ownership 
within the USA. At different periods employee ownership has found and fallen 
from favour, depending on the ruling presidential party of the time. Ronald 
Reagan (1981-1989) signed laws that enabled the creation of between 1500-
2000 majority (or entirely) employee owned organisations – predominantly small 
and family owned businesses. 
"There has been an almost Jeffersonian ideological theme beginning with 
President Ronald Reagan that every citizen deserves a stake in 
capitalism, that wages are not enough, and that people need to strive 
towards individual economic responsibility." (Blasi and Kruse 2006, 
p133).  
Subsequent administrations (for example the Clinton administration, 1993-2001) 
have taken an opposite point of view. In recent years the UK coalition 
government (Conservative and Liberal Democrat, 2010-2015) has been 
supportive of the EO sector (BIS 2012). Since coming to power in 2015, the 
current Conservative government has been less vocal in its support. 
 In South America, EO has been a response to the collapse of 
organisations via reclaimed businesses. As Ranis (2005, p94) puts it  
“The Argentine workers depict dramatic confrontations between the rights of 
private property and the rights of the well-being of the working class confronted 
with unemployment and poverty”.  
Ex-employees reclaimed the business (known as "Worker-take-overs" in 
Europe) from owners who had the capital (buildings and equipment) but no 
longer had the appetite to run the business hence denying people access to 
employment and therefore personal wealth, financial security and health (Paton 
1989, Jensen 2011). This led to the creation of worker-cooperatives and 
employment rights were returned to the workers. 
 One of the most famous European examples of employee owned firms is 
that of Mondragon, in the Basque region of northern Spain, founded by the 
Catholic priest, Father José María Arizmendiarrieta in the late 1950s (Whyte 
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and Whyte 1988). (Technically Mondragon Co-operatives are actually worker-
owned as the workforce is self-employed; however they are a good example of 
a worker cooperative by virtue of being joint-owners of the co-operative capital). 
By 2000, 85% of the population were directly or indirectly involved with one or 
more cooperatives and by 2009 it was employing over 100,000 workers. This 
provides significant benefits to the local community in terms of employment, 
finance, healthcare, education and childcare (Whyte and Whyte 1988, Erdal 
2011, Ridley-Duff and Bull 2015) all areas that are constantly under pressure 
within the UK. "In Mondragon, I saw no signs of poverty. I saw no signs of 
extreme wealth…I saw people looking out for each other." (Long Island 
University 2000). The personal financial gain from being a member of a 
Mondragon cooperative is in the form of a capital account, where money is paid 
in, from the surplus but can also be taken out again if there is a deficit, hence 
there are also similarities to the UK direct model, as each member has a 
personal stake which can go up and down in value. 
 Similarly, in Italy there is "the west's largest most successful genuine 
workers co-operative movement” according to Birchall (1990) quoting 
Holmström. With the significant density of coops around Imola, Erdal (2011) 
found evidence to suggest that the impact of worker cooperatives had a positive 
effect on the health and education of the population, as well as a propensity to 
not purchase larger cars (even though they could afford them with the higher 
wages) as they “did not feel the need to make a public display of their wealth” 
(Erdal 2011, p241). Hence this cooperative form of EO was affecting the culture 
of the surrounding population and as such makes it an interesting and relevant 
subject to study further. 
 Kibbutzes in Israel were created along similar lines to worker coops, with 
four underlying principles (Barkai 1975): 
1. Property is owned in common by the membership, both land and 
buildings. This has similarities to the UK trust model where there are no 
individual owners and all participants are beneficiaries. 
2. Self-labour of the membership is paramount, so hired labour 
should not be employed, although this is an ideal and not a reality. 
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3. Labour power is at the disposal of the community (that is, 
members do not individually determine what work they do or the 
amount). 
4. Equality of distribution - effort and reward are not linked. Individual 
monetary reward is minimised by providing communal rewards instead, 
for example housing and dining, however this enables at least a 
comparable wage to the average wage in the country. 
 This was a utopian view and although the number of people in kibbutzes 
has increased (115,300 in 2000, up from 69,089 in the early 1950s (Abramitzky 
2011, p187)) the percentage of the overall national population involved has 
dropped since the halcyon days of the 1950s. Issues of “brain-drain” (skilled 
participants becoming frustrated with equal reward, shirking (those less 
ideologically committed were less hard working) and adverse-selection (people 
of lower ability choosing to work there in order to receive a better wage than 
they could otherwise obtain) have all impacted upon their desirability 
(Abramitzky 2011). As such this is a different expression of the rights of an 
employee owner from those presented above by Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 
(1991) and Gates (1998) and the espoused values will impact on the culture 
(Schein 1992). 
 The former Yugoslavia attempted to utilise self-management hoping to 
build the economy around labour managed firms and thus provide full 
employment for the country (Vanek 1973, 1975, Holmström 1985). However the 
model was based around the state owning the capital, rather than the individual, 
aligning it more to a trust based model (Ramachandran, Russell and Kun Seo, 
1979) but clearly with different governance and not determined by the actual 
workers. Mygind (2012, p1616) provides further history on the rapid growth of 
EO and subsequent decline in the rest of Eastern Europe. Following the political 
revolution away from communism in the late 80’s, it led to “the most 
comprehensive privatization in history and laid the foundation for a new 
distribution of wealth and power” whereby companies were given to their 
employees. However this was rapidly followed by a steep drop in production 
and wages. This downturn, linked with poor governance structures, enabled 
strong management to extract capital from the organisation and encouraged 
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employees to sell their ownership. Therefore EO blossomed and withered 
quickly. It managed to survive more effectively in Croatia where they already 
had appropriate legislation and governance structures. 
 It was a similarly story in Poland. As part of the revolution away from 
communism, the desire was to turn all of the state owned industries into worker 
cooperatives, however in order to cope with the crippling debt the country faced, 
they were in fact sold into western interests, who proceeded to make staff 
redundant and close them down (Klein 2007). 
 In the UK, the “Rochdale Pioneers”, are frequently regarded as being the 
first successful cooperative society formed in 1844; a collection of weavers and 
artisans who combined their resources in order to buy and sell, however 
cooperatives originally existed in Scotland dating back to 1761 (Harrison 1969). 
The Pioneers created the first draft of the cooperative principles which have 
evolved over time but still bear a clear resemblance to their origins.  
 In 1929, John Spedan Lewis (Lewis 1948, 1954, Flanders, Pomeranz 
and Woodward 1968) created what has become the largest UK EOB utilising an 
Employee Benefit Trust (EOA 2012a) which now has approximately 90,000 
partners and sales of £10bn (John Lewis Partnership 2014). The trust is held on 
behalf of the partners (employees) who receive a bonus based on the profits of 
the partnership. In 2013, this was 17% of a partner’s annual salary, leading to 
an average pay-out of £4000 (Ruddick 2013). The partnership’s ultimate 
purpose is “the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile and 
satisfying employment in a successful business” (John Lewis Partnership 
2013a) and as such, business decisions are constantly checked to see that they 
are in line with the stated purpose (Erdal 2011, John Lewis Partnership 2013b, 
Ruddick 2013). The John Lewis partnership is a keen advocate for EO and it 
sponsors research into the field (for example see Matrix Evidence (2010)) as 
well as supporting the EOA. 
 Sunderland Home Care Associates (2016) is an example of a hybrid 
EOB having both a trust and a direct element of ownership. The majority of 
shares are held in an employee benefit trust (EBT), to which all employees are 
beneficiaries but pre-tax profits are then used to purchase shares. These are 
then given to the current workforce so that employees hold their own personal 
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level of shares too, dependent on length of service and the performance of the 
organisation.  
 These are examples of EO taken from around the world and many more 
could be cited, Germany, Denmark, Canada and so forth (Erdal 2011). They 
illustrate that EO is part of the global economy and relevant today, so worth 
studying. 
2.2.1.2 Scale of employee ownership in the UK  
Ownership in the UK tends to be broken into two distinct groups, that of 
Cooperatives (UK Cooperatives) and non-cooperatives (primarily the EOA 
definition of EO), however both like to share the John Lewis Partnership for its 
pioneering role and positive contribution to the size of EO. Pendleton and 
Robinson (2015) report that there are "around 250-300 firms with significant 
employee ownership" in the UK, employing 150 thousand employees and 
generating over £20bn in sales (EOA 2012a). Whereas Co-operatives UK 
(2015a) report that there are nearly 7000 Coops, employing 15 million people 
with a turnover of £37bn and that the cooperative sector has grown 20% since 
the recession of 2008 (ICA 2013). However this includes all forms of 
cooperative (for example consumer, producer, worker) hence these figures are 
over represented. A conservative estimate of worker cooperatives suggests that 
they account for £146m of business, employing over 6000 people (Atherton 
2012). The ICA (2013) suggests a more significant contribution (when John 
Lewis Partnership has been removed from the figures), that there are 496 
worker cooperatives with a combined turnover of £500m. As mentioned in 
section 1.1, this research specifically focuses on trust, direct and worker 
cooperative forms of EO.  
 As such EO is still a relatively niche area of the UK’s total economy 
however it was being promoted by the government that the UK needed to move 
to a “John Lewis Economy” (Mason 2012). The EOA has a target to increase 
the turnover of EOBs to £100bn (or 10% of GDP) by 2020 (EOA 2013a) hence 
it is an area that is growing in importance. 
2.2.1.3 Benefits of employee ownership 
Employee ownership is argued to have a beneficial effect on both employee 
owners and the overall businesses but they are not guaranteed. The meta-
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research by Matrix Evidence (2010) suggests a number of benefits from EO. 
However this research is sponsored by two large EOBs that potentially have a 
vested interest in promoting EO, so there is still a need for independent 
university led research into the claimed benefits of EO. They report that the 
most significant benefit for employees is being able to have a voice with regard 
to management decisions and that employees are better rewarded both 
financially and intrinsically (for example job satisfaction). Employee commitment 
and satisfaction "tends" to be stronger in EO organisations than not, but it is 
unclear if it is a causal effect. 
 The increased work autonomy leads to better overall employee health or 
at least does not lead to the detrimental effect on health from a lack of 
autonomy. This is supported by McQuaid et al (2012). EOBs can also have a 
positive impact on the surrounding population, suggesting that the concentration 
of EOBs in different parts of Italy correspond to increased levels of health and 
life expectancy (Erdal 2011). 
 EO is seen to have benefits for the commercial performance of EOBs as 
well (Henry 1989). Performance of EO businesses is at least as good as non-
EO businesses and in certain conditions there are productivity gains from EO. 
This is most obvious when there is a definite link to involvement in decision 
making. Survival in difficult economic times is at least as good if not better for 
EO businesses. There is also a suggestion that EO creates conditions which 
are favourable to innovation within the organisation (Matrix Evidence 2010). 
 There are, however, well-documented examples of EO businesses that 
have not survived in the long term (Rosen, Case and Starbus 2005, Blasi and 
Kruse 2006, Fahey 2009). Erdal (2011) celebrates the paper manufacturing firm 
Tullis Russell as being a family owned business (since 1809) that transferred 
into EO in the late 1980s. However a significant part (Tullis Russell 
Papermakers, employing 374 staff) went into receivership in 2015 as it was no 
longer economically viable (Tullis Russell 2015, BBC 2015). Similarly 
organisations can move in and out of EO, subject to approval of the governing 
trustees if it is considered in the best interests of the employees (Pendleton and 
Robinson 2015). This was the case of Loch Fyne Oysters, which transferred 
into EO following the sudden death of one of the two founding owners and then 
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transferred back into private ownership nine years later in order to gain access 
to funds required to expand the business (Erdal 2008, 2011, BBC 2012).  
 McCarthy and Palcic (2012) tell the story of Eircom, the Irish 
telecommunications organisation that “despite the substantial shareholding and 
influence of the ESOP, we find that it has failed to create a sense of 
psychological ownership among employees”, this led to short termism, 
maximising of personal profits and ultimately massive debts rather than a longer 
term shared view. The governance board were appointed by trade union 
representatives rather than employees and when employees left the 
organisation they were able to hold onto their shares, causing over 50% of the 
"employee ownership" to be owned by ex-employees with a preference for 
personal profit over employment which was no longer relevant. 
 Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006, p677) also question the benefit of EO 
suggesting that: 
“Several reviews of studies of the link between employee ownership on 
the one hand, and HRM outcomes and company performance on the 
other hand, have concluded that hardly any negative effects have been 
found, but at the same time that positive effects do not appear to come 
about automatically” (emphasis in original) 
It can be seen that EO is not a guaranteed panacea for solving all of an 
organisation’s problems but it does have potential to bring benefits to the 
organisation and its employees as well as society in general (Wills 1998, Erdal 
2011). Therefore this is a potential reason for an organisation to become 
employee owned, and this is now discussed further in the next section. 
2.2.1.4 Why adopt employee ownership? 
In researching the organisational culture of EOBs it is important to appreciate 
why people choose to adopt employee ownership in the first place as it may 
have an impact on the culture (Schein 1992). Hyman and Mason (1995) 
suggest two potential reasons; firstly, "to enhance workforce performance 
through the alteration of employee behaviour" (that is, for purely commercial 
benefit hoping to gain a perceived competitive advantage as shown in the 
previous section (Matrix Evidence 2010, EOA 2014)); or secondly, for "idealistic 
philosophy" and moral reasons (Harrison 1969). Under these two broad 
headings there are a variety of options which are discussed below. 
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 Employee ownership can provide a degree of social justice in response 
to the excesses of capitalism, in order to reduce wealth inequality and the 
negative impact it has, as shown by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010). Copeman, 
Moore and Arrowsmith (1984, p15) point out that: 
“…the low popularity of capitalism, in spite of its economic success, does 
not lie in the nature of competitive enterprise itself, but in the way the tax 
system and the workings of the capital market together have caused the 
bulk of the population to be shut out from owning part of the enterprise 
system. The criticism has lain not on the amount of wealth produced, but 
on its distribution."  
A practical example of this is the John Lewis Partnership and how the founder, 
John Spedan Lewis, was deeply upset by the huge wage inequalities he saw in 
the organisation (£2m for three family owners compared to £4000 each for 300 
workers). He subsequently chose to transform the business into an EOB, 
handing over his ownership (£50m in today’s money) to a trust (Erdal 2011). 
Ernest Bader (1975), the founder of Scott Bader, tells a similar story of 
disillusionment with capitalist values so he also chose to voluntarily give the 
ownership over to the employees via a trust (Scott Bader 2015). These are both 
illustrations of a moral response to perceived injustices that could be partially 
rectified through moving to EO. 
 Adler, Forbes and Willmott (2007, p157) define capitalism as:  
"a form of society characterized by wage employment (thus domination 
by the class of owners, as distinct from cooperative ownership) and 
competition between firms (thus domination by the anarchy of the 
market, as distinct from democratic planning)”.   
As a form of social innovation, EO confronts this definition head on via 
cooperative ownership and with the class of owners being the same group of 
people as the employees. Employee ownership challenges the standard 
Master/Servant employment contract, since the employee holds both roles 
simultaneously (Ellerman 1997). It is an attempt to move from the position 
where capital buys labour to where labour buys capital. In fact it seeks to 
challenge the whole employment relationship and alters the balance of power to 
that of one of democratic sharing (Erdal 2011, Jensen 2011a). Bader (1975, 
p227) similarly questions the values of wage employment:  
“The wage system takes almost everything for granted; it is all too 
common to speak of obligations and rights, of duties and hours of work. 
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In a family, such a state of affairs would be strange since, ideally whether 
rich or poor, there is a natural concern for all.”  
At the same time, Vanek (1975, p364) wrote similarly, proposing a “labor-
managed system” that is “at worst equal to the western-type capitalist system”. 
The emphasis being on maximised income per worker rather than total overall 
profit. However in times of recession this can lead to downsizing the 
organisation in order to maintain the individual profit level for the remaining 
employees and casting aside the redundant ones (Vanek 1977). Post 
Yugoslavia, is this the preferred strategy for EO in the UK now? 
 Principle 6 of the ICA’s cooperative principles (ICA 2014) states that 
there should be “Cooperation amongst cooperatives”. This provides an 
alternative to the “anarchy of the market” whereby cooperatives actively work 
together to support each other. An example of this is in seen in the Italian 
worker coops where “When labour must be laid off, other co-ops come under 
strong moral pressure to take on extra workers or even to absorb a whole co-
op” (Holmström 1985, p10). Similarly the Mondragon cooperative members pay 
a tax (in 1985 it was 2.35%) to the social security cooperative (Lagun-Aro) 
which is then responsible for relocating redundant members into other coops 
(Whyte and Whyte 1988). This is different to the standard market approach of 
letting failing organisations simply go to the wall. 
 Ellerman (1997, p1) argues for an economic democracy, "A market 
economy where the predominant number of firms are democratic firms”, in order 
to renegotiate the employer-employee relationship so that employers no longer 
“hire” human beings but they can become members of the organisation . EO 
where EOBs reportedly give their employees influence via a voice could 
therefore be a step towards this. Similarly, Johnson (2006) argues for 
organisational democracy which ultimately spills over into a “democratic culture 
in civic life”, once again employee owners who are democratically involved in 
the governance of the organisation will exhibit this. 
 However EO can be construed negatively, simply as a means of tax 
avoidance. The offer of a proportion of ownership has been used as a 
mechanism for exchanging employment rights for possession (for example 
reduced wage increases for share options). A recent example of this in the UK 
was the selloff of Royal Mail where employees received 10% of the ownership 
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in exchange for changes in working conditions (Parker 2014).  Another example 
of this brings into question, for whose benefit is the EO for?  
“One of the few businesses to start using the scheme is private equity 
owned fruit firm Whitworths, where eight senior executives have been 
handed stakes as part of a £90 million sale. They won’t have 
employment rights, but they will – entirely coincidentally - be exempt from 
capital gains tax when they sell their shares.” (People Management 
2013). 
Slott (1985) argues that although EO may be good for the employees of 
an EOB, it weakens the power of trade unions in general and as such is bad for 
employment overall. However from their experience of the UK bus industry 
Pendleton, Robinson and Wilson (1995) disagree. They found that 
organisations that transferred into EO, kept their existing union roles which 
could actually became stronger with a greater voice. 
Sauser (2009) questions whether EOBs can maintain a truly democratic 
structure as they grow larger and individual voice diminishes whilst some form 
of management power rises up instead. Ultimately he sees that this could then 
degenerate into an abuse of power by a few with no distinction from a traditional 
organisation. Although he does suggest that EO might be the “ideal blend of 
capitalism and communitarianism”. It is also recognised that capitalism has 
different emphasises around the world, for example "the Japanese see 
capitalism as a system in which communities serve customers, rather than one 
in which individuals extract profits" (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1994, 
p167) the latter of which is a more Anglo-American perspective and this 
research, based in the UK, fits into.  
EO may lead to a fairer society, as Spedan Lewis (1957, p1) said in a 
radio broadcast  
“The present state of affairs is really a perversion of the proper working 
of capitalism. It is all wrong to have millionaires before you have ceased 
to have slums.” 
Using Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2010) information Erdal (2011, p243) picks out 
social problems (suicide rates, drug abuse, prison population) that would benefit 
from “a better, fairer distribution of wealth”. In classically owned companies 
large wage disparities can exist. In 2009 the average pay for FTSE 100 chief 
executives was 88 times that of the UK median pay, up from 47 times just ten 
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years earlier (Armstrong 2012). In 2016, People Management (2016) put the 
average FTSE 100 CEO pay as 183 times that of the “typical” employee. 
Bratton (2015, p253) goes further in his example of an American CEO who 
received 1795 times the lowest paid worker in the organisation ($53m 
compared to $20k) and who was then subsequently laid off for underperforming. 
Would a democratic EOB allow such an extreme disparity to happen (Dietz, 
Cullen and Coad 2005, Norton and Ariely 2011)? In large EOBs the ratio 
between the highest paid and lowest can be dramatically different.  In John 
Lewis the ratio was capped at 25:1 until recently (Cathcart 2009) but has now 
been extended to 75 times with the bi-annual option to dismiss the chairman by 
the elected board for under performance (John Lewis Partnership 2014). Ridley-
Duff and Bull (2015) note that the ratio at Mondragon has always been less than 
10 to 1 and averages just 5:1, which has to be agreed by all members via a 
vote. Stiglitz (2013) in the USA and McDonnell, Macknight and Donnelly (2012) 
in the UK report that wealth inequalities have been seen to be widening in 
recent years; as Oakeshott (1975, p293) pondered “what differentials would 
result in Britain if they were decided by even a partially democratic voting 
system, as at Mondragon?”  
Therefore, choosing to create or become an EOB could be for a variety 
of reasons; social justice, personal moral conviction, a desire for a more 
democratic society, improved organisational performance, a reduction of wealth 
inequalities, community benefit, increased personal gain, tax avoidance or a 
reduction in workers power. Therefore having a greater understanding of EO 
would be beneficial to employers, employees and society in general. 
2.2.1.5 How EOBs are instigated 
The EOA (2015a) highlight how organisations can become employee owned at 
different points in the business lifecycle (Cornforth et al. 1988). These include: 
• Start-ups - where the founding partner(s) deliberate set out to create an 
EO company from scratch.  • Growth - Utilising the positive features of EO to obtain and retain key 
employees. • Public service spin-out - On conversion from public service to an 
external organisation (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
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• Succession - where private owners chose to leave the organisation or 
retire. This is the most frequent route into EO (EOA 2015b) however it 
does not guarantee that the option will be welcomed by the current 
workforce. • Insolvency or closure - using an employee buyout or worker-take-over 
to extend the life of a failing organisation (Paton 1989, Wills 1998, 
Jensen 2011) or one threatened with being sold off to a competitor or 
closed down on the retirement of the owner. By sharing ownership 
amongst all the employees and writing the deeds of the trust in such a 
way that the organisation cannot be sold, this provides a level of 
protection of employment to the employees (Aubert et al. 2014). 
Each scenario brings different challenges to face with regard to the conversion 
to EO and subsequent psychological adoption of ownership (Pierce, Rubenfeld 
and Morgan 1991). According to Schein’s (1992) definition of culture concerning 
new members being taught successful ways to work, previous experience 
clearly has an impact on the current culture, so the history of the organisation is 
important.  Hence at the point of becoming employee owned, the culture will 
either have carried on from before, to a greater or lesser extent, or been 
initiated by the founding workforce. This will be relevant to the research. This 
section has provided a background to EO in general, it now turns in detail to 
look at the specific models that are relevant to this research. 
2.2.2 Types of employee ownership  
As previously mentioned there are different ways in which employee ownership 
can be operationalised and these fall into three broad models of ownership. 
They are: cooperatively (or mutually) owned, directly owned and trust owned 
(also known as indirectly owned). They differ in the way that shares (or equity) 
are acquired by employees as well as the amount an employee can hold. They 
also have different ways of financially rewarding the employees based directly 
on their stake in the organisation. As Toscano says, quoted by Pierce, 
Rubenfeld, and Morgan (2009, p130), "Different forms of ownership have 
different effects on companies and their work force" and a significant aim of this 
research is to understand how the ownership model influences the culture of the 
organisation. Therefore a clear understanding of the three ownership models is 
important and provided below. 
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2.2.2.1 Cooperative ownership 
There are various forms of cooperatives based on who is eligible for 
membership, for example consumer cooperatives, producer cooperatives, 
worker cooperatives, client cooperatives and mixtures thereof. This research 
focuses purely on worker cooperatives, as it means the workers have the 
greatest influence on the cooperative and not external shareholders. Ellerman 
(1997, p68) defines worker cooperatives as  
“a cooperative where the members are the people working in the 
company, and where patronage is based on their labor as measured by 
hours or by pay.”   
Cooperatives have been traditionally created along ideological lines (typically 
formed in the 1970s in the UK) or more pragmatically simply as an effective 
business model (formed more in the 1980s). Cornforth et al. (1988) found that 
the average size of a worker cooperative was only seven people. Membership 
may require a capital investment by a new member, which can potentially 
exclude people, or a nominal £1 share is often use, with the capital being raised 
elsewhere. This can be a particular issue for cooperatives, as banks can be 
reluctant to loan money to them due to the poor equity to loan ratio (Ridley-Duff 
2009). In addition, coops may not have an equal distribution of ownership 
amongst members, although all the coops in this research are equal and so 
membership was a purely nominal cost (Paton 1989). Similarly it looks at 
cooperatives where the entire ownership is within the workers and not held 
externally, so that it is not diluted or subjected to external control due to 
ownership. 
 The initial share value (whether £1 or a share of the true cost) is typically 
offered at “par value”. This means that it cannot accrue in value and prevents 
any desire for the cooperative “being run mainly for the purpose of increasing 
the value of the shares (just like an investor-owned business)” (McDonnell, 
Macknight and Donnelly 2012) and instead allows it to be focused on the values 
of cooperatives. 
 Cooperatives follow a set of internationally agreed principles; the most 
recent version declared by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) in 1995, 
has 7 principles (ICA 2014): 
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1. Voluntary and open membership 
2. Democratic member control 
3. Member economic participation 
4. Autonomy and independence 
5. Education, training and information 
6. Cooperation amongst cooperatives 
7. Concern for community 
These principles were adapted by the ICA (2005) to specifically cover the 
characteristics of worker cooperatives and are reproduced below: 
1. They have the objective of creating and maintaining sustainable jobs and 
generating wealth, in order to improve the quality of life of the worker-members, 
dignify human work, allow workers’ democratic self-management and promote 
community and local development. 
2. The free and voluntary membership of their members, in order to contribute 
with their personal work and economic resources, is conditioned by the 
existence of workplaces. 
3. As a general rule, work shall be carried out by the members. This implies that 
the majority of the workers in a given worker cooperative enterprise are 
members and vice versa. 
4. The worker-members’ relation with their cooperative shall be considered as 
different to that of conventional wage-based labour and to that of autonomous 
individual work. 
5. Their internal regulation is formally defined by regimes that are 
democratically agreed upon and accepted by the worker-members. 
6. They shall be autonomous and independent, before the State and third 
parties, in their labour relations and management, and in the usage and 
management of the means of production. 
 Therefore worker cooperatives are characterised by their adherence to 
the ICA (2005) principles and have a focus on democratic governance usually 
made upon a one member/one vote basis (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2011). Profit is 
shared in a manner agreed amongst the membership. 
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2.2.2.2 Direct ownership 
In directly owned organisations, employees possess personal shares in the 
organisation. They can either be purchased voluntarily or mandated to be 
purchased as a condition of continuing employment or given to the employee as 
part of the overall reward package (Shields 2007). The cost of share purchase 
can be a barrier to ownership so organisations sometimes provide loans to help 
support employees. Often there is a limit on the amount of shares an individual 
can hold, specifically to stop them obtaining a controlling share in the 
organisation, therefore denying liquidation and transfer rights (Gates 1998). 
Paton (1989, p102) refers to direct ownership as “Worker Capitalism”. 
 Organisations provide a mechanism to enable employees to buy and sell 
shares, often this is time limited (for example during one day or month in the 
year). Typically when an employee leaves or retires there is an agreed plan to 
return the shares, either immediately or over a period of time (Ellerman 1997). 
The employee gains personally from this ownership in potentially receiving an 
annual share dividends as well as benefiting from any increases in share value 
when they are sold, however they can also go down in value, losing the 
employee money. If governance is based on a one share/one vote basis, it can 
lead to a potentially uneven distribution of power, limiting some people’s voice 
(Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 2008). 
 Therefore direct ownership is characterised by personal ownership of a 
variable quantity of shares, that provide a dividend as well as potentially gaining 
in value over time, that can be extracted from the organisation by selling them 
back (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
2.2.2.3 Trust ownership 
An Employee Benefits Trust (EBT) is a legal arrangement whereby ownership 
of an organisation is held on behalf of the employees, typically by a board with 
appointed trustees (Nuttall 2012). The governance and purpose of the trust is 
defined within the Trust deeds, which may require specific requirements to be 
upheld. For example the John Lewis Partnership, a well-known UK Trust owned 
organisation, has a list of defined principles that can only be changed through 
the democratic process; they include Principle 1 –  
“The Partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, 
through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful 
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business. Because the Partnership is owned in trust for its members, 
they share the responsibilities of ownership as well as its rewards – 
profit, knowledge and power.” (John Lewis Partnership 2013a, p7).  
All decisions in the organisation are reviewed against this principle to see that 
they are consistent with it.  
 Trust ownership is an effective way of handling business succession. In 
this scenario, the retiring owner can sell their shares to a trust which uses a 
loan to pay for the purchase. The profits of the organisation are then used to 
initially pay off the loan and ultimately provide a dividend to employees (Rosen, 
Case and Starbus 2005, Erdal 2011). In the case of the John Lewis Partnership, 
the owner (John Spedan Lewis) deliberately chose to donate all of his shares to 
the trust thereby avoiding the need for the trust to commence its existence in 
debt (Lewis 1948, 1954). 
 Trusts can have a defined duration (a maximum of 125 years) or be in 
perpetuity and on completion the trustees can choose to allocate the shares to 
the employees directly, create a new EBT or, give them away to charity (Nuttall 
2012). The trustees also determine the dividend that each employee receives. 
 Trust ownership is also known as indirect ownership, in contrast to direct 
ownership explained above. It therefore allows employees to benefit from the 
trust (as beneficiaries) however ownership is not personally held by the actual 
employees but by the trust instead (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
2.2.2.4 Ambiguity in ownership 
The three models presented above represent different methods of achieving EO 
however in reality the situation is much more complex. In their purest form, EO 
organisations would be entirely owned by the employees, but external 
ownership of a portion of the organisation is still possible. This may be due to 
initial investors maintaining a stake, retired or leaving employees retaining 
shares, venture capitalists buying a share or for a variety of other reasons 
(McCarthy and Palcic 2012). 
 Similarly, more than one model of ownership can be in operation at the 
same time, thereby creating hybrid models. For example the EOA recognises a 
fourth model of “hybrid ownership” (McDonnell, Macknight and Donnelly 2012, 
EOA 2012b, Pendleton and Robinson 2015,). This is a mixture of trust owned 
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and directly owned, which benefits from allowing employees to purchase their 
own shares and also provides a repository for any currently unallocated shares, 
which are then held in trust for the benefit of all employees. Hence in this 
scenario employees may receive a dual benefit of reward from their personal 
shares as well as a dividend on the shares held centrally. This can lead to an 
ebb and flow of shares from the trust to employees, providing an ever changing 
situation. In addition thought is required in order to ensure an appropriate 
democratic influence, considering whether some employees get a double vote 
through the trust and their personal share ownership.  
 Again though the EOA (2012b) model is too simplistic, since hybrid 
models can exist between each of the three primary types. Worker cooperatives 
can themselves be members of other cooperatives. For example the 
Mondragon Cooperative Corporation in Spain is a cooperative of coops (De 
Normanville, Wren and Ridley-Duff 2015). Each member coop is primarily 
owned by its workers and the secondary coop, which will have seeded the initial 
creation with start-up funding. Profits from the organisation are not paid directly 
to the employee in cash but held on their behalf in an “internal capital account” 
that accrues interest which is similar to an employee holding a share in the 
direct model (Ellerman 1997, Ridley-Duff and Bull 2015). 
 Cooperatives do not have to have an equal equity share distribution 
between members and the cost of joining can be a true percentage of the value 
of the cooperative. Hence this is more akin to a direct model however voting is 
restricted to “one member one vote” and is not affected by the amount of shares 
held (Co-operatives UK 2015b). Nor does the surplus distribution have to be 
shared equally amongst members; it can be defined within the articles of the 
coop, making it more aligned to a trust model. 
 As part of the contested definition of exactly what EO is, it has only been 
in the last five years that the EOA has fully recognised worker cooperatives as 
part of the EO sector. During their sponsored study of the effect of EO on 
organisations (Matrix Evidence 2010), the EOA specifically requested that 
during the data gathering phase it “Exclude studies of worker co-operatives”. 
Similarly in 2011, the UK government stated that there are “two main types of 
employee ownership” (BIS 2011), which are direct and indirect. Hence outside 
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the cooperative world, worker cooperatives are not as well recognised although 
John Spedan Lewis (1954) created the John Lewis Partnership as a “Producer-
Cooperation, as a method of sharing more fairly”. Since it is the largest 
employed owned business in the UK and a vocal supporter of EO (John Lewis 
Partnership 2013c), the EOA have been keen to embrace it but still do not make 
specific reference to worker cooperatives within their definition of EO (EOA 
2015a).  
 The influential Nuttall (2012) review, investigating the barriers to growth 
of the EO sector, only acknowledges direct, indirect and hybrid (direct and trust) 
models. The response by the UK government still makes a distinction between 
“employee ownership and cooperatives sector” (BIS 2012). More recently 
though in collaboration with the EOA, Pendleton and Robinson (2015) 
recognise four forms (direct, indirect, membership/mutual and hybrid) in their 
survey of EO in Britain.  
  The purpose of this research is to investigate organisational culture 
within EOBs, specifically considering how the ownership type might influence 
the culture. Therefore to provide the greatest contrast between the types, 
hybrids are avoided (as far as possible, although practically this is not 
straightforward) and only the three initial theoretical models (worker 
cooperative, direct and trust) are used, to attempt to provide a clearer distinction 
between them. Table (2.1) below summarises the different forms of ownership 
prior to fieldwork. 
EO Type Gain ownership Reward Hybrid (?) 
Cooperative Purchased (either 
nominal value £1 
or % of actual 
value). 
Share of surplus Cooperative of 
cooperatives. 
Direct Purchased via 
shares in the 
organisation 
Share dividend 
and increase in 
share value on 
sale. 
Yes with trust 
type. 
Trust Ownership 
remains with the 
trust but the 
benefits are given 
to all qualifying 
employees. 
Bonus 
determined by 
trust from the 
profit created. 
Yes with Direct 
type. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of ownership types4 
2.2.3 Rights of ownership 
What does ownership actual offer? Gates (1998) defines ownership as 
providing a collection of rights (see also McDonnell, Macknight and Donnelly 
(2012)). These are revisited (from section 1.2.3) and reviewed from an EO 
standpoint below since the expectation of rights feeds into underlying beliefs 
and assumptions and hence culture (Schein 1992). 
• Liquidation Upon liquidation employee owners would have greater 
rights to obtain a portion of the remaining value of the organisation than if 
they were just employees since they are shareholders as well, entitling 
them to a preferred status as well as residual value after creditors are 
paid. • Appreciation The direct form of ownership does give appreciation rights 
to owners who are able to sell their personal shares. This does not apply 
to trust (as individuals have no shares) and cooperative (those that have 
a nominal £1 fixed price share) employees. In this way direct owners can 
receive recognition for their entrepreneurial effort. Sauser (2009) suggest 
that this can also lead to a conflict of interests whereby employees are 
supporting the ongoing profitability of the organisation for the long term 
whilst seeking to maximise their own personal income in the short term. • Transfer As owners do employees have a right to transfer some of their 
shares elsewhere or alternatively, prevent the organisation being 
transferred into different ownership? Again direct ownership allows 
employees to have personal shares. However whether they can be 
transferred outside of the organisation is a question to be determined 
during the research. Cooperatives and trusts do not normally allow 
shares to be owned outside of the trust or cooperative itself. This control 
does give employee owners a say in whether the organisation is partially 
sold off or even prevented from being sold off. Cathcart (2009) tells the 
story of a single employee that raised the question of whether the entire 
John Lewis Partnership could be transferred into private ownership, 
potentially realising £100,000 for every partner. It was prevented by the 
                                               
4
 Note this table is revised in chapter 8 following the fieldwork. 
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constitution and the requirement upon the chairman to resist any such 
attempt. However Eaga (an EO organisation) was sold externally by the 
elected trustees, who considered that they were acting on behalf of the 
employee owners. However when the workforce became aware of the 
deal, they were able to negotiate a continuing stake (in the form of a 
trust) in the organisation, thereby preventing a complete transfer of 
ownership (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2015). Sauser (2009) advises that EOBs 
should “Create an organizational structure that shares power among 
several bodies, and thus limit its concentration” which he sees as a way 
of avoiding the conflict of interests of a single power base as well as 
reducing the scope for the potential abuse of that power, including selling 
the organisation off. This is seen in the tripartite governance structure of 
both John Lewis Partnership and the Mondragon cooperatives (De 
Normanville, Wren and Ridley-Duff 2015). Therefore EO does provide 
additional rights to employee owners to be involved in the decision to 
transfer shares. • Income What right do employees have to receiving an income based 
solely on being an owner, rather than just a wage which is earnt? As 
employee owners, they have the same right as external owners to a 
share in the profits generated, this is potentially more than a non-owner 
but employee ownership on its own does not guarantee in sharing 
dividends. This is seen in the recent NHS spin offs, that are declared as 
not for profit from the outset (Cooper and Robinson 2013). For an 
example see Spectrum Health (2015) in Wakefield. However this 
research specifically focuses on “for profit” organisations so that there is 
a link between ownership and potential, personal financial gain in order 
to see its influence on culture. If there is no possibility of personal gain 
then it could be expected that it would have an impact on the culture as 
well. 
Therefore EO does give employee owners greater rights than would normally 
be given to an employee in a traditional investor-led organisation. Possession 
entitles possession of the organisation as well as possession of the fruits of the 
organisation and not simply a wage (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma 2006, Erdal 
2011). By providing a voice, EO gives a level of influence within the 
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organisation. Share ownership without control rights “make little difference to 
the pattern of worker layoffs and management practices” (Ridley-Duff and Bull 
2015, p99). However that influence can be enacted in multiple ways. 
 Do employee owners have rights to vote on decision and be involved in 
the governance of the organisation? Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991) 
suggest that being able to exercise influence (control) is a key tenet of EO and 
therefore employee owners should have greater involvement in the running of 
their organisation over that of a traditional investor-led organisation. Control 
may or may not be enacted through voting but other mechanisms yet to be 
determined in the field. Do employee owners have equal influence or does it 
alter depending on the level of ownership?  Are voting rights linked to the 
amount of ownership or are they simply “one person, one vote”? 
 Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013, p13, 24) developed a theoretical 
framework showing varying depths of participation (reproduced below in table 
2.2). To what extent do the different ownership types encourage participation in 
the management and governance of the organisation? 
Level Depth of participation 
1 - No involvement A management style where 
members/employees are not invited to 
meetings or elected to management bodies to 
contribute to operational or strategic decision-
making. Typically, staff are not provided with 
any verbal or written guidance by managers 
and/or governors before decisions are made. 
2 - Passive involvement A management style where 
members/employees are provided with both 
written and verbal guidance by managers 
and/or governors, but are not invited or 
elected (individually or in groups) to contribute 
to operational or strategic decision-making. 
3 – Active Involvement A management style where 
members/employees (individually or in 
groups) have discussions about (pre-formed) 
management proposals, but are not invited or 
elected to participate in the formation of these 
proposals, or final decisions about their 
implementation. 
4 - Managed Participation A management style where 
members/employees (individually or in 
groups) can participate in the development of 
ideas, and where managers focus on 
coaching members/employees to develop 
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their ideas into proposals, and support them 
during implementation. Managers retain some 
powers to screen-out weak proposals. 
5 - Member-Driven 
Participation 
A management style where any 
member/employee (individually or in groups) 
can initiate discussions on operational or 
strategic issues, arrange and participate in 
meetings to develop proposals, and exercise 
both voice and voting power when decisions 
are made about implementation. 
Table 2.2 Depths of participation (Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013, p13 & p24)). 
 Greater involvement is not necessarily a good thing though. Hyman and 
Mason (1995) see empowerment as a form of employee involvement whereby 
employees are given individual job ownership with a view to improving the 
organisation. From their experience, empowerment is used where management 
layers have been removed and is therefore a form of work intensification. This 
can have two negative effects; additional stress from the responsibility without 
any extrinsic reward being given and secondly, being held responsible for any 
failures, rather than the deficiency of managerial support. 
 What information is made available and who and when can they access 
it? Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991) suggest that information access is a 
vital part of ownership and it would therefore be expected to be more available 
than in a non-EO organisation.  There may however be restrictions on what 
employee owners have access to and considerations on the timeliness of 
information. Within the John Lewis Partnership, employees can write to the 
chairman requesting information which has to be supplied or an acceptable 
explanation given for not doing so (John Lewis Partnership 2013a). Therefore it 
is expected that employee owners will have greater access to information than 
normal organisations and this will be reviewed in the field. 
2.2.4 Employee ownership summary 
The section above has provided a background to what employee ownership is; 
its different forms; where it came from and its current standing in the UK. This is 
the foundation to the research, which focuses exclusively on the three specific 
types of ownership (cooperative, direct and trust) and so is required in order to 
understand the rest of the investigation. The aim of the research is to 
understand how the ownership types influence culture, so attention is now 
turned to look at the literature on culture and its intersection with EO. 
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2.3 Organisational culture 
Watson (2001, p32) provides a sombre warning regarding the creation of 
cultures in society,  
“a process which involves power, violence and intimidation, in which 
regularly see some human groups winning out over others in the 
competition for scarce and valued resources, for power and for the 
freedom to define meaning for others.” 
How is culture created and maintained within EOBs? In this initial look at 
organisational culture, three theoretical models are described and reviewed; 
those of Schein (1992), Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2008) and Martin 
(2002). There are many more that could be selected (for example Deal and 
Kennedy (2000), Hatch (2010)) however these are selected as being significant 
signposts in the development of the topic and widely acknowledged by other 
authors (for example Ouchi and Wilkins (1985), Kahn (1990), Bratton (2010)) 
and each other). It is expected that during the findings chapters (5, 6, 7, 8 and 
9) a wider spread of literature will be brought to bear but for this inductive 
research only a limited amount will be considered initially. 
2.3.1 Schein’s model of culture 
Schein (1992, p12) defines the culture of a group as, 
 “A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it 
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that 
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems”.  
As such he sees it as being made up of three levels that move from surface and 
visible to deep and unobservable:  
• Artefacts • Espoused Beliefs and Values • Basic underlying Assumptions 
Schein (1992, p26) suggests that you can learn about culture through studying 
all three levels of culture however the "essence of a culture lies in the pattern of 
basic underlying assumptions" and it is only after grasping these that the other 
two levels can be appropriately understood. Artefacts are easy to observe but 
can also be misinterpreted when trying to understand the underlying 
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assumptions. This study is looking to uncover the underlying assumptions within 
the culture and how EO might influence those assumptions. 
 Looking specifically at worker coop culture Whyte and Whyte (1988, 
p270) provide a definition that is similar to Schein's, "the culture of a people is a 
system of widely shared beliefs and values and a set of characteristic 
behaviours used in organizing social processes". Caramelli and Briole (2007, 
p296) recognise the influential nature of values and the impact they have, 
hence the importance in selecting them, as far as is possible,  
“By setting the rule of what is good and bad, important and unimportant, 
etc., values are considered as the determinants of attitudes and 
behaviours in determinate situations. They are therefore likely to 
moderate the attitudinal and behavioural effects of management 
practices”. 
Within EO who determines the outwardly declared values? Is it management or 
are all employee owners involved in defining them? 
 In line with Schein’s understanding of teaching new recruits how to 
behave, Gibson et al (2006, p41) define socialization as “the process by which 
organizations bring new employees into the culture” and it is made up of three 
stages: anticipatory (both employer and employee finding out about each other 
prior to starting work); accommodation (what happens as the employee starts 
work) and role management (how the employee adapts to balance their life 
inside and outside of work as well as adapting to working alongside different 
departments). Each of these stages is relevant to the recruitment and 
performance of an employee owner and their adoption of the psychological 
element of ownership. 
2.3.2 Johnson et al. Cultural web 
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2008) build on Schein's understanding of 
culture and refer to the "organisational paradigm", by which they mean the "set 
of assumptions held in common and taken for granted in an organisation" this is 
in effect Schein's basic underlying assumptions.  As a way of being able to 
analyse an organisation's culture they proposed the "cultural web" (see figure 
2.1 below) which illustrates the "behavioural, physical and symbolic 
manifestations of culture". The different “petals” of the web provide useful 
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lenses through which to look at the culture of the EOBs and can help form 
questions to be asked during interviews. 
[ Figure removed for copyright reasons.] 
Figure 2.1 “Cultural web” (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 2008). 
Are there cultural symbols that relate to employee ownership? How is power 
distributed within the organisation? To what extent does EO affect it? Are the 
organisational structures altered by being EO? Is it more hierarchical or less 
or something completely different than would be expected? What control 
systems are used for monitoring and supporting members of the organisation, 
such as Key Results Areas (KRAs) and Key Performance indicators (KPIs) 
(Shields 2007)? How are they influenced by EO? Are there Rituals and 
Routines that relate to being EO? Are there Stories relating to EO that provide 
good examples of the culture; either heroes of the culture, villains (that 
demonstrate anti-culture), mavericks (who demonstrate a different way of doing 
something), successes (reinforcing the good) or failures (warnings against the 
bad)? 
2.3.3 Martin’s view of culture 
Martin (2002) lays a significant foundation for researching organisational culture 
both theoretically and practically. She identifies eleven different definitions of 
organisational culture, in addition to her own definition of culture,  
“patterns of interpretation composed of the meanings associated with 
various cultural manifestations, such as stories, rituals, formal and 
informal practices, jargon, and physical arrangements” (Martin 2002, 
p330).  
This multiplicity of definitions helps to explain some of the controversy and 
confusion surrounding the subject. 
 To help understand Martin’s definition it is important to recognise that 
patterns of interpretation are  
“collectively shared mindsets which are neither accidental estimations 
nor selective individual opinions. They are implicit and normative in that 
they guide human activities” (Fuchs 2013).  
Hence they are shared understandings of cultural indicators that are potentially 
accessible to anyone in the organisation if they are available and these then 
guide the actions of the actors involved. To be part of the culture the mindset 
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must be recognisable among more than just one person, if not, it is an opinion 
rather than a shared understanding. 
 Several of Martin’s listed definitions also emphasise the shared nature of 
culture amongst the participants. For example, Sathe (Martin 2002, p57) states,  
“Culture is the set of important understandings (often unstated) that 
members of a community share in common”. 
These understandings are interpretations of unwritten rules that exist socially, 
but have a physical manifestation and outworking. Davis (Martin 2002, p57) 
says  
“(Culture is) the pattern of shared beliefs and values that give members 
of an institution meaning, and provide them with the rules for behaviour 
in their organization”.  
However conflict and ambiguity can also form the culture. Mills (Martin 2002, 
p57) says,  
“Ideas and cultural arrangements confront actors as a series of rules and 
behaviour; rules that, in their contradiction, may variously be enacted, 
followed or resisted”.  
Different actors can interpret the rules independently, as well as having different 
motivations for choosing to follow or reject them. They can actively desire to be 
anti-cultural but in so doing there is recognition that there is still a culture with 
defining rules. 
 Martin (1992) proposes three different views for looking at organisational 
culture; Integration, Differentiation and Fragmentation5. The views all differ in 
the way that they consider “Orientation to consensus”; “Relation among 
manifestations” and “Orientation to ambiguity”. They are: 
• Integration – There is only one legitimate culture which is consistent 
across the whole organisation although this does not necessarily mean 
that it is accepted by everyone within the organisation but it has the 
consensus particularly amongst management. Consequently, those 
elements that are not accepted do not form part of the culture or 
alternatively the employees (“lower-level employees”) are not researched 
so that deviations from the norm are not identified. 
                                               
5
 These different views are clearly illustrated in the paper by Harris and Ogbonna (1998). 
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• Differentiation - culture is defined with sub-groupings of the whole which 
can either help, hinder or be independent of each other although Martin 
points out that this is not as simple as a collection of individual 
“Integrational” cultures as people will belong to many different sub-
cultures. • Fragmentation – “(where there is a) focus on ambiguity; complexity of 
relationships among manifestations and a multiplicity of interpretations 
that do not coalesce into a stable consensus” (Martin 1992, p130). 
Fragmentation is more akin to a postmodern view of organisations, a 
position Martin (1991) chose to explore further as her academic career 
has developed. 
 Martin (1992) uses each of these three views in turn to analyse an 
organisation that she researched to show how they illuminate different aspects 
of culture. She further points out that some papers written will use only one of 
the views. For example, Schein (1992) reflects on his time at DEC using an 
integration view; Van Maanen (1991) explores the different sub-cultures within 
employees of Disneyland and Hatch (1999) compares organisational structure 
to improvised jazz but her strong recommendation is that all three views should 
be used to give a better understanding.  
2.3.4 Critique of culture 
Schein’s (1992) integrationist view of culture is contested by many 
authors. Martin (1992, p165) considers that this view is a “relatively unlikely 
scenario (consistency, organization-wide consensus, the absence of 
ambiguity)”. Van Maanen and Barley (1985, p32) suggest that even though the 
expression “organisational culture” implies a single and unique culture, it is 
“difficult to justify empirically”. They expect sub-cultures to be “scattered 
throughout an organisation”, potentially based around function, gender, 
divisions and/or locations. Louis (1985) points out that a unique culture would 
necessarily be visible anywhere and therefore by talking to just one group of 
people, it will become revealed. Hence talking just to management would be 
sufficient, thereby ignoring the employees’ voices. She also questions whether 
a singular culture can be a determining force within an organisation.  
Van Maanen and Barley (1985) prefer the differentiated view, illustrated 
via a Venn diagram showing sub-cultures that at some points (in time, location, 
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people group, values) overlap. Any elements of a common culture would be 
where all the sub-cultures overlap, if that is possible. Therefore, they do not 
entirely rule out a unitary culture and suggest that it would require specific 
circumstances: where participants face the same issues; where everyone 
communicates with all other members (implying a smaller organisation); where 
participants agree on a set of behaviours and during a crisis. Alvesson (2002, 
p164) also discounts the integrationist view and prefers to recognise the 
differentiated view as well as giving tacit recognition to the role of ambiguity and 
hence the fragmented view. However, as he points out, if there is total 
ambiguity and fragmentation with no consensus, then there is in effect no 
culture either and there must be “some modest degree of shared meaning”. 
Martin and Siehl (1983, p52) take issue with the integrationist view, that 
of “unifying the diverse elements of an organisation” and that there can only be 
one culture per organisation which can be intentionally managed through 
actions. They also question the link between some cultures causing greater 
organisational performance and they assert that “the most that can be expected 
is that a manager can slightly modify the trajectory of a culture” (ibid 1983, p53). 
They prefer to acknowledge the existence of sub-cultures and countercultures 
that can help to define the boundary of a dominant culture. 
Schein (1994, p342) does not agree with Martin (1992) though, 
suggesting that the three views proposed by her are more dependent on the 
research method being used -  
“Integrationists are more ethnographic and clinical, while the 
differentationists and fragmentationists work more closely in the positivist 
quantitative and qualitative tradition.” 
I consider the fragmentation view is postmodern and therefore comes from a 
subjective ontological and epistemological position. Cleaveland (1994) concurs 
that by looking at all three views it enables a “blending of modern and 
postmodern perspectives”. Ybema (1997) and Ashkanasy (2003) also disagree, 
saying that that any cultural research that chooses to only use one perspective 
is not necessarily “flawed” but it will lack the three dimensions that Martin (1992) 
proposes “is both possible and desirable”. 
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McDonald and Foster (2013) apply the “cultural web” to each of Martin’s 
three perspectives. In the Integrationist view they suggest that it is helpful for 
creating a schema to describe a culture or for comparing two culture (past and 
present, present and future desired or two different organisations). The 
differentiated view will create multiple webs, reflecting different groupings within 
an organisation and they concluded that the web was suitable for handling 
conflicting opinions, unresolved issues and other ambiguities that are found in 
the fragmented view. 
Grey (2013) quotes Smircich saying that she sees that culture can be 
seen in one of two ways, either as a “critical variable” that can be managed or a 
“root metaphor”. In the first case organisations have cultures that can be 
managed (a manageralist view) or as Grey suggests manipulated. In the 
second case an organisation is a culture “spontaneous, unmanaged, just the 
way things are”, a symbolic view, which can include conflict, feminist and critical 
perspectives (Martin 2002, Bratton 2010). The purpose of this research is to 
understand the organisational culture of different types of EOBs, in that sense it 
is a culture.  
 Ybema (1997) explains that the dissent on views is partly due to the 
purpose of the research, be it either theoretical or pragmatic. The purpose of 
this research is to observe what cultures exist within EOBs and then attempt to 
provide suggestions for effective working within the sector for managers. Hence 
this is fundamentally a pragmatic stance using the integrationist lense. It 
acknowledges the differentiated and fragmented views but looks for the 
intersection within Van Maanen and Barley (1985) Venn diagram of consensus 
and hence depicts culture as a tool or variable of management that can be 
managed (Nord 1985). 
 Charlie Mayfield, the current chairman of the John Lewis Partnership, 
told the following story (Mayfield, Purnell and Davies 2012, p216):  
"I was speaking the other day to a woman who worked a shop that we 
acquired from a competitor. She said that with the old company, she 
came in to work on time, she did her hours and then she went home 
straightaway. Now she usually comes in early, she usually stays late, she 
gets involved in a whole lot of social activities around the shop, which we 
encourage, and I’m absolutely confident that she is contributing a lot 
more than she did before."  
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He mentions that employee owners have rights as well as responsibilities “to do 
their job better every day” (emphasis in the original) but are the responsibilities 
balanced or a form of management abuse? Grey (2013, p68) is scathing in his 
opinion of the abuse of value manipulation to achieve culture management,  
“Culture management imagines a world in which shared values are 
directed towards the goal of productivity, whether as quantity or quality. 
So, suddenly, the goal of freedom and empowerment envisaged by 
culture management takes on a new hue: these supposedly progressive 
goals are only on offer if the employees accept that their efforts must be 
directed towards the profitability of the company… And this is the thing 
about culture management. It is based upon the idea that cultural values 
are hierarchically defined - that is defined by senior managers or by head 
office.” 
 Watson (2006, p283) raises a similar ethical concern regarding 
manipulation, “given the considerable difference in power between corporate 
employers and individual employees”. Willmott (1993) too likens culture 
management to an Orwellian 1984, totalitarian state. The primary focus of his 
article is a review of the ideas raised in the book “In Search of Excellence” by 
Peters and Waterman6 (1982), in which “successful” organisations were 
studied, and from that it is suggested that creating a “strong culture” is 
beneficial. A strong culture being one where there is significant alignment 
between an employee’s held values and the corporate values, and hence the 
employee will exhibit organisational commitment and outperform organisations 
that do not have such a “strong” culture. Storey (2007) sees that within HRM, 
managing culture is “more important” than managing via procedures and 
systems in obtaining the discretionary effort that committed employees bring.  
 Clegg, Kornberger and Pitsis (2005) point out a potential pitfall of having 
a strong culture though, if the culture has blind spots that encourage employees 
to work unethically or take unacceptable risks. They cite the example of Barings 
bank, brought down by the actions of one person, when the pervading culture 
relied on expecting people to do the honourable thing rather than checking to 
see if they were. Kotter and Heskett (1992) also question whether strong culture 
leads to excellent performance, especially if the “cultural drummer” is heading in 
                                               
6
 Twenty years later Peters (2001) went on to discredit the reliability of his own work. 
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the wrong direction! Their research found that companies with a “weak” culture 
could still have strong performance. 
 Returning to Grey's (2013) quote above, is this still true for EOBs? Is 
profitability the only desire of the company and is it hierarchically defined by 
senior managers to the exclusion of rank and file employees? Is the profitable 
success of the organisation the only measure of success? EO can provide a 
voice into management to influence what the purpose of the organisation is. As 
mentioned, for Spedan Lewis (1948) in creating the John Lewis trust, the 
“happiness” of the employees was also highly regarded and the international 
cooperatives principles do not make profit making the highest priority (ICA 
2014). Therefore, for EOBs at least, there is worth in looking at how culture is 
managed, specifically using values in an organisation, since the employees are 
involved in defining the values and external shareholder profit is not the only 
measure of success. 
 Ridley-Duff’s (2010) research raises the issue of “culture mismatch”, 
where employees’ personal values are incongruent with those of the 
organisation. In extreme cases staff members were invited to leave with the 
benefit of a financial payment. To what extent do EOBs attempt to avoid cultural 
mismatch? Do the organisations actively look to recruit people who do have the 
“right” values or are they moulded into the company form? What happens to 
those that do not fit the organisation? 
 From his personal experience, Handy (2009) using an integrationist view, 
suggests four organisational cultures, which are: Club, Role, Task and 
Existential (shown below in table 2.3).  
Culture Description 
Club Based around the power of a central person (probably the 
founder) who all other employees are subordinate to. It is 
informal and enables quick decision making. 
Role Based around the definition of the role or the job to be done, 
and not around personalities. Classical, hierarchical 
structure, with an overarching management team, the 
predominant structure for large corporate organisations. 
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Task Based around networking and team work, people assembled 
together to complete a task and then disassembled, ready 
for the next task. 
Existential Based around experts who can work independently (for 
example a practice of lawyers) that has an administrative 
function that joins them together. Each person is powerful in 
their own sphere of influence but cannot override a 
colleague. 
Table 2.3  Handy's culture typology (2009). 
Using his typology, he suggests how different work practices will flourish or 
struggle depending on the culture that surrounds them. As he points out (Handy 
2009, p20) 
"It is important to realise that each of the cultures, or ways of running 
things, is good - for something. No culture, or mix of cultures, is bad or 
wrong in itself, only inappropriate to its circumstances." 
Inappropriate cultures lead to inefficient performance. Do the ownership types 
fall under any of Handy’s cultures? If so, is the culture benefitting the overall 
performance or is it in conflict with the employee owners?  
 Erdal (2011) discusses culture within EOBs and suggests that it takes a 
significant time for organisations that transfer into employee ownership to grasp 
the fundamental changes that have happened and for it to be expressed in the 
culture (Schein (1992) suggests it takes years for cultures to change). These 
include a reduction in intimidation plus a greater sense of equality and 
openness. Rothschild and Whitt (1986) suggest that within cooperatives there is 
a significant degree of cultural homogeneity. This can be based around 
nationality, educational background, political viewpoint, life experience or 
membership of a social movement. Is this still relevant, some thirty years later 
and does it apply to other types of EO? 
 Hence the first research question to be answered from this research is: 
Q1) What can we understand about culture in EOBs with regard to 
the different ownership types? 
 From what has been shown, a key part of ownership is the being able to 
share in the rewards of the organisation and hence how they are generated 
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through the performance of the employees. The next section looks specifically 
at the literature regarding performance and reward management. 
2.4 Performance and reward management 
Initially the idea of reviewing the whole scope of Human Resource Management 
(including learning and development, resource and talent planning, 
organisational design and development, service delivery, employee relations, 
employee engagement and performance and reward (CIPD 2016a)) and its 
interaction with employee ownership was considered. However, this was quickly 
considered to be too vast a topic for a single thesis, so the area was narrowed 
down to provide a viable piece of research. From the breadth of HR, the topics 
of performance and reward management were selected. 
 Reward management was identified as a key component primarily due to 
the link between EO and the opportunity to gain intrinsically and extrinsically 
through being an employee owner. EO recognises that employees have a right 
to gain from the capital of the organisation, which is not always the case in 
traditional investor-led or charitable organisations, so is likely to influence the 
culture in a specific way (BIS 2013). The CIPD (2015a) also recognise its 
importance,  
"Reward has always had an important role in attracting and retaining 
employees, securing their engagement and enhancing their performance 
– hence its central place in any HR strategy.”  
In addition, culture is expressed through the way people are rewarded; be it 
generously, holistically, miserly, financially or in a multitude of ways, so can be 
seen as an expression of the culture, hence studying reward will help to 
illuminate that culture. 
 Storey (1989, p7) identifies the human resource management cycle; this 
shows a link from performance to appraisal and then on to both reward and 
development, which both in turn feedback to performance7. Hence reward and 
performance are directly linked. Armstrong (2015) makes a connection between 
culture and performance and therefore the way that employees behave (see for 
example Davis’s definition of culture mentioned previously (Martin 2002, p57)). 
                                               
7
 More recent authors (for example Shields (2007)) include development as a specific form of 
reward which is not apparent from Storey’s diagram. 
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Bach (2005) also sees performance management as a vehicle through which 
culture can be influenced. Co-ownership has the potential to alter the behaviour 
of employees who have a personal interest in the well-being of the organisation.  
 Hence performance and reward management were selected as the 
vehicles through which culture would be studied. In addition, the annual CIPD 
(2013) Outlook survey report suggests, “In terms of HR priorities, managing 
performance is currently a strong area of focus for the majority of HR 
departments” hence it is also a timely topic to review. 
2.4.1 Performance management 
It is important to be clear about what performance management is regarding 
this study. Performance is taken to mean the performance of the individual 
employee and not the performance of the organisation as a whole. Therefore, in 
this case the profit (or loss) of an organisation is not a measure of success. 
Instead, performance is both the outcome and behaviour of the individual 
(Armstrong 2015). High achievement outcomes with poor behaviour were a fruit 
of Management by Objectives (Ford 1979) leading to moral bankruptcy (for 
example see the collapse of Enron by Finchman and Rhodes (2005)). 
Conversely poor achievement with great behaviour makes for a high-quality 
customer experience but poor sales figures. Hence both are valued in the field 
of HR. 
 Armstrong (2015, p9) provides a useful starting point to understanding 
performance management, he says it is 
"the continuous process of improving performance by setting individual 
and team goals which are aligned to the strategic goals of the 
organization, planning performance to achieve the goals, reviewing and 
assessing progress, and developing the knowledge, skills and abilities of 
people."  
Hence his definition is more expansive than simple doing tasks and then trying 
to do them better in the future. It takes a holistic view of the organisation and its 
employees, working together towards strategic goals and recognising the 
centrality of people within the organisation. The CIPD (2014b, p16) Employee 
Outlook survey suggest though that organisations’ performance management 
systems do not necessarily incentivise individual’s performance, with only 22% 
of employees saying they are effective or very effective and 38% describing 
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them as ineffective or very ineffective. However, many organisations see 
performance management as a facilitator for cultural change by being able to 
define core competencies and then evaluate employees’ abilities against them 
(Bach 2005). 
Armstrong’s definition does not mention who defines the goals, or how it 
is done and to whose benefit the goals are in favour, management, workers, 
shareholders or even clients? Legge (1978) points out, the interests of 
managers and workers are different and hence their goals will be. Townley 
(1993) suggests that the overriding purpose of performance management, is the 
control of workers which Bach (2005, p305) elaborates, seeing it  
“as part of a more sinister management regime to control all aspects of 
employee behaviour and eliminate scope for resistance." 
Is this the same for co-owners? 
Boxall and Purcell (2010, p40) explain that “employers pursue a mix of 
both economic and socio-political goals which are subject to strategic tensions”. 
Hence it is important to ensure a financially viable organisation as well as one 
that is compatible with the surrounding society and its laws. Legge (1989) refers 
to “tough love”, which recognises that people are the most important resource in 
an organisation and their needs should be acknowledged but if the firm goes 
bust, then it will cause even more harm to the people and the connected 
community. What relevance do the social aspects of work and the dignity of 
work have and are they enhanced within EO? McLeod (2009, p73) quoting 
Pope John XXIII said  
“Justice is to be observed not only in the distribution of wealth, but also in 
regard to the conditions in which men are engaged in producing this 
wealth. Every man has, of his very nature, a need to perfect his own 
being. Consequently, if the whole structure and organization of an 
economic system is such as to compromise human dignity, to lessen a 
man's sense of responsibility or rob him of opportunity for exercising 
personal initiative, then such a system, we maintain, is altogether unjust - 
no matter how much wealth it produces, or how justly and equitably such 
wealth is distributed." 
 Armstrong (2015) does highlight the joined up approach of connecting 
individuals to teams to the organisation (see also Shields 2007); that none of 
the elements are independent of the others although they may not all be acting 
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in harmony. Does EO have a bearing on the management structures of the 
organisation and is it different in each of the ownership types? 
 Armstrong (2015) continues, the relationship between the employee and 
their manager is important and it is not just the process that matters - a 
performance management system "with the most academically correct 
competencies or performance measures may fail if it does not fit with the 
company's culture or workforce" (Stoskopf 2002). The trust levels with a line 
manager may determine how honest an employee is when providing a self-
assessment of their performance (Bach 2005). Does EO alter the relationship 
between an employee and their manager and therefore how they are managed?  
 Performance appraisals are a recognised tool within performance 
management (Armstrong 2015). Townley (1997, p267) identifies two specific 
forms, judgemental and developmental. Judgemental emphasises a centrally 
coordinated system, used for resource allocation as well as punishment and 
reward, this can however, limit its effectiveness as employees may choose what 
to accentuate or not to reveal instead. Developmental appraisals seek "to 
identify individual strengths and weaknesses and develop skills and abilities" 
with the aim to breakdown the relationship with punishment or reward so that a 
more trusting relationship is formed allowing a free flow of information. 
However, Townley (1993) suggests that the appraisal is a form of management 
control and one of the “techniques used by employers to elicit commitment and 
at the same time to exercise detailed control over employee behaviour” (Bach 
2005, p290). 
 McGregor (1960) saw appraisals as a “judgemental and demotivating 
process”. They can be used to provide a rating for an employee, that feeds into 
reward or to identify the poorest performers who are then subsequently 
“yanked” from the company. Managers can feel uncomfortable in giving a low 
rating, in order to avoid conflict or thereby acknowledging their poor 
performance as a manager in supporting the employee. This can lead 
managers into over inflating the rating (Bach 2005). From her research Lee 
(2002) identified that performance appraisals provided an opportunity for 
bullying in the workplace by deliberately giving an unsatisfactory rating. 
Typically, in an appraisal there is no third person (which can be the case in a 
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selection interview) which provides more scope for abuse (Bach 2005). How do 
the different types of EO use appraisals and does the ownership type influence 
it? 
 Some organisations choose to use “360 feedback” to improve the quality 
of the feedback and reduce bias from just one person. This can lead to 
information overload though and make the administrative task harder. A 
significant proportion of employers (45%) felt that direct reports felt threatened 
whilst taking part and were therefore unable to provide honest answers (Bach 
2005) hence the quality may not be as good as hoped for. This option would 
work best in a high trust environment, where fear was not so prevalent.  
 McCloy, Campbell and Cudeck (1994, p494) hypothesise that 
performance is a function of three components, 
 “to perform a task, a person must (a) possess the prerequisite 
knowledge, (b) master the prerequisite skills, and then (c) actually 
choose to work on the job tasks, for some period of time at some level of 
effort”. 
Hence motivation to carry out the task is a key aspect. Does EO motivate 
employees? Klein (1987, p320) provides three theoretical models of the 
psychological effect of employee ownership regarding job satisfaction and 
commitment which in turn have a bearing on performance. These are: the 
intrinsic satisfaction model, whereby employee owners will be more satisfied 
and committed just because they are owners; the instrumental satisfaction 
model, whereby “employee ownership increases employee influence in 
company decision making which in tum increases employee commitment”; and 
the extrinsic satisfaction model whereby commitment is increased if employees 
receive a financial reward from their ownership. Her research found that only 
the instrumental and extrinsic model were relevant; the greatest influence on 
commitment came from being involved with decision making and to a lesser 
extent, the financial rewards obtained. This research was subsequently 
repeated by Buchko (1992) with the same results; simply making employees 
into owners was not enough, they needed to be involved with running the 
organisation and receiving financially from its gain to be satisfied and 
committed. 
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 Pierce and Rodgers (2004, p601) argue that “individual’s possessions 
are commonly interwoven into the self-concept” and as such EO directly feeds 
into an employee’s self-esteem as they own part of the organisation, leading to 
“organisation based self-esteem”. As such they see EO as an effective 
communication, which leads to greater motivation. They propose, that 
employees have a desire to maintain (or enhance) their self-esteem, hence they 
are motivated to perform for the organisation, leading to greater self-esteem, 
creating an upward cycle of greater performance. Grey (2013, p79) sees this as 
cultural manipulation though, taking advantage of a powerful relationship for the 
good of the organisation and therefore abusive, “culture, like all these other 
examples, is crucially concerned with the promotion of self-managing, self-
disciplined individuals.” (See section 2.3 for further discussion of this.) 
 Rothschild and Whitt (1986, p158) suggest that cooperatives “self-select” 
members, attracting  
“idealists, people who demand a strong sense of purpose from their 
work. Such people are probably also more prone to guilt than most. This 
disposes them to overburden themselves with extra responsibilities and 
tasks.” 
This leads to a virtuous circle of hard work and less voluntary absences, leading 
to reduced turnover which requires less supervision, thus increasing labour 
productivity. But at what cost? Does this lead to exhaustion for members? The 
alternative is the “free-rider” problem where there are “people who don’t carry 
their weight” (ibid, p112). How is this managed within an EOB? 
 Herzberg's (1968a, 1968b) theory of motivation-hygiene explains how 
different elements of job enrichment (achievement, recognition, work itself, 
responsibility, advancement and personal growth) can lead to greater job 
satisfaction and help to motivate people rather than move them (he sees that 
motivation repeatedly comes from within the employee and movement requires 
repeated external intervention by management). Similarly, hygiene factors, if not 
handled correctly, lead to dissatisfaction which is not the opposite of 
satisfaction; these are: company policy and administration, supervision, 
relationships with supervisor, peer and subordinates, salary, personal life, 
status and security. How does EO rate against these different aspects? Does it 
encourage the motivators as well as satisfying the hygiene factors? 
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 Looking specifically for literature that combines employee ownership and 
personal performance management, there is a lack. Most literature is based on 
the EO experience (primarily ESOPs) within America, with very little from the 
United Kingdom. When searching for performance, the articles returned 
concerned organisational performance rather than an individual's personal 
performance management. Hence this thesis will provide a contribution to 
knowledge in that area. Appendix 1 gives details of the literature review carried 
out and the lack of results obtained. 
 To summarise, performance management is used to enhance 
individuals’ performance leading to greater organisational effectiveness, 
although this is in no way guaranteed. Frequently objectives are set to define 
the behaviours and outcomes desired; this can be used to bring about cultural 
change by rewarding employees that are aligned to the organisational values 
and removing those that are opposed (Bach 2005). Performance management 
can therefore be a form of management control, imposed on workers (Townley 
1993). Performance appraisals can be used to determine performance levels 
(providing a comparative rating across the organisation) or for development 
purposes or both (Townley 1997). They are subjective in nature and potentially 
provide a back door for workplace bullying to take place (Lee 2002). Collective 
feedback can be given to provide a more complete picture of an employee but 
this requires high levels of trust, otherwise employees can fill threatened to 
participate (Bach 2005). Thus, performance management hinges on “who” 
determines “what” behaviours/outcomes are required and “how” it can 
effectively be measured (Armstrong 2015). How does EO fit into these 
parameters and for whose benefit? 
This section has reviewed the limited existing literature about EO and 
personal performance; this will be used as pre-understanding for this inductive 
study. As performance and reward are inextricably linked attention is now 
turned to the literature on reward management. 
2.4.2 Reward management 
Armstrong (2012, p6) defines reward management as dealing with the 
 “strategies, policies and processes required to ensure that the value of 
people and the contribution they make to achieving organizational, 
departmental and team goals is recognized and rewarded.”  
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A key input in to this is the reward philosophy which is the set of values and 
beliefs that influence the reward strategy and therefore, according to Schein 
(1992), make up part of the organisational culture. Hence this will be company 
specific although there is significant scope for overlap between organisations 
with broadly similar values. 
 The three main aims of reward management from a management 
perspective are to attract the right staff to the organisation; motivate them to 
work and retain them in the organisation. The outcomes of the reward system 
(Armstrong 2012, p10) are then: 
• Performance • To define/Influence behaviour • Attraction and retention • Motivation and engagement • To add value 
Hence reward and performance are linked (Kessler (2005) refers to the “effort-
reward bargain”) as reward provides the mechanism to acknowledge 
achievement, competence and merit. It can be a motivating factor and lead to 
greater engagement with the aim of creating a high-performance culture where 
"the achievement of high levels of performance is a way of life" (Armstrong 
2012, p50).  
 Employee ownership in a for-profit organisation should lead to a share in 
the profits but rewards are not limited just to financial pay-outs (for example 
salary, bonuses, pension and share dividend). Non-financial rewards may also 
be important and these can take the form of both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
(Armstrong 2012). Shields (2007) lists extrinsic rewards as financial, 
developmental and social. For intrinsic rewards, he suggests job challenge, 
responsibility, autonomy and task variety. Are these implemented distinctly 
within the different EO types? 
 Having a “desirable job”, one where employees want to work, is a form of 
reward. Greene (2014, p7) lists the five components of the “job characteristics 
index” which are “(1) task identity, (2) task variety, (3) task significance, (4) 
autonomy and (5) feedback.” Kessler (2005) notes the link between reward and 
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the job (what is involved), the person (skills, knowledge, experience) and the 
performance (how well it is done). Rewards should also balance internally and 
externally. That is, are comparable jobs internally paid the same and how do 
pay rates compare to the external market? If they are set to low in relation to the 
external market then, there may be issues recruiting new employees and 
“organisations cannot survive” (Kessler 2001). Internal comparisons also 
matter; there was an 18% pay gap between male and female full time workers 
in the UK (Kessler 2005). Do employee owners, with the right to a voice, have 
any control over creating roles that are desirable and enjoyable whilst still 
maintaining a viable business? Does EO influence pay equality? 
 Kaplan (2005) suggests employers should consider the “total reward” 
concept which includes everything that an employee values. It is made of up of 
four elements; Compensation (pay, bonuses), Benefits (pension, health cover, 
child care, gym), Development (learning, personal growth, new skills) and the 
Work Environment (job design, flexible working, work/life balance). Increased 
flexibility of reward also brings an increased administrative burden which may 
make total rewards unaffordable for smaller organisations (Kessler 2005). With 
employee owners having a voice with influence in their organisation, to what 
extent do they benefit from a total rewards perspective? Can they be involved in 
prescribing what rewards are available or what wage levels are set at? Being an 
owner should provide additional financial compensation but how much more? Is 
it significant? Do the different forms of EO give a different weighting to the 
elements of reward? Pérotin and Robinson (2002) point out that creating and 
maintaining some form of profit sharing scheme does come at a financial cost 
which needs to be considered as part of the overall viability of ownership. 
 Aubert et al. (2014) see that EO can be a double-edged sword. It can be 
used to improve overall company performance and enhance the satisfaction of 
employees or as a way of entrenching, potentially poor, management - denying 
external investors the ability to purchase the organisation and then removing 
the management. As such they see the rewards of EO being given out 
ultimately for managements benefit. Spedan Lewis was philanthropic when he 
gave his company to its employees, although he recognised and encouraged 
the improved performance of the staff (Lewis 1948). How does the reason for 
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creating the EOB impact on its culture? Reward can also directly impact on 
culture, as Trevor (2011, p147) points out 
“Pay is also a powerful tool for communicating what is valued by senior 
management to employees and serves to promote a sense of shared 
culture that is valued by line management and employees.” 
Note though that in this quote it is the senior managers that determine the 
values, allowing for the control of workers but Kessler (2001, p219) agrees that 
pay can “send very strong messages about corporate values, beliefs and 
principles.” 
Kuvaas (2003) highlights a key difference between the reward employee 
owners receive from a profit-sharing scheme (i.e. trust or co-operative) and a 
share dividend (i.e. direct) scheme with accompanying increase in share value. 
Profit-sharing reflects recent, past performance (perhaps over the previous 
year) whereas direct share ownership reflects the organisation’s “long-term 
performance” and therefore comes with greater risk. He suggests that this helps 
in 
“reducing any feelings of ‘‘them and us’’ and creating a sense of shared 
goals, of one’s own fate being tied to that of the organization.” (Kuvaas 
2003, p198). 
 Similarly, Renaud, St-Ogne and Magnan (2004) and Milkovich and 
Newman (2002) both question the benefit of the direct ownership model 
whereby employees look to cash in their shares at some distant point. How can 
the effort of an employee today be related to the final price? So the incentive 
value becomes complex, uncontrollable and unclear. However, they suggest 
that  
“ESOPs foster employee willingness to participate in the decision-making 
process. And a company that takes advantage of that willingness can 
harness a considerable resource—the creative energy of its workforce” 
(Milkovich and Newman 2002, p336). 
It is this desire to participate that makes the difference to the organisation’s 
performance which then potentially feeds through into the final share price. 
Pendleton (2006) is in agreement with this view; although the potential incentive 
of a distant reward may be limited, it helps employees to think long-term and be 
more cooperative than if they were paid purely on individual performance. 
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Writing later though, Pendleton and Robinson (2011, p443), still question this 
perspective, 
“However, linking pay to performance via share plans is probably not the 
most effective way of providing direct incentives because of free-riding, 
the potential for noise and a lengthy ‘line of sight’ between employee 
effort and corporate outcomes”. 
Specifically looking at cooperatives (in the USA), Rothschild and Whitt 
(1986) found from their research in the 1970s that incentives did not necessarily 
follow the bureaucratic norm. Cooperatives relied more upon a shared purpose 
and friendship ties and less on financial rewards, even to the extent of working 
for no pay if there were insufficient funds. Cooperatives were seen by young 
employees as a place to gain critical work experience to obtain a foothold on 
the career ladder of a traditional organisation. Wage differentials were often 
limited and status distinctions minimised by utilising task sharing, job rotation, 
informal relations, dress and collaborative decision making.  
 Within cooperatives, Davis (2004) suggests that individual performance 
related pay, is a threat to their solidarity, however the pay is collectively 
determined which may in fact lead to equal pay for members. Rothschild and 
Whitt (1986, p99) provide an illustration of this where members received the 
same pay so that highly skilled members were receiving 18-25% of a 
comparable external pay rate whilst secretaries were receiving 83-100% of a 
comparable external rate. Therefore, there must be other aspects of working in 
a cooperative that compensate for the reduced financial rewards. What effect 
does EO have on pay dispersion? How do the rewards of EO motivate 
employees or alter their perspective of the organisation? How does this affect 
the culture?  
Armstrong (2012) lists intrinsic rewards as one of four enablers of 
employee engagement, so what intrinsic rewards does EO give to the 
employee? Other forms of organisation can also use collective pay 
arrangements, for example team pay or group level pay. Kessler (2001) gives 
an example of a national building society that paid employees a bonus 
dependent on the success of their branch but overall, team pay has a low take 
up with less than 20% of organisations involved (Kessler 2005). Pérotin and 
Robinson (2002, p14) suggest that reward related to collective performance 
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(profit sharing or dividend payments) encourages cooperation and enables 
“intangible forms of commitment like ‘company spirit’”. Also, that the democratic 
governance within EOBs promotes economic democracy within society leading 
to greater social justice. This can resonate with employee’s personal values 
leading to personal congruence with their work. Spedan Lewis (1954, p28) saw 
the potential of 
“a society far healthier and for almost everyone far happier if the national 
income was divided very much less unequally.” 
In this case the rewards of the organisation spread out further than the direct 
participants as was observed by Erdal (2011) in Italy. 
Kurtulus, Kruse and Blasi (2011) consider rewards that are dependent on 
overall organisational performance, so applicable to all the forms of EO. They 
point out that this can lead to the free rider problem, so employees have a 
choice to not cooperate or it may encourage cooperation along with monitoring 
of colleagues, rather than leaving it to the management. Therefore, they see the 
relationship between co-workers as being key in the effectiveness of EO and 
their attitude towards cooperation with regard to shared rewards. This also 
extends to trust with the management; that they will be effective in managing as 
well as fair in distributing the rewards of the organisation. EO changes the 
dynamics of the manager/worker relationship by providing a level of influence 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991) so does this enable a sufficient level of 
trust to occur? 
 Sobering, Thomas and Williams (2014) looked at gender equality within 
worker-owned businesses (primarily in the USA) to understand how ownership 
influenced reward. They concluded that inequalities could still exist within EOBs 
however not for ownership reasons but due to historical factors. The difference 
was either the same as non-owned organisations or more equal but not worse. 
They did find examples where there was no inequality, for example the Worker 
Reclaimed Companies in Argentina (Ozarow and Croucher 2014) and more 
feminist worker co-ops that were specifically set up with equality in mind.  
 With the rapid demise of collective bargaining facilitated by trade unions 
over recent years (there was a 50% drop in union involvement between 1984 
and 1989 alone) there has been a significant move to pay being specified by 
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managers (Lindop 2009). Individual performance related pay can reward 
employees for a specific contribution leading to greater commitment, but limited 
research shows that for most employees it creates no change in commitment 
(Kessler 2001). Similarly, Trevor’s (2011) research found that although pay 
systems are designed to bring about strategic outcomes (for example increased 
discretionary effort and performance) at an operational level he concluded that 
“Pay is non-strategic”. As Pendleton (2000, p346) points out, it is easy to 
overlook whether “the potential to secure additional rewards is important to the 
employee”. If not, then the reward is unlikely to influence performance. Does 
EO influence how pay is determined? 
 Again, turning specifically to the literature that combines employee 
ownership and reward management, having performed a systematic search 
using terms such as “Employee ownership” or “cooperative” with “reward”, there 
is also a lack of it (Wright 2010, Kurtulus, Kruse and Blasi 2011, Sobering, 
Thomas and Williams 2014), hence this thesis will provide a contribution to 
knowledge in the reward area too. Details of the results of a systematic search 
are shown in appendix 1. 
To summarise, reward is used to attract and retain desirable employees 
and encourage them to perform but reward is much more than just pay. It can 
take many forms, intrinsic and extrinsic, as well as individual and collective and 
can include options like benefits, development opportunities, flexibility, 
additional leave and increased responsibility, all coming together in the form of 
a Total Reward. Equality of pay, across jobs and genders, is an issue and 
hence exactly how pay is determined for an individual can be contentious. 
Reward is a cultural change enabler, by rewarding what is good and 
discouraging the bad, although its effectiveness is questioned. 
 Hence the second question to be determined from this research is: 
Q2) What cultures of performance and reward are observed in EOBs 
within the different ownership types? 
2.5 Combined literature 
Following a systematic review of potential literature (see appendix 1), it is 
apparent that there is a lack of literature on the intersection of the three areas of 
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organisational culture, performance and reward management associated with 
EO. This is also recognised by the few authors that do cover the area. For 
example, in response to the banking crisis, Wright (2010) investigates the 
relationship between reward and organisational culture. She acknowledged a 
“substantial gap” in the literature and suggests further research should be done. 
Similarly as Caramellie and Briole (2007) agree “The theoretical propositions 
presented in this paper are exploratory in nature since there are virtually no past 
studies of the cross-cultural attitudinal effects of employee ownership.” One 
potential reason for the lack of literature could be that the field has no relevance 
and is therefore not worth researching, however as has already been shown the 
EO sector is growing in significance and this research will create new 
knowledge in this area. The omission of EO from relevant literature is 
significant. Articles (for example Trevor (2011), Sisson (2007)) frequently do not 
mention EO and the impact that it might have within HRM. A good example is 
Legge’s (2001) article in search of the “Holy grail” of HRM, finding a link 
between HRM practices and high performance. At no point, does she consider 
the influence EO could have on practices and the resulting performance. 
Therefore, the results of this research will be a key contribution to knowledge.  
 A significant purpose of this research is to help equip employees 
regarding the HR function within EO, therefore the third and final question to be 
determined due to the current lack of research is: 
Q3) What guidance can be given concerning HR practices with 
regard to cultures of performance and reward in EOBs in general 
and individual ownership types?   
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a theoretical understanding of the key components 
in this research, namely employee ownership, organisational culture and 
performance and reward management. It has explained the relevance of EO to 
the UK economy and society in general and then looked at the intersection of it 
with each element (culture, performance and reward) in turn. From it, the lack of 
combined literature has been highlighted. This neglected area paves the way 
for the following research to add to this limited area. A manageralist approach 
for the research has been proposed. The limitations of this are recognised 
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however it fits the purposes of the research in answering the following 
questions: 
Q1) What can we understand about culture in EOBs with regard to 
the different ownership types?  
Q2) What cultures of performance and reward are observed in EOBs 
within the different ownership types? 
Q3) What guidance can be given concerning HR practices with 
regard to cultures of performance and reward in EOBs in general 
and individual ownership types?  
The next chapter considers the research methods required to be undertaken to 
answer these questions. 
  
 67 
 
Chapter 3 - Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction. 
This chapter explains the research methodology chosen and makes 
justifications as for its appropriateness to be able to attempt to answer the 
questions previously posed. Inherent in the choice of methodology are 
philosophical stances regarding ontology and epistemology and specifically my 
personal understanding of them which have a direct bearing on the 
methodology (Johnson and Duberley 2000). This is followed by a detailed 
explanation of the actual methods used as well as a review of timescales, risks, 
ethics, limitations and how the research might be evaluated. Finally, there are 
some thoughts as to how the results are communicated to the reader along with 
an explanation of the notation used throughout the rest of the thesis. 
3.2 Research philosophy 
Gill and Johnson (2010, p6) argue that a methodology should not be selected 
just from looking at the research question and the area under investigation in 
isolation but by considering the philosophical commitment of the researcher too,  
"research methods … are not merely neutral devices or techniques that 
we can 'take off the shelf' to undertake a particular task for which they 
are most suited. Such a perspective implies that it is the nature of the 
research question, and what phenomenon is under investigation, which 
should pragmatically dictate the correct research method …. different 
research methods available to the management researcher also bring 
with them a great deal of philosophical baggage".  
They go on to say that a researcher's pre-understanding must be brought out 
into the open by revealing what they think about ontology (the nature of being), 
epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and axiology (the study of values) 
(Gaarder 1995). Morgan and Smircich (1980, p491) agree that underlying 
assumptions need to be included in the choice of research methodology,  
"the choice and adequacy of a method embodies a variety of 
assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge and the methods 
through which that knowledge can be obtained, as well as a set of root 
assumptions about the nature of the phenomena to be investigated." 
They discuss a subjective/objective continuum approach to research which has 
a direct bearing on the understanding of what is being researched and therefore 
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how it can be researched, although some methods are more suitable at different 
points of the continuum. Without this prior thinking, as Johnson and Duberley 
(2003) point out, decisions will be made “usually by default”. 
 Cunliffe (2010) responds to Morgan and Smircich (1980) by pointing out 
specifically that organisational culture can be studied from an objectivist or 
subjectivist position depending on the researcher's understanding of culture. 
Indeed, Hofstede (2001) has operationalised organisational culture into 4 
dimensions (Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism and 
Masculinity) although his methodology has subsequently been challenged on a 
number of fronts (for example choosing one organisation to represent an entire 
country, putting the Netherlands and Belgium together shows a lack of 
granularity and could be offensive to either nation). These issues have been 
addressed in his more recent work and the number of dimensions has 
increased to six (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010). Also, Ouchi and Wilkins 
(1985) suggest that the way in which culture is studied (holistically, via language 
or quantitatively) will also affect the methodology. 
 Advocates of positivism assert that there is a real world that is separate 
from the researcher which can be viewed from a neutral (objective) viewpoint. 
This is an "etic" stance where the observer is outside and distant from the 
object being observed. It usually favours a deductive approach to prove causal 
theories via quantitative methods (Johnson and Duberley 2000) although it is 
not exclusively deductive. Typical methods are questionnaires using Likert 
scales (May 2001) and laboratory experiments often using large data-sets and 
statistical analysis. Key questions to do with positivistic methods are the 
reliability (can it be repeated?), validity (does it measure what it sets out to 
measure?) and generalisability (how representative is the sample?). It is still the 
dominant philosophical position, particularly regarding getting academic papers 
published (Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998, Johnson et al. 2006, Gill and Johnson 
2010). 
 Based on Alvesson and Deetz, Clark (2014, p111) explains that neo-
empiricism refers to "methodologies that assume the possibility of unbiased and 
objective collection of qualitative empirical data the analysis of which is capable 
of ensuring objective truth in a correspondence sense".  Alvesson and Deetz 
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(2000) continue to say that it "simultaneously reject falsification in favour of 
induction”. They therefore share a positivistic view of an objective ontology 
however it differs from a purely positivistic stance in that the actors (those being 
observed) subjectively interpret what they see depending on their personal 
understanding - they are not blindly led by cause and effect like automatons. 
Johnson and Duberley (2000, p35) explain it well, 
“the observers’ registered observations are epistemologically privileged 
as they are construed as being independent of the processes of the 
observer observing. Therefore it is claimed that ‘truth’ is to be found in 
the observers’ passive sensory registration of the facts that constitute 
external reality through the application of a neutral observational 
language. Thus the veracity of accounts may be adjudicated through 
reference to their correspondence with the facts of a cognitively 
accessible external social world.” 
 Thus a neo-empiricist view relies on a correspondence theory of truth; 
that is when a proposition is compared to see if corresponds with “the way the 
world is” (Mingers 2008, p66). There is also an underlying assumption that the 
protocols devised by the researcher during data collection and analysis propel 
them towards an objective evaluation as well as in the integrity of the 
researcher (Lincoln and Guba 1994). 
 Research can either be deductive (trying to prove or falsify a hypothesis) 
or inductive (looking to create themes or theories). Hence inductive research 
can be followed by deductive to verify any theories that have been suggested. 
With the lack of current literature acknowledged previously and a desire to 
simply see what culture looks like within EOBs, this research is inductive, that 
is, it is looking to understand what is there and generate themes from the data 
(Gill and Johnson 2010). 
 Martin (2002) highlights two distinct branches of organisational culture 
research.  Research for managers is aimed at understanding culture to be able 
to inform management practice to change it for organisational benefit. Research 
for academics is where the emphasis is to understand and explain. A 
managerial orientation clearly serves the best interest of management, except 
in the case of critical management research which is more likely to be 
emancipatory for the workforce (Grey 2004). EO can already be seen to be 
emancipatory as a key tenet of it is an element of information and power 
sharing. Therefore the key critical act of empowering workers has already 
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happened. The primary purpose of this research is to simply “see what is there” 
rather than having an “ambition to stir things up, to challenge the ongoing 
reproduction of modes of social ordering evaluated to constrain human 
possibilities” which is the ambition of Critical Research (Alversson and Deetz 
2000, p208). Similarly for the purpose of this thesis organisational culture is 
seen as something real that produces tangible observable social practices that 
concretely affect the subjectivities of culture members. Hence the ontology of 
culture is objective rather than subjective.  
 To summarise, this research adopts a neo-empiricist perspective so that, 
according to Clark (2014, p113), 
“the ‘qualitative’ descriptions are not contaminated by the researcher 
who, as in mainstream positivist research, remains separate from the 
‘objects’ of research so as to produce neutral findings”.  
It utilises qualitative methods to inductively build themes from what is 
empirically observed of an actor’s subjective realm rather than deductively 
trying to establish a cause or law (neo-positivism) (Johnson and Clark 2006). It 
assumes an objective ontology, that there is a real world out there that can be 
observed empirically and that the researcher will follow research protocols that 
propel them towards neutrality and impartial evaluation of evidence is passive 
and neutral, separated from the actors’ “inter-subjective cultural experiences” 
(Johnson et al. 2006). It relies on a correspondence theory of truth (Mingers 
2008). 
3.3 Research strategy 
The research strategy must be in alignment with the research questions in order 
to be able to contribute relevant answers. The questions are: 
Q1) What can we understand about culture in EOBs with regard to 
the different ownership types?  
Q2) What cultures of performance and reward are observed in EOBs 
within the different ownership types? 
Q3) What guidance can be given concerning HR practices with 
regard to cultures of performance and reward in EOBs in general 
and individual ownership types?   
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 The research starts with open ended questions, seeking to understand 
what cultures and reward/performance management is there rather than to 
verify a hypothesis. Hence the research is inductive rather than deductive 
(Johnson and Duberley 2000). It looks at EO across the three different 
ownership types of cooperative, direct and trust owned. 
3.4 Research method 
The fieldwork was planned to be done in two distinct, sequential phases: 
• Phase 1 - was designed to provide an introduction to current 
performance and reward management methods utilised by a variety of 
EOBs of different ownership types in order to scope and inform the 
second phase. It also looked at the culture of those organisations. • Phase 2 - was designed to be an in-depth study of a much smaller 
number of EOBs' culture regarding possible interaction between 
performance management and reward management and organisational 
culture. This phase was considered to be the more significant of the two 
phases as it looked in greater depth at each of the ownership types in 
turn. 
The research design for each phase will now be explained in turn. 
3.4.1 Phase 1 - Scoping the landscape. 
The purpose of this first phase was to supplement the scant existing literature 
with experience from the real world. This enabled me to immerse myself in the 
language and thoughts of employee owners as well as start to understand the 
situations and challenges that they engaged with in business currently. Using 
this understanding enabled me to be able to communicate more effectively 
when it came to the Phase 2 and not simply have an academic view of the 
business world that EOBs are facing8. It also provided a more current 
understanding than academic literature can keep up to date with. 
 It had been considered whether to use an electronic email survey sent 
out to all the HR representatives of EOBs as an alternative to interviews 
                                               
8
 During a conversation with Iain Hasdell, Chief Executive of the Employee Owners Association 
– 11/01/13, he pointed out that the term "Human Resources" would be seen as offensive to a 
number of EOBs and a more appropriate expression would be "Human Relationships". 
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(Simsek and Veiga 2000, 2001); however, to allow the recipient to complete the 
information in their own words, it would require the opportunity for descriptive 
textual boxes in response to open questions. If the recipient were to be given 
multiple choice options or Likert scales (May 2001) then the survey creator is in 
effect defining the boundaries in a positivistic fashion which does not allow for 
new data to be discovered (Gill and Johnson 2010). In addition, this approach 
was discounted for several reasons: 
• Email addresses might not be made available en mass from the 
ownership bodies to send the survey out to. • Targeting the HR representative within an organisation might be 
infeasible. • Expecting busy HR personnel to spend sufficient time giving sufficiently 
detailed textual answer was unrealistic within a limited time span 
(Kessler 2001). • It assumes that one person knows everything about the topic and is 
prepared to find out, rather than guess if they do not (Legge 2001). 
Hence the semi-structured interview was considered an appropriate method to 
use as suggested by Storey and Sisson (1989). 
 A list of EOBs of each of the three ownership types (cooperative, direct 
and trust) was drawn up and potential candidates contacted, usually via email 
or telephone. The initial selection criterion was: 
• Having one of the required ownership types. For directly owned 
businesses, where the majority of employees have their own 
personal shares. For trust ownership, more than 50% of the 
ownership must be held in trust for at least 25% of the employees. 
For worker cooperatives, at least 50% of the employees must be 
members. • There must be some form of involvement (level 3 or above 
according to Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013)) by the employees in 
the governance of the organisation as well as access to 
information on how the organisation is performing.  • The organisation must intend to be profit making as opposed to a 
charity or a social enterprise that is not-for-profit. 
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• Reasonable chance of being able to gain access within the 
required timeframe (November 2013 - February 2014). In some 
cases contact had previously been made with a representative of 
the organisation, usually through networking at a conference and 
the research had already been discussed, alternatively this was 
done via a trusted friends network. In some cases organisation 
were identified purely by searching the internet using an 
appropriate Employee Ownership membership site (for example 
The Employee Ownership Association EOA (2013b) or Co-
operatives UK (2014)). • A preference for organisations based within commuting distance 
so that face to face interviews could be held where possible, 
although a number were done via telephone. Although any multi-
national organisation had to have a permanent UK office 
presence. • At least 20 employees. Anything smaller may in effect act like a 
club or extended family rather than an organisation. • Been trading for a minimum of two years to avoid a still rapidly 
evolving culture. • A desire to speak to at least 3 organisations of each of the 
ownership types. 
 Although the criteria were quite specific, information gained in advance 
about EOBs from available sources (typically websites) did not go into such 
levels of detail. Hence EOB websites often proclaimed that they were employee 
owned but gave very little information as to the extent of the ownership. 
Therefore not all the criteria could be checked out prior to arranging an 
interview however this was not considered to be critical. This is purposively 
sampling as suggested by Cresswell (2003) since a set of requirements need to 
be satisfied in order to be included and participants were then actively sought 
out that met the criteria. A list of all the phase 1 contacts and a brief description 
of each is provided in chapter 4.  
 The initial scoping was done by carrying out a limited number of semi-
structured interviews with one person from each company, either an HR 
representative, founder or business manager who were involved in performance 
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and reward management (Kvale 2007). Sample interview questions are given in 
appendix 2. They were developed from the literature that had been read and 
based around the research aims. After each interview they were reviewed and 
refined depending on the experience (there were 3 iterations in total). The 
interviews were carried out either face to face or via the telephone, depending 
on the logistics (e.g. diary availability, distance to travel). Initially ten interviews 
were sought, from across the spectrum of ownership types. The number was 
set to achieve some level of “saturation” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and identify 
recurrent themes without expanding to an unmanageable amount causing 
excessive delay to the research. It also allowed for each of the ownership types 
to be represented.  It was not expected that any of the organisations 
interviewed for Phase 1 would be invited to take part in Phase 2, so a longer-
term relationship was not sought. The organisations were selected from 
contacts made with the Employee Ownership Association (EOA 2013b) and 
other such ownership bodies, as well as Sheffield Hallam University’s contacts 
and those made attending networking events (e.g. Employee Ownership day, 
4th July 2013 (EOA 2013c)). There were a diverse set of organisations of 
varying ownership types, sectors, ages and sizes. 
 All the interviewees were asked permission to record the conversation 
using a digital recorder, to which they all agreed, except for one (DIR_Service). 
Digital recordings were used for two reasons. Firstly, to enable me to focus on 
the person and what was being said rather than trying to make copious notes at 
the same time. Secondly, to gain a more accurate view of what was said rather 
than to rely on memory, which can act as a "selective filter" (Kvale and 
Brinkman 2009) and as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) point out “Memory is 
an inadequate basis for subsequent analysis”. For DIR_Service the question 
sheet was printed out and used to manually record responses against each 
question. These were then expanded upon immediately after the interview had 
finished in order maximise the information recorded. Hand written notes and 
recorded interviews were converted into electronic WORD documents to assist 
the analysis. This experience, and information, gained was then used to inform 
Phase 2 and a detailed explanation of how the data was analysed follows in 
chapter four. 
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3.4.2 Phase 2 - In-depth study of culture. 
In order to study the culture of the organisations a suitable technique had to be 
used. Ethnography is a relevant method to carry out research into culture as 
Spradley (1979) states, “Ethnography is a culture-studying culture”. 
Hammersley argues that the aim of ethnography, "is to find the general in the 
particular; a world in a grain of sand" (Hammersley 1992, p16) and that it is "a 
form of social and educational research that emphasises the importance of 
studying at first hand what people do and say in particular contexts" (emphasis 
is the author's) (Hammersley 2006, p4). A significant element of it is the need to 
observe people in their own location and it can include a variety of methods 
within it, for example interviews, document analysis, surveys and unstructured 
conversations (see for example Watson (2001), Kunda (2006)).  
 From an anthropological position the word ethnography literally means to 
“write” about a “cultured” being (Watson 2011) and Watson (2001, 2011) further 
advocates the use of personal observation to enable people to understand “how 
things work”.  He contends that it is a pragmatic approach to research that 
enables both academics and practitioner peer-groups (of those being observed) 
to 'hit the ground running'. Ethnography gives access to what people actually do 
("the informal organization") rather than what they espouse ("the formal 
organization") (Gill and Johnson 2002). There are numerous examples of 
ethnography being used in a wide variety of settings (Frost et al. 1991, 
Monaghan 2002) 
 The level of involvement in participant observation is important to 
understand. At one extreme, ethnomethodology, the researcher attempts to 
become one of the team being observed. They enter fully into the activities of 
everyone else, so that they not only hear about the area but get to feel for 
themselves what it is like. Their reflections on their feelings then become crucial 
in understanding the environment and the method allows them access to often 
unspoken and hidden aspects of the culture. However, there is a danger that 
they become so immersed that they can no longer distinguish the culture from 
themselves and therefore cannot see what it is they are trying to record. If this 
happens, culture that might appear abnormal to an outsider can start to become 
normal. Vaughan (2004) found this when looking at levels of risk in a high risk 
environment, ultimately leading to catastrophic failure. At the other extreme - 
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purely non-participant observation, where the researcher observes and does 
not interact at all with the subjects, there is a danger that they must rely on what 
they see and are told, which may be a complete misinterpretation or even 
fabrication. Between the two extremes there is a continuum of decreasing 
involvement.  
 For my own research, I became a partial participant-observer 
("Participant-as-Observer"), whereby I observed and interacted with the actors 
but stopped short of doing their work (Gill and Johnson 2002). As well as 
observing the people, the physical environment including artefacts, uniforms 
and displays were also noted and photographed, where allowed (Schein 1992) 
although care was taken to not be able to identify individual people. 
 Ethnography has its drawbacks though. It can require considerable time 
observing, in order to ensure that the involvement and subsequent reporting, 
authentically reflects what happens. Martin (2002) suggests anthropologists 
require one to two years of participation to attain true emic status and Bate 
(1997, p1150) disdainfully refers to researchers who fly in and out of 
organisations for quick visits as carrying out 'jet-plane ethnography'. Although 
Alversson and Deetz (2000 p200) provide a more realistic view, within a time 
constrained thesis:  
“One does not, however have to stick to the old anthropological norm of 
being at least one year in the field, but can limit and concentrate the 
efforts. Some weeks of participant observation is, according to our 
experience, sometimes sufficient”. 
It was also considered to be a more effective use of time observing in several 
organisations, as it was a requirement to be able to research the effect of the 
different ownership types on the culture. 
 Watson (2011, p204) highlights some further issues with ethnography 
and hence his confession as a "reluctant ethnographer".  He states that 
ethnography is: 
• Emotionally tiring and requires considerable nervous energy for long 
hours in the field. This was my experience, with an introverted preference 
(Briggs Myers 2000); continually building rapport with strangers was 
emotionally draining. 
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• Viewed with suspicion in academic journals and can therefore have a 
negative impact on an academic career although they can bring 
significant benefit once a study has been published. Although there are 
now dedicated journals to ethnographic study which has helped with this 
aspect. • Potentially generates huge volumes of data to be transcribed and 
analysed (Hammersley 2006). This can create electronic storage issues 
(the recordings from phase 1 alone exceeded the default storage 
allocated to a student at the university) and the transcription and analysis 
took far longer than was expected. • Perceived to have a lack of (positivistic) reliability and validity (LeCompte 
and Goetz 1982). However, Guba and Lincoln (1989) provide 
suggestions to mitigate the subjectivity of the researcher which are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 I intended to overtly spend one month at three separate organisations 
carrying out observation and having “friendly conversations” (Spradley 1979). A 
standard set of questions (shown in appendix 3) was developed from what was 
learnt in phase 1. This acted as a guide, so that conversations were semi-
structured but flexible to allow the conversation to flow naturally. I expected to 
be on site during the working week and evenings as required, for example to 
attend a social or business event outside of normal working hours. The 
observation time is shorter than either Watson or Martin suggests however it 
was achievable and provided an opportunity to develop a “rich picture” of the 
culture. Journaling was done at every available time and at the earliest 
opportunity to ensure that the memories were still fresh, aided by on-site 
photographs (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011). 
 Martin (1992) poses the question - which people make up the 
organisational culture? Or, who are the “cultural participants”, as she refers to 
them? At first thought the simple answer is everyone who works within the 
organisation; however, there are a number of potential complications. Are family 
members of employees’ part of the culture as they will affect and be affected by 
it? Similarly, what about regulators, customers and suppliers who all have a 
direct involvement with organisations? Kunda (2006) reversed the question by 
querying the effect organisational culture had on society around it, in terms of 
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burnout, stress, divorce and alcoholism. Do part-time employees have less 
affinity to the culture than full-time employees? With the rise of home-working 
are off-site workers less influenced by the culture and for multi-national 
organisations does the culture in different countries influence the organisational 
culture?  Employees can have “variations in intensity” with regard to the culture, 
for example compare a University student doing a part-time job to pay the rent 
with the founding managing director. What impact do shareholders have on the 
culture and are they therefore part of it? (Barclay’s shareholders voted against 
excessive pay awards, challenging the culture of bank bonuses (BBC, 2012)). I 
chose to limit myself to talk with people who were part of the EOB and not 
external to the organisation (e.g. spouses/family members related to employees 
(Barney 2004)) although in some organisations both husband and wife did work 
for the same company and in Direct1, I was voluntarily introduced to a supplier 
to get an external perspective. 
 A further option was to carry out focus groups or group interviews, terms 
which are often interchangeable but do have different emphasis. In a group 
interview the researcher asks questions of the group who reply, whereas in a 
focus group the researcher facilitates a discussion between members who are 
given various prompts to start a discussion, so the role is more peripheral rather 
than central (Thomas 2011). As previously mentioned culture is inter-
subjectively created so a group discussion of it makes sense however with 
regard to performance and reward management these can be very personal 
topics (for example, how much a person gets paid; who is currently on a 
performance improvement program) so a group discussion is potentially not the 
best place to obtain such information. Therefore, although both options could be 
used, neither option was deliberately sought or arranged although at points 
group discussions did occur naturally, particularly in relaxed settings like the 
staff canteen.  
 Being on site does not give necessarily direct access to those employees 
who work remotely (for example from home, on the road, at client sites or at 
different sites) however for Direct1 I was taken to multiple sites and given the 
phone number of a travelling salesman, whom I contacted. His connection with 
the culture was therefore looser since he spent less time on site but it was a 
significant aspect of his role. 
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  By choosing three different organisations it allowed me to analyse each 
one in turn as well as to compare and contrast them. This was essential in order 
to observe the potential variations in culture specifically due to ownership type. 
A preliminary consideration of the data gathered from the initial site was carried 
out to inform the second visit and subsequently for the third.  
 In some cases, participants were invited to tell stories about culture as it 
is a useful method, since culture is often passed on via stories of heroes, 
villains and mavericks to new employees (Schein 1992, Yiannis 2000, Wren 
2011). This can give an insight into sub-cultures that are at odds with the 
espoused culture (Watson 2001, Martin 2002). 
 Reviewing company documents (e.g. websites, annual reports and staff 
handbooks and publications) provided further information. It helped to 
triangulate the data providing greater credibility (Guba and Lincoln 1989) but is 
secondary to the direct observation and interaction with actors (Gill and 
Johnson 2002). 
 The research was intended to be three ethnographic episodes rather 
than one multiple-case study as described by Yin (2012, 2014) whereby the 
individual cases should either be “literal replications” or “theoretical 
replications”. Case study has many overlaps with ethnographic research and 
both share the potential use of multiple methods as well as the skills required of 
the researcher (“Asking Good Questions”, “Good Listener”, “Adaptive” Yin 
(2014, p73)).  These are attributes which I feel I possess. However, Yin 
suggests that the fundamental difference between case studies and 
ethnography is the former’s requirement to generate theory prior to carrying out 
fieldwork which is not applicable to this inductive research. 
 The purpose of my research was to discover themes and provide 
guidance, rather than to prove a specific occurrence of a phenomenon under 
research. Selected conclusions were fed back to the organisations who took 
part (as an incentive for their involvement) but the overriding purpose was not to 
fix any specific issues that they had. Therefore, this was not Participative Action 
Research (PAR) (Whyte 1991). 
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 Each of the three ownership types was to be represented by a different 
organisation. In reality it did not happen as planned and led to involvement with 
two worker cooperatives, one directly owned and two trust based. Again, 
purposive sampling was used with the same criteria as for Phase 1 but with an 
emphasis on ensuring that the different ownership types were represented 
(Cresswell 2003). Although specific people were targeted within each 
organisation (senior managers, HR representatives, line managers), there was 
an emphasis on trying to talk to anybody and everybody irrespective of gender, 
grade or position since trying to ethnographically understand the culture meant 
seeing it at all levels. 
  Following an initial email conversation with a trust owned company 
(Trust2), when it was subsequently approached to confirm access for a month 
long ethnographic study, it no longer felt it was suitable. This was primarily due 
to the potentially hazardous working environment, so allowing an untrained 
person to wander freely around the site was unsafe. However, the Finance 
Director did volunteer himself to be interviewed, which was gratefully accepted. 
The information provided is included in the final analysis. Another Trust based 
organisation was therefore required. After attending an Employee Ownership 
conference, facilitated by the White Rose Consortium (2014), an introduction 
was made to a senior ex-employee of Trust1. He was able to provide the email 
address of the branch manager of a store, from which the necessary access 
was obtained (June 2014). Previously I had tried twice before to personally 
access the organisation (by calling in to a store and using the enquiry service 
on their website) neither of which had yielded any viable response. 
 Verbal agreement to carry out research in a worker cooperative had 
been agreed on two occasions with the HR director of a medium-sized worker 
cooperative. Once again when contacting them to confirm my desire for a 
month-long visit, there was considerable delay as it required a member to 
volunteer to host me as well as have the time to do it. Eventually only a single 
day on-site could be arranged so this was gratefully accepted and ultimately led 
to a second period afterwards. As this did not meet the desired month, one of 
the coops approached during Phase 1 was asked if they could host me again 
and they also agreed to an intensive day on-site, interviewing members (July 
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2014). Although this was less than had been planned it did give an alternative 
perspective to the directly owned and trust owned organisations.  
 Specific details of each of the ethnographic periods in the different EOBs 
are given below. 
3.4.2.1 Worker cooperatives - Coop1 and Coop2 
A day was spent on-site at Coop1 on 17th July 2014, from 9:15am to 4pm. 
During this time nine conversations were held with seven distinct people (or 
groups) lasting 4.5 hours of which 2.5 hours were recorded. Subsequently I was 
allowed to attend the Quarterly General meeting (the evening of 25th July 2014), 
where a further 3 hours of observation and conversations took place. 
 To supplement my understanding of worker cooperatives, a day (25th 
July 2014) was spent at Coop2 where I spent 6 hours on site, carrying out 
eleven distinct interviews with individuals, all of which were recorded lasting for 
a total of just over 3 hours. A member responsible for HR was specifically 
targeted (as I had already spoken to her in phase 1); otherwise all the other 
interviewees had been arranged for me and the members had various roles with 
the organisation. In both cooperatives notes were made alongside the 
interviews and everything was transcribed for subsequent analysis. 
3.4.2.2 Directly owned organisation - Direct1 
As part of an initial bid to have the PhD funded, a directly owned company had 
already given written consent to taking part in the research. As consent to 
access the company was in place, Direct1 was the first one to take part in the 
research fieldwork (Jan-Feb 2014). 
An initial face to face meeting was set up with my contact person and a member 
of staff responsible for “People & Culture”. I discussed with them my aims and 
plans and showed them my consent form. This was brushed away with disdain, 
due to a strongly dislike of bureaucracy but access was agreed. During the 
period 10th February to the 13th March 2014, the organisation was visited on 
eleven separate days (over 51 hours on site); 61 contacts were made with 51 
distinct people (or groups of people); over 15 hours of conversation were had, 
of which 5hr 45m was recorded electronically. Targeted interviews were held 
with the founder, the current managing director, two people responsible for 
“People and Culture” (the company explicitly does not have an HR department 
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or “Human Remains” as the founder refers to it in his interview), several team 
leaders and one conversation was with an offsite salesman via telephone. 
Numerous spontaneous conversations were held with other shop floor and 
office workers. 
3.4.2.3 Trust based organisations - Trust1 and Trust2 
Whilst attending an academic conference at York University I obtained the email 
address of a branch manager of Trust1. I contacted him directly and received a 
reply from his assistant inviting me for an initial meeting in the canteen. After 
explaining my plans, I was invited to carry out my research within the branch, 
having received approval from the Central office as well. During the period 4th 
June to the 28th June 2014, I observed at a single branch of Trust1 on thirteen 
separate days (68 hours on site); 62 contacts were made with 49 distinct people 
(or groups); 33 hours of conversation were had, of which 6 ½ were recorded 
electronically. Targeted interviews were held with the branch manager, regional 
HR representative, middle managers, regional representative and elected 
representation committee chairperson as well as general employees on an ad 
hoc basis. 
 As previously mentioned, a recorded interview was held as part of Phase 
2 with the Finance director of another trust based organisation (Trust2), which 
lasted for an hour and included a tour of the site. Additional literature was also 
provided that gave information on the structure and history of the organisation. 
3.4.2.4 Phase 2 summary 
Table (3.4) below shows a summary of the EOBs contacted during phase 2 and 
the amount of time spent with each. 
EOB Contact period On site 
time 
Contact 
time 
Number 
of 
distinct 
contacts 
Audio 
Recorded 
time 
Direct1 10/02/14 - 12/03/14 51 hr 15 hr 51 5hr 45m 
Trust1 04/06/14 - 14/07/14 68 hr 33 hr 45 5hr 15m 
Trust2 19/05/14 1 hr 1 hr 1 40m 
Coop1 17/07/14 & 25/07/14  10.5 hr 7 hr 10 2hr 45m 
Coop2 25/07/14 5.5hr 3hr 10m 11 3hr 10m 
Table 3.4 Summary of contact time with EOBs during phase 2. 
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3.5 Methodological reflexivity 
A Neo-empiricist stance allows for methodological reflexivity, which is “critically 
scrutinizing the impact upon the research setting and findings of the researcher 
and his/her research strategy”. These should include reviewing the balance 
between being an ‘outsider’ or ‘insider’; ‘distance’ and ‘inclusion’; ‘detachment’ 
and ‘involvement’ (Johnson and Duberley 2003, p1284). 
During the fieldwork, such reflexivity did take place and some examples are 
given below. 
• Interview questions were deliberately phrased to be open questions 
(Kvale 2007) (see appendix 3) to allow the participant to give an 
opportunity to speak rather than just answer with a single word. 
However, with a lack of experience at times, multiple questions were 
asked before a response was given which meant that some questions 
simply did not get answered at all. An example is given below from 
Coop1: 
Me: “So you are not involved in any of the democracy or anything 
like that? You come in, five days a week?” 
Casual Worker: “Yeah, I’ve been doing four but for a few weeks been 
doing five.” 
Hence the original question of how much a temporary worker is involved 
in the democratic process was completely ignored. 
• To best capture what was being said during interviews, audio recordings 
were made, where permitted. This meant that it was necessary to 
momentarily check that the “red light” was still on the recorder and 
therefore still recording. This was a distraction from what was being said 
but necessary to make sure the information was captured (see Darabi 
(2013) as an example). In some locations (e.g. staff canteen) there was a 
lot of background noise that made it hard to hear exactly what had been 
said. Transcribing the information as soon after the event as possible 
helped to alleviate this issue. Not having to write notes as the interview 
happened also meant that better eye contact and rapport could be 
maintained throughout. 
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• Where recording interviews was inappropriate or impractical, for instance 
in customer areas of Trust1, notes were written onto the question sheet 
or added immediately after the interview but as Hammerlsey and 
Atkinson (2007, p142) say, although this was carried out "with as much 
care and self-conscious awareness as possible… Fieldnotes are always 
selective: it is not possible to capture everything”. Memories fade quickly 
and written notes do not always reflect the inflections in a voice that give 
emphasis.  • During management meetings, I was sat amongst the managers and felt 
uncomfortable making notes as the meeting was going on. Clearly 
anything I wrote would be visible to the managers on either side of me 
and I felt this restricted what I could record at that time. Again, my 
thoughts were written up immediately after the meeting in a safe place. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) say that notetaking can be seen as 
“inappropriate or threatening, and will prove disruptive” so care was 
taken to minimise the disturbance. • Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p28) point out, "in ethnographic 
research the development of research problems is rarely completed 
before field work begins; indeed, the collection of primary data often 
plays a key role in that process of development.” This was found to be 
the case as the research questions were repeatedly refined as the data 
was analysed. • I was conscious of the clothes I wore to want to appear to blend in as 
well as stand out! For example, at Trust1, the standard uniform for a 
male on the shop floor is either a white or black shirt and tie, hence I 
deliberately wore a coloured shirt and tie, so that I had the professional 
image to be part of the shop but then be different from all the employees, 
to not confuse customers. Although I was approached once, to be asked 
how to get out of the store! • Due to employees working shift patterns, particularly in Direct1 and 
Trust1, I deliberately chose to be on site at different times of the day, 
including the start and end of a day. 
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3.6 Reporting method 
It is important to consider the writing style of the results. Martin (2002, p269) 
asks the pertinent question "In whose interests do I want to write - in the 
managerial interest, or do I want to focus on change-oriented emancipatory 
political agenda that would improve the lives of workers who earn relatively 
little?" This includes the assumption that EO employees receive a small wage 
which will be reviewed as part of the research. She discusses three types as 
proposed by Van Maanen - realist, confessional and impressionist (Van 
Maanen 1988, Hammar 1991). As has already been explained this research is 
interpretive and attempts to portray what is being observed, hence the most 
relevant style is that of “realist” with elements of impressionism as it is more 
akin with how I prefer to write and gives space for humour that for example Van 
Maanen can include - "the lone vuvuzela in the orchestra" (Van Mannen 2011, 
p218). Another example of this style would be Kunda (2006). 
3.7 Ethics 
The ethical aspects of the research needed to be considered and can have a 
profound effect on the research methodology. A key aspect was whether to be 
covert or overt during the fieldwork. Covert participant observation may 
potentially lead to a greater depth of revelation as employees talk in an 
unguarded manner, however if the researcher were to be exposed, the damage 
done to the trusting relationship towards myself and the university could be 
devastating, causing a loss of reputation and for the research to be halted 
immediately. This was deemed an unacceptable risk and not in line with the 
University’s ethical policy (Sheffield Hallam University 2012). Therefore this 
research was carried out overtly at all times (Gill and Johnson 2002). 
 Informed consent for arranged interviews is important and was requested 
at the start of interviews for Phase 1. This was done either on the phone 
verbally or by signing a consent form for the face to face interviews. For Phase 
2 it was more complex. One of the features of ethnography is that participants 
may not provide explicit consent for an informal conversation next to the coffee 
machine. To mitigate this, as part of negotiating access, consent was obtained 
from the company sponsor during which the method of research was clearly 
explained and it was suggested that the organisation communicates with all 
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employees the dates for which I was on site. From my observations, this did 
appear to have happened as people frequently knew who I was when I 
approached them. When requested, I wore the standard issue, company 
provided visitors badge (Trust1 only) but did not have any other formal 
identification (e.g. a badge identifying me from the university) however this had 
the potential to affect the interactions that I had (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2009) which was observed.  In addition, every time I deliberately approached a 
participant to request their help I always introduced myself as a researcher from 
the University and asked for their permission rather than assuming it. Some 
manual machine operators appeared to be overawed by a PhD student 
whereas for alumni members of the University it helped to build the rapport 
quicker. Also, the University is independent from the EOBs, which potentially 
gives interviewees greater freedom to answer, rather than if the research was 
being funded by their employer. 
 Anonymity is required so that individual people and their contributions 
cannot be identified. Using fictional names or amalgamating several people into 
one quasi fictional person can help with this (see for example Ridley-Duff 2005). 
Similarly, confidential and commercially sensitive information had to be handled 
appropriately by denying public access both physically and electronically. 
During the fieldwork large amounts of electronic data was collected. This was 
located on a secure password protected network and will be held in line with the 
University’s data protection standard (Sheffield Hallam University 2012). 
3.8 Limitations 
The proposed research does have a number of identifiable limitations; the key 
ones are: 
• The length of time spent in the field during the ethnography. As already 
mentioned the duration of the ethnographic period is significantly less 
than some authors would agree with. Further research could be done by 
spending longer in the field. For example, at Trust1, it felt like fully 
trusted relationships were starting to be created that would have 
potentially led to a different perspective on the organisation. However, 
the vast majority of employees I spoke to were of one mind and only five 
people (out of 62) expressed any form of dissent from the company view. 
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Therefore, this research provides the potential opportunity of a platform 
for further prolonged research in each of the organisations where contact 
has already been made. • The number of EOBs involved. Clearly having more organisations 
involved would give a richer picture but again there is a trade-off between 
time and results. I consider that sufficient organisations were involved to 
be able to generate credible results bearing in mind that it is an inductive 
study. • The type of EOBs involved. Organisations from different sectors or 
different sizes would bring a different perspective but again there has to 
be a limit on what is achievable and what is acceptable. • The location of EOBs. During Phase 1 the location of the EOB’s was less 
relevant as interviews could be arranged by phone, however for the 
ethnographic phase the EOBs had to be within commuting distance to 
manage the cost in time and money and be practicable for everyday 
living. • Myself as a researcher. Ethnography requires a confidence to initiate 
conversations and my personality (introvert/extrovert) (Briggs Myers 
2000) had a bearing on the ease with which that was done. A different 
researcher with a more extrovert personality may have achieved different 
conversations. Similar my gender may or may not have influenced the 
access or openness to which I was received (Summers 2002). As 
Savage (2000) points out “the researcher becomes the medium of 
research, features such as the age, gender, and personality of the 
researcher will direct the findings”. The researcher must also be reflexive 
to understand their own culture and views; how they might impact on the 
research. It would be easy for a researcher to completely miss underlying 
beliefs within an organisation that were in line with their own as it would 
appear “normal” and therefore unremarkable. Reeves Sanday (1979, 
p528) quoting Clyde Kuckholm points out “It would hardly be fish who 
discovered the existence of water.”   
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3.9 Risks 
With any methodology there are potential risks that need to be identified and 
managed. Regarding this specific research the risks were: 
• Access to organisations (in both phases). Without organisations taking 
part there would be no data to analyse. This was mitigated by building up 
personal connections with EOBs as well as umbrella organisations (for 
example the Employee Ownership Association (EOA 2013b)). However 
once on site, it still required individual cooperation of employees as well, 
to capture their personal understandings. This was best achieved by 
building up a level of rapport and trust through openness, visibility, 
transparency, communication and explanation with all employees on site. • Constant concentration. Maintaining a focus during long hours of 
observation can prove difficult and in trying to understand culture, the 
smallest look instead of the spoken word might be the biggest clue which 
could easily be missed as demonstrated by Summers (2002) in her 
ethnographic work. To reduce this risk, it was important to take breaks 
from the fieldwork as well as be ready to capture observations as soon 
after the event as possible. Consequently, a notebook was taken 
everywhere on site to record such thoughts. This included a copy of the 
cultural web (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 2008) glued into the 
front to remind me that it was the organisational culture that I was trying 
to understand. Using a voice recorder and camera to record events also 
helped, providing data to be analysed. • Breaking confidence with participants. Great care was taken when talking 
in and outside of each EOB to not identify specific individuals. This was 
especially important when talking to managers about what their staff may 
have said. This could have led to a breakdown in trust and much 
suspicion if it had failed. • Insufficient data being collected. I appreciated the opportunity freely 
given to me by the EOBs so I endeavoured to glean as much information 
as possible. In reality, a large volume of raw data has been collected. • Physical risks. This was important whilst on site in potentially hazardous 
manufacturing plants, however health and safety was of a very high 
standard, so it was not an issue. Toe-protection was provided where 
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necessary although the over-sized shoes probably created more of a trip 
hazard! In one organisation, due to the hot weather and a lack of inside 
cooling, interviews were carried out on the roof space but at a safe 
distance from the edge of a flat roof. Hence I was either supervised in 
dangerous areas (with fork lift trucks operating) or the risk was 
acceptable with common sense. 
3.10 Timescale 
The actual timeline for the research was as follows: 
Time period. Activity 
November 2013 - January 2014 Phase 1 - Create, test and utilise semi-
structured interview with approximately 
ten EOBs. 
February 2014 - July 2014. Phase 2 – Carry out ethnographic 
studies within the three different 
ownership types, and analyse findings 
in between.  
August 2014 - September 2014 Transcribing of audio data. 
October 2014 - March 2015 Intensive coding of nodes within Nvivo, 
repeating the process. 
March 2015 - October 2016 Continual reflection and writing up of 
findings, prior to submission. 
October 2016 Submission. 
December 2016 Confirmed. 
Table 3.5 Timeline of research 
3.11 Research evaluation 
Positivistic research can be measured on reliability (can the experiment be 
repeated with the same results?) and validity (does the experiment measure 
what is required?) (Johnson and Duberley 2000).  However for qualitative 
research, reliability and validity cannot be the yardsticks for evaluation as it is 
almost impossible to replicate a scenario to the necessary degree. Therefore as 
Johnson et al. (2006) and Thomas (2006) point out, different criteria are 
required and they both suggest Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) work as a starting 
point, in order to evaluate qualitative research with an objective epistemology, 
although their particular stance is constructionism. 
• Stability in both the methods used to carry out the research as well as 
the phenomena being observed. This is relevant for organisational 
culture which does not undergo rapid changes (Schein 1992). 
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Throughout the process I was the sole researcher in the field collecting 
the information. The set of questions used in each of the different 
organisations was fundamentally the same and they were asked in a 
consistent way. I made no deliberate effort to adopt a different persona in 
the different locations so that too was stable (although I learnt from each 
experience). Especially for the organisations where there was a longer 
period on-site (Direct1 and Trust1), the specific time slots were not 
unique in comparison to other points in the year that I could have visited. 
Although both organisations go through seasonal variations (especially in 
retail, for example the busy Christmas period versus the quieter summer 
months in Trust1), fundamentally the business being done is still the 
same. For example, there is no shift from heavy labour in the summer to 
high tech IT services in the winter. • Credibility which is "establishing the match between the constructed 
realities of respondents (or stakeholders) and those realities as 
represented by the evaluator and attributed to various stakeholders" 
(Guba and Lincoln 1989, p237). They suggest this can be enhanced by 
substantial engagement with the situation; persistent observation; being 
reflexive; discussing potential thoughts and theories with a disinterested 
party and primarily by reflecting back to the original actors what has been 
observed to see if they agree with the understanding. All of these facets 
of credibility were available to me as a researcher but required a 
concentrated effort. Specifically for the two sites (Direct1 and Trust1) 
where a reasonable amount of time was spent on site, the experience 
was consistent throughout and definitely did not change on a frequent or 
even ad hoc basis (Bate 1997). Observation was carried out all the time 
on site and a notebook was always to hand to record information. Being 
in the field allowed for times of methodological reflection to see if I was 
maximising my opportunity. During the fieldwork and subsequently, 
discussions have been had on a regular monthly with my supervisory 
team to flesh out my understanding. Feedback on the initial findings was 
specifically requested by some organisations and therefore provided and 
the response noted (either neutral or very positive, never negative or 
contradictory). Whilst on site I had a specific contact person and would 
meet with them (at least weekly) to informally discuss progress and any 
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initial thoughts, in effect “Member checks” as Guba and Lincoln (1989, 
p238) call them. This helped to clarify and rectify any potential 
misunderstands, • Transferability which places the emphasis on the receiver of the research 
information to verify whether it is transferable to their specific situation. 
Ultimately it will be the reader’s responsibility to see if it applies to their 
situation however an aim of the research is to provide guidance to HR 
practitioners so it should be transferable to organisations within the EOB 
sector, subject to the limitations of their own ownership type. By looking 
at three different types of ownership it increases the breadth of potential 
comparable organisations. Another option is to present the findings to an 
informed body to gain their comments. This happened on 11th March 
2016 at a regional meeting of the EOA where the findings were 
presented to a group of EOA members who were given the opportunity to 
discuss and feedback their comments. This group included one of the 
key contacts from Direct1 (employee 21). As such the feedback was 
positive and agreeable and the minutes reported on the EOA website. 
The findings were also presented at a doctoral conference at Sheffield 
Hallam University on 20th May 2016 to an academic audience for 
comments, again receiving positive feedback. • Confirmability which is allowing the reader to track where the data came 
from as well as understand the processes it went through in order to 
produce the findings. A detailed explanation of the analysis process is 
given in chapter 4. The reader does not have access to the entire set of 
actual transcripts or notes taken for confidentiality reasons. However 
they were made available and reviewed by my supervisory team which 
gives credibility to the claim. In my research the transcripts could be 
verified by the participant however this only happened once where it was 
specifically requested (DIR_Service). • Fairness which is the way in which different constructions are given an 
equal voice to be heard. This is very relevant in EOBs where the normal 
owner/manager and employee demarcation is not so obvious. The 
ethnographic method allows for many more voices to be heard rather 
than a few elite and so a more consistent picture is built up. This is also 
achievable through being methodologically reflexive; reviewing whether I 
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have preferred one group (say managers) over another (say shop floor 
workers) (Johnson and Duberley 2003). • Authenticity (Ontological – that respondents understand their own 
construction better, Educative – that respondents understand other 
people’s constructions better and Catalytic – that the results brings about 
action). Ontological and educative can be achieved by feeding back the 
results of the research to the actors involved and this was done for both 
Direct1 and Trust1. It is intended to provide guidance to those 
responsible for performance and reward management so it should be 
catalytic and emailed correspondence implied that it would be reviewed 
at a management level. 
 To summarise, “To put the point more bluntly, prolonged engagement 
and persistent observation (or any other methods one might choose) do not 
ensure that stakeholder constructions have been collected and faithfully 
represented.” (Guba and Lincoln 1989, p245). There will always be the potential 
for misrepresentation, unintentionally or not, and researchers need strategies in 
place to address this potential. Considerable time and effort was spent in trying 
to accurately reflect actors' contributions through repeated, detailed 
transcription checking and comparing my notes against what was said to give 
greater confidence that the meaning was recorded and not just the words.  
3.12 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed a wide range of methodological options for the 
research and explained the chosen one, which was a two-phased approach of 
interviews and ethnography. It detailed the selection criteria and briefly 
introduced the organisations that participated. It has also highlighted the 
commitment to ethical research and some identifiable limitations of the research 
as well as criteria for evaluating it. 
 The next chapter provides explains in detail how the analysis of the data 
was carried out and gives a background to all the organisations involved, from 
this the findings can then be reported. 
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Chapter 4 - Analysis 
4.1 Introduction. 
In the previous chapter the methods used to collect data relating to the research 
questions were set out. This chapter explains how that data has been analysed 
as well as detailing what assumptions have been made to evaluate the research 
(Braun and Clarke 2008). Background information on all the individual research 
organisations is given to provide a contextual and comparative perspective. 
4.2 How the data was analysed. 
The inductive, interpretive approach of the research allows for themes and core 
meanings to be identified from the data collected. This happens as the data is 
analysed by the researcher. The analysis was guided by two articles that both 
provide an explanation of, and method for, analysing qualitative data, namely 
Thomas (2006) and Braun and Clarke (2008). Thomas refers to a “General 
Inductive Approach for Analyzing” qualitative data. His concern is that analysis 
should not only be efficient but defendable as well and that it allows for “The 
identification of any significant unplanned or unanticipated effects”. This is 
appropriate as no prior theory was assumed nor was I trying to prove any theory 
through deduction but it does allow for understanding to be generated from the 
data. Braun and Clarke (2008, p79) describe Thematic Analysis as “a method 
for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.” 
 As such, Thomas (2006) and Braun and Clarke (2008) both offer a very 
similar method for analysing qualitative data although their terminology is 
slightly different. Thomas (2006) creates meaning from complex data via data 
reduction using themes or categories. Braun and Clark see Thematic Analysis 
as the “foundational method” of qualitative analysis and the first method 
researchers should use. They differ from strict Grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967) in that there is a recognition that the researcher will bring prior 
knowledge to the experience and that coding will not be done in an 
“epistemological vacuum”. 
 The six phases of Thematic Analysis from Braun and Clark (2008, p87) 
are: 
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1. Familiarizing yourself with your data 
2. Generating initial codes 
3. Searching for themes 
4. Reviewing themes 
5. Defining and naming themes: 
6. Producing the report 
 Obtaining permission to undertake research is obviously critical and often 
difficult to obtain. As such the opportunity for ethnographic site visits were 
grasped with both hands when they were offered. This meant that there was 
only a very limited period between Phase 1 and Phase 2. (In fact the final 
Phase 1 interview occurred during the on-site research at Direct1.) Therefore, 
there was insufficient time to analyse Phase 1 discretely from Phase 2 so the 
decision was taken to amalgamate the two sets of data into one. Therefore, for 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the research, the underlying method of analysis 
was the same and is described in detail below. (Note that to reduce confusion 
between phases of research and phases of analysis, the six analysis phases 
will subsequently be referred to as stages instead.) 
4.2.1 Stage 1 - Familiarising with the data. 
A significant amount of time was spent familiarising with the data which was 
done via creating, listening, transcribing and reading the information. The raw 
data was primarily electronic audio recordings of interviews and hand written 
notes made during, or immediately, after interviews. (There were other forms of 
data that will be discussed later.) In the case of electronic recordings these 
were transcribed with the aid of voice recognition software (Dragon version v12 
- (Nuance 2015)). Interviews were listened to via headphones and then spoken 
into a microphone to be automatically transcribed into a Microsoft WORD 
document. From previous experience (Wren, 2011) this was found to be the 
fastest method of transcribing and assisted with Braun and Clarke’s emphasis 
to “immerse yourself in the data to the extent that you are familiar with the depth 
and breadth of the content” (2008, p87). Interviews were then listened to again 
and reviewed against the initial automated output to allow for manual 
corrections and further punctuation to be added ensuring the written words 
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conveyed the intent of what had been said as well as the actual words. This 
was a long, slow process and mirrored what Braun and Clark (2008, p87) 
accurately quote from Riessman, namely “The process of transcription, while it 
may seem time-consuming, frustrating, and at times boring, can be an excellent 
way to start familiarizing yourself with the data”.  
 In the transcripts, a consistent approach was taken to differentiate my 
voice from an interviewee by highlighting mine in bold. This was not done to add 
any extra emphasis or weight to it but simply to be able to recognise where one 
voice finished and another started. An example taken from the interview with 
DIR_Professional is shown below: 
Do you have employees who don’t own shares then?  
Yes we do. They don’t own shares outright because the trust holds them 
on their behalf. 
 A deliberate choice was made not to note every pause, cough, “Urm” or 
“Err” unless it had a direct bearing on the meaning of what was being said as it 
did not affect the message and would have further added to the time taken to 
transcribe. This confirms Lapadat and Lindsay (1999) that the act of transcribing 
is a form of analysis by choosing what to write about and what to exclude. 
According to Lapadat and Lindsay (1999, p75) Poland says that the quality of 
transcripts can be adversely affected by deliberate, accidental, and unavoidable 
alterations of the data. Although no deliberate attempt was made to alter the 
data, minor mistakes were found and corrected in the transcriptions during 
subsequent stages of the analysis (typically words that had been incorrectly 
translated by the software). At some points in the recordings, background noise 
made it difficult to hear what was being said and English was not always the 
first language of interviewees making comprehension still harder. In these 
cases the written notes made on-site were used to help fill in the gaps. Finally 
on 24th September 2014, all the raw data had been transcribed. As noted by 
Braun and Clark, initial thoughts about coding occurred to me throughout this 
process and these were noted down in an “Analysis Diary” and later added to 
the model.  
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 Other forms of data such as physical documents provided by 
organisations, websites and pictures taken on site were also collected. 
Documents were scanned and electronic versions then used instead. 
 Therefore the data corpus (Braun and Clark 2008) was made up of the 
following: 
• Electronic recordings of interviews • Hand written notes of responses during interviews (either on a pro-forma 
question sheet or free hand in a notebook). • Hand written notes of reflections on interviews and other observations. • Pictures taken on site with a mobile phone. • Electronic documents (.pdf, WORD, POWERPOINT, emails) provided by 
organisations • Paper documents (sales catalogues, brochures, appraisal documents, 
newsletters) provided by organisations. • Organisations’ websites.  
 From this the data set was created, which differed only in the amount of 
physical items used (all electronic documents were included). For example, 
COOP1 provided an entire sales brochure (272 pages long) so practically not 
every page could be scanned and included nor was it necessarily relevant 
however my observations about the style and content of the brochure are 
included in the data set. Similarly, the “Values statement” (as it has a direct 
bearing on the culture of the organisation (Schein 1992)) from the company 
brochure of DIR_Manuf has been copied into the interview notes taken but the 
document in its entirety was not scanned in. 
4.2.2 Stage 2 - Generating initial codes. 
The second phase in Braun and Clark’s (2008) thematic analysis is to 
“Generate initial codes”. Due to the large quantity of data items and time 
constraints, no attempt was made to perform manual coding and software for 
analysing data was used instead (Seale 2010, Kelle 2004, Patton 2002). There 
are a variety of software tools for analysing data (for example MAXQDA (2015)) 
however Nvivo (QSR International 2013) was chosen as it is readily available 
within the University and I had previously been trained in using it as well as 
having experience of applying it in a qualitative study (Wren 2011). Individual 
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items were loaded into the Nvivo software in a systematic manner, by phase 
and then chronological order. The two phases of research were separated out 
into different folders (See Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2 Initial sources loaded into Nivivo. 
 Braun and Clark (2008, p88) describe Codes as identifiers of “a feature 
of the data (semantic content or latent) that appears interesting to the analyst”, 
which relate to the most basic element of raw data that has meaning. Thomas 
(2006, p241) explains that the “evaluator then identifies text segments that 
contain meaningful units and creates a label for a new category to which text is 
assigned”. Potential codes that had been identified during the first stage were 
added as “Nodes” in the Nvivo model. Each data item (for example, transcribed 
interview or record of observation) was then coded in turn, working 
chronologically with Phase 1 and through onto Phase 2. The data item was read 
in detail and using the software, data extracts were associated with zero, one or 
more nodes. Coding was “data-driven” rather than “theory-driven” (Braun and 
Clark 2008, p88) as the purpose of the research is to allow for themes to be 
created from the data rather than to deductively prove a theory. Therefore items 
were coded according to the meaning rather than whether they were thought to 
be part of an answer hence there was potential to over code extracts that would 
not form part of the final report. 
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 By 24th November 2015 the data set had been coded throughout and 273 
nodes had been created. Partway through this exercise, each node was 
reviewed to clarify its meaning and give it a description to ensure distinction 
between nodes. This allowed for more accurate coding and new nodes to be 
created. On completion, the entire data set was then re-coded (building on the 
existing nodes) as suggested by Braun and Clark (2008). This allowed for 
nodes that had been identified in later data items to be recognised within the 
initial interviews to see if they had in fact occurred previously. (100 nodes were 
added between Direct1 having been coded once and then being coded again.) 
On completion, the total number of nodes had risen to 284; a small increase 
however a meaningful number of new links had been identified. This is to be 
expected as “coding is an ongoing organic process” (Braun and Clark 2008, 
p91).  
 During the coding no intentional bias was applied to the data. That is, 
management interviews were not treated any different from subordinates; no 
regard was given to gender; each voice was given equal weight. Extracts were 
also coded inclusively, so that some surrounding text was included to provide a 
relevant context and make it easier to when referring back to it (Braun and Clark 
2008). 
 Once again all nodes were checked to ensure that they had a distinct 
definition. Where this wasn’t the case, nodes were collapsed into their twin (for 
example “People Valued” and “Valued as a Person”). During this whole stage 
hierarchies of nodes were already being created. This typically happened for 
several reasons: 
• Where nodes were created as more detailed explanations of an existing 
node. For example, “leaving the organisation” was created and then 
different reasons for leaving were noted (e.g. “Death”, “Leave by Choice”, 
and “Pressure from Peers”.) • When two nodes were the opposite of each other (e.g. “Happiness state” 
was created to include both “Happy” and “Unhappy”) • Where similarities between nodes were already being identified (e.g. 
“Type of Ownership” contains “Direct Ownership”, “External Ownership” 
and “Trust Ownership”). 
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 Nodes that only had one or no reference were checked to see that they 
were relevant to the study and deleted if obsolete. For example, “Inward looking 
Culture” had been added as an antonym to “Outward looking culture” but then 
never referenced so was deleted. Each node within a hierarchy was then 
reviewed to see if it was still appropriately placed and moved if not. In some 
cases parent nodes had become a catch all, so were reviewed to see that the 
references contained with them were appropriate, with the aim to remove all 
references from parent nodes if at all possible. This finally led to a set of 349 
nodes in total which became the master version of the data. From this point the 
data was frozen and no new nodes were created, otherwise the task of coding 
could become an infinite task. 
4.2.3 Stage 3 - Searching for themes 
The third stage is to search for themes within the codes and “involves sorting 
the different codes into potential themes, and collating all the relevant coded 
data extracts within the identified themes” (Braun and Clark 2008, p89). This 
was practically done within Nvivo by moving nodes to create further hierarchies, 
of parents, siblings and orphans. Nodes were reviewed to see if they could be 
combined into overarching themes, initially these were given very generic 
names to allow the process to happen quickly without being slowed down (e.g. 
“Culture Stuff”). From here nine high level themes were created (See figure 
4.3), a significant reduction in nodes which is the desired aim (Thomas 2006).  
 
Figure 4.3 Themes derived from Nvivo model 
 Graphical displays were also used to help with the analysis (see figure 
4.4) to give a visual and therefore different way to view the data. This helped to 
clarify the content of the super-ordinates. 
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Figure 4.4 Representation of initial themes from Nvivo model 
4.2.4 Stage 4 - Reviewing themes 
Having created the themes, it was then important to review them to ensure that 
they had both internal homogeneity (that the data within a theme should all 
relate to each other and there should be no odd members of the family) and 
External heterogeneity (that a theme should be different from all other themes) 
(Patton 2002). This was done by reviewing each node in conjunction with its 
description, to see that all data extracts within it were appropriately coded and if 
necessary amending the description or name, recoding or creating further 
nodes. This was done for all 349 nodes (Braun and Clark 2008). 
4.2.5 Stage 5 - Defining and naming themes 
In this fifth stage (Braun and Clark 2008), the themes are accurately named to 
reflect their content and refined to ensure that they are not “too diverse and 
complex”. Again, the overall number of themes was expected to reduce but also 
identify redundant themes that, although may be of importance were not 
relevant to this specific study. 
 It was at this point that it suddenly became clear that analysing the data 
as a collective was not exposing the potential differences of culture between the 
ownership types, a fundamental objective of the research. Therefore, from the 
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master Nvivo model three separate sub-models were created, each only 
containing the sources from the appropriate ownership type: 
Ownership type Organisation 
Cooperative Coop1, Coop2 & Coop_Service   
Direct Direct1, DIR_Professional, DIR_Consultancy, 
DIR_Service, DIR_Eng & DIR_Manuf 
Trust Trust1, Trust2 & TRUST_Service 
Table 4.6 Organisations within type. 
 This then allowed each of the ownership types to be viewed in isolation 
and in comparison, with the others. This was further aided by exporting each 
node set into a spreadsheet so that the number of references and sources for 
each node for each ownership type could be viewed simultaneously. This 
provided a visual perception of the data that could be interpreted whilst still 
using the in-depth knowledge of the overall dataset. From this five “levels” of 
nodes were defined (and colour coded): 
Level Colour Meaning 
5          Nodes that were significant and were common across all the 
ownership types (e.g. “Openess”) 
4.xx 
 
 Nodes that were present and unique to one ownership type 
(e.g. “Share payout” in Direct ownership).  
3  Nodes that were not considered to be significant due to their 
presence or absence. This typically arose due to coding 
items that after further reflection were not considered directly 
relevant to the study (e.g. “Working hours”) or nodes that 
were perhaps only mentioned by one person (e.g. 
“deadlines”) and considered to be insignificant. 
2  Nodes that were conspicuously absent from one of the 
ownership types. That is where two of the ownership types 
did refer to a node which might be considered to be 
mainstream organisational practise but one type clearly 
omitted it. (e.g. “Grading for performance” was absent in 
cooperatives). These nodes were then often renamed to 
acknowledge their absence (e.g. “Line manager - Lack of” in 
cooperatives). 
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1  Nodes that were expected to be in all ownership types but 
were not significantly present. Only two nodes were left in this 
level - “pressure from peers” and “Anti-culture”. 
Table 4.7 Repetition of nodes across types. 
This spreadsheet was reflected upon and revised, leading to a further 
subdivision of level 4 to acknowledge which types the node did relate to (for 
example 4.23 meant that the node was present in both trust and cooperative 
EOBs but not direct). A screen print from the spreadsheet is shown below (see 
figure 4.5): 
 
Figure 4.5 Spreadsheet showing comparison of nodes within ownership types. 
 This finally revealed four distinct datasets (cooperative, direct, trust and 
combined) with parent nodes within them (these are shown in the findings 
chapters). Taking each set of nodes in turn, themes were then drawn out to 
highlight the culture within the different ownership type. These node sets and 
final themes are presented in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
4.2.6 Stage 6 - Producing the report 
The purpose of writing the report up is to publish the findings and so make them 
accessible to a wider audience. This needs to be done in a way that convinces 
the reader “of the merit and validity” of the analysis process (Braun and Clarke 
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2008). Thomas (2006, p245) provides a suggested “reporting style” for 
presenting findings, which includes the following three levels: 
• Top-level category (or theme). • A detailed description of the theme • Suitable quotes to illustrate the theme 
This model has been used in each of the findings chapters (5, 6, 7 and 8) but is 
preceded in each case by a more general section that illustrates some of the 
source information to show originality.  
 Throughout the rest of this thesis, verbatim quotes (potentially 
grammatically incorrect since they are part of a spoken conversation) and 
copies of field notes taken are included to illustrate the points made. These are 
indicated by indented, italicised text, followed by the organisation and some 
reference to the person speaking (if applicable). Quotes in bold are questions 
or comments that I have made during the conversation. The originating 
organisation is always shown and if necessary an anonymous identifier so that 
the contribution of a person can be identified but not the actual person. An 
example quote is shown below: 
“What are the main benefits of employee ownership to you? 
For me, its happiness. If you’re looking forward to coming into work, that 
says more than anything. You are not waking up and thinking “God I’m 
going to work!” You are actually quite happy, because you know “I’m 
going to have a really good time” and get your job done and hit 
everything you need to do.” - Direct1 employee 1. 
 Conversations have only been changed when it is required to preserve 
the anonymity of a person or organisation, or provide further clarification to an 
extract of a conversation. This is typically shown by enclosing a substituted 
word within "[ ]", for example: 
Can you tell me about the culture?  
There is a "[Organisation] Culture". Wherever you go in the world in a 
[Organisation] office, I could walk in and feel welcome, comfortable and 
have things in common with other people. - DIR_Service. 
 As previously mentioned the writing up of ethnographic studies has its 
own style (Van Maanen 1988) and the themes are explored in detail in Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8. 
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4.3 Background information about the organisations 
involved 
4.3.1 Phase 1 organisations  
This section introduces each of the organisations that agreed to take part in 
Phase 1 of the research. For confidentiality reasons, some of the explanations 
are deliberately vague but they provide sufficient understanding to gain an 
appreciation of their context and enable a degree of comparison. All the 
interviews took place between December 2013 and February 2014 and the 
lifespan is at the point the interview was carried out. All the organisations are 
still in existence at the time of completion of this thesis (2016) except for 
COOP_Service which has been bought out by a larger operator in the sector in 
2014. The exact reasons for this are unknown.  Where ownership is considered 
to be a hybrid form, the dominant ownership type has been highlighted; this is 
the ownership model that the organisation has been most like and has been 
used when analysing the data. A summary of all the contacts made as well as 
unsuccessful attempts is shown in the table (4.8) below, followed by a 
description of each one in turn. 
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Interview 
number 
  
and date 
Ownership 
Type 
(dominant 
type 
shown in 
yellow) 
Pseudo Name Description Access 
method 
Type of 
Interview - 
Face or 
Telephone 
1 
 
4/12/13 
TRUST + 
DIRECT 
DIR_Professional Medium 
sized 
professional 
services firm 
Identified 
from EOA 
website, 
then cold 
called. 
Telephone 
2 
 
9/12/13 
TRUST + 
DIRECT 
DIR_Consultancy Small sized 
professional 
services firm 
Via 
networking 
at EOA 
Conferenc
e 
Telephone 
3 
 
10/12/13 
COOP COOP_Shop,  
becomes Coop2. 
Small sized 
retail firm 
Suggested 
by trusted 
friend. 
Face to 
Face 
4 
 
16/12/13 
COOP COOP_Service Small sized 
professional 
services firm 
Identified 
from Co-
operatives 
UK 
website, 
then cold 
called. 
Face to 
Face 
5 
 
20/12/13 
TRUST TRUST_Service Large multi-
national 
professional 
services 
organisation. 
Via 
networking 
at EOA 
conference 
and White 
rose event. 
Telephone 
6 
 
7/1/14 
DIRECT DIR_Service Large multi-
national 
professional 
services. 
Via 
networking 
at EOA 
Conferenc
e  
Telephone 
(not 
recorded) 
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7 
 
7/1/14 
TRUST + 
DIRECT 
DIR_Eng Medium 
sized 
engineering 
firm 
Via 
networking 
at EOA 
day & EOA 
Conference 
Face to 
Face 
8 
 
21/2/14 
TRUST + 
DIRECT 
DIR_Manuf Medium 
sized 
manufacturing 
firm 
Via 
networking 
at EOA 
day 
Face to 
Face 
- TRUST Declined_1 Large retail 
organisation 
Dropped 
card off - 
no 
response 
 
- TRUST + 
DIRECT 
Declined_2 Medium 
sized 
engineering 
firm 
Via 
Networking 
at EOA 
Conferenc
e 
 
- COOP Declined_3 Small sized 
retail firm 
Suggested 
by trusted 
friend 
 
- COOP Declined_4 National 
medium 
sized retailer 
Identified 
from Co-
operatives 
UK 
website, 
then cold 
called. 
 
Table 4.8 Summary of Phase 1 organisations contacted 
Note: the definitions of size (Small, Medium and Large) are taken from the 
European Commission’s definition of Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME’s) (European Commission 2014). 
Note: From the very first two interviews it became apparent that my simplistic 
view that an organisation might be a trust or directly owned was inadequate. 
Where employees directly owned shares, it was frequently done in conjunction 
with a Trust holding shares on behalf of employees as well. These are therefore 
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examples of the hybrid model discussed in chapter two hence the dominant 
ownership type is shown above in bold. 
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4.3.1.1 DIR_Professional 
 
Pseudo Name DIR_Professional 
Ownership Type 68% owned by employees either in trust (all 
employees are members) or directly owned thorough 
share purchase (approximately 2/3rds have acquired 
shares). 32% is externally owned (acquired before EO 
was an option). The target is to be 100% employee 
owned by 20179. 
Dominant 
Ownership Type 
DIRECT 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
25 years (1988). 
Number of 
Employees 
1600 
Sector Personal Services 
History of EO The organisation was started with private investment 
by one person with external help. After seeing a 
successful model of EO run by his father, the founder 
chose to make it employee owned from 2000, where 
all employees became beneficiaries of a trust and 
were given the option to buy further shares if they 
wished. EO is seen as irrevocable and core to their 
way of working.  
National/Global National 
Multi-site Yes. 
Contact Person HR Director. 
Access Method After attending the EOA Conference in 2013, I cold-
emailed the organisation specifically asking to speak 
to the HR director and received a positive response. 
 
 
                                               
9
 From a conversation with a current employee at the EOA Robert Oakeshott lecture, 20/3/15 in 
London 
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4.3.1.2 DIR_Consultancy 
 
Pseudo Name DIR_Consultancy 
Ownership Type Majority owned by the 3 founders (all 
directors/employees). 13% of shares are in a SIP 
(Share Incentive Plan) where shares are given directly 
and personally to employees. Potentially in the future 
employees will also be able to purchase shares. 5% 
belong to an EBT (Employee benefit Trust) where all 
employees are members automatically of the trust, 
subject to a probationary period. 
Dominant 
Ownership Type 
DIRECT 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
3 years (2010). 
Number of 
Employees 
30 
Sector Professional Services 
History of EO Founded by 3 colleagues, who all left a FTSE 100 
organisation. From their previous (negative) 
experience they wanted to create an employee owned 
business from the start so took professional advice 
from Baxendale on how best to do this. The 
recommended solution was the result. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No. 
Contact Person Director/Founder. 
Access Method Contact with one of the employees who I met at the 
EO conference in 2013, who then gave access to the 
director. 
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4.3.1.3 COOP_Shop (This becomes Coop2) 
 
Pseudo Name COOP_Shop 
Ownership Type 100% Cooperative - however operates as a sociocracy 
where decisions are made by consensus rather than 
voting. 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
17 years (1996) 
Number of 
Employees 
44 members, 6 probationers, 10 casuals. 
Sector Food retail 
History of EO Created from the start as a worker coop, has 
continued to grow from its original three founders. 
Probationers serve a 7-month period after which the 
entire cooperative votes as to whether they should 
become members and pay for their £1 share. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No. 
Contact Person HR Director 
Access Method Contact was initiated via a colleague at the University 
who introduced me directly to the HR director. 
 
4.3.1.4 COOP_Service 
 
Pseudo Name COOP_Service 
Ownership Type 100% Cooperative 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
21 years (1982) 
Number of 
Employees 
32 
Sector Professional Services 
History of EO Originally created as a worker cooperative from the 
outset by seven founders.  
National/Global Local 
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Multi-site No. 
Contact Person Company secretary and commercial manager (just 
one person). 
Access Method Cold emailed after looking through Coops UK website 
for local Cooperatives, specifically asking to speak to 
senior manager. 
 
4.3.1.5 TRUST_Service 
 
Pseudo Name TRUST_Service 
Ownership Type 100% Trust owned by all employees. Shares are not 
evenly distributed; they cannot be purchased only 
accumulated due to length of service (gain 1.5 shares 
for each year of service) and position within the 
organisation (seniority is rewarded). 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
67 years (founded in 1940s, moved into EO in late 
1980s) 
Number of 
Employees 
11,700 (4,500 in the UK) 
Sector Professional Services 
History of EO Create by 2 brothers with some external partners. 
When they came to retire, they decided to move the 
organisation into EO. 
National/Global Global 
Multi-site Yes. 
Contact Person HR Director 
Access Method Made personal contact via a colleague at the company 
after hearing a speech at the EOA Conference in 
2013. I specifically targeted the HR director. 
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4.3.1.6 DIR_Service 
 
Pseudo Name DIR_Service  
Ownership Type 100% Directly owned, however only 56% of the 
employees choose to purchase shares following their 
one year probation. Therefore 44% choose not to own 
shares. Shares are purchased and cannot be kept 
outside of the organisation (i.e. on retiring or leaving 
they must be cashed in.) 
Dominant 
Ownership Type 
DIRECT 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
53 years (1960) 
Number of 
Employees 
9000 
Sector Professional Services 
History of EO Originally created by 3 founders they decided to give 
employees the option to purchase shares from the 
beginning. 
National/Global Global 
Multi-site Yes. 
Contact Person HR Principal 
Access Method Made personal contact after hearing a speech at the 
EOA Conference in 2013 given by the interviewee. 
 
4.3.1.7 DIR_Eng 
 
Pseudo Name DIR_Eng 
Ownership Type Direct and trust owned. Employees must buy a 
minimum quantity of shares as a condition of their full 
employment (i.e. once they have passed probation). 
They can then optionally purchase more if they wish 
(some do, some do not). Hence the distribution of 
shares is not equal and the founder holds significantly 
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more than average. The remainder of the shares are 
held within a trust for all members of an umbrella trust. 
(Note some non-executives are given shares rather 
than paid for their services so this is external 
ownership but relatively insignificant.) 
Dominant 
Ownership Type 
DIRECT 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
14 years (2000) 
Number of 
Employees 
50 
Sector Engineering/Manufacturing 
History of EO This organisation was purchased out of a business run 
by the MD’s father in 2000. At this point employees 
could optionally purchase shares in the business 
however it was not until 2006 that EO was formally 
introduced. Ownership via share purchase is now 
mandatory on joining the organisation. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No. 
Contact Person Managing Director (and founder). 
Access Method Originally met the MD at an EOA event and 
subsequently phoned up to arrange access. 
 
4.3.1.8 DIR_Manuf 
 
Pseudo Name DIR_Manuf 
Ownership Type On starting an employee must purchase at least 5% of 
their salary in shares (via a loan over a 12-month 
period). There is the annual option to purchase more if 
they wish and they must be sold within 5 years of 
leaving the organisation (or quicker if they have served 
less than 5 years on a year for year basis.) The 
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remainder of the shares are held in trust for all the 
employees. 
Dominant 
Ownership Type 
DIRECT 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
33 years (1980) 
Number of 
Employees 
120. 
Sector Manufacturing. 
History of EO The firm was started by two partners and transferred 
into EO in 2004 following the sudden death of one of 
them. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No. 
Contact Person HR Director 
Access Method Via contact at the University who introduced us. 
Specifically targeted the HR director. 
4.3.2 Phase 2 organisations  
This section provides a similar introduction to each of the organisations that 
agreed to take part in Phase 2 of the research. More information is provided for 
these organisations because of their greater role in the overall research; 
however, anonymity is still observed. Fieldwork took place during the period 
February to July in 2014. 
 From Schein’s (1992) definition of organisational culture concerning 
shared assumptions that are valid and therefore passed onto the next 
generation, it is important to have a deeper understanding of the history of 
these organisations to see how the original understandings were first created. 
4.3.2.1 Coop1 
 
Pseudo Name Coop1 
Ownership Type 100% worker cooperative 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
37 years (1977) 
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Number of 
Employees 
150 + 35 casual workers 
Sector Wholesale food retail 
History of EO See below. Created by its founder then sold in 1977 to 
7 members who created the cooperative from the 
outset. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No 
Turnover £40m 
Contact Person HR Director 
Access Method Via a contact at the University who introduced us. 
 
4.3.2.1.1 Coop1 history 
From the initial seven members of the cooperative, the organisation has moved 
premises several times as it has grown. It now resides in a purpose-built unit on 
an industrial estate in roughly the same locality. The membership has grown to 
150 members as well as having several people on temporary contracts. The 
turnover is approximately £40m. 
4.3.2.1.2 Coop1 ethnographic experience 
Access to Coop1 for a month long ethnographic placement had been verbally 
given in discussions with the HR director, some months prior to attending.  
However when trying to email and finalise exact details of when to come, the 
responses became slow and unforthcoming. After some pressing it became 
apparent that the HR representative could not host me and that another 
member had to be found to do it. In addition, it would no longer be a month. 
Repeated email requests over some months by the HR director around the 
membership did finally provide a contact who was prepared to host me for one 
day. This was less than desired but taken with a view to possibly being able to 
extend once on site. 
 On the visit day, I was met by my host and two interviews had been 
prepared in advance for me to attend. One was in the staff canteen, a noisy but 
important hub within the organisation, the other being outside due to the sunny 
weather. I also interviewed my contact and a member volunteered themselves 
on spec as well as volunteering a casual worker for them. I was given free 
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access to look through the record of past minutes of the management 
committee meetings. We returned to the canteen for lunch where members on 
long tables were happy to talk to me and at the end of the day, my contact took 
me on a tour of the warehouse. Throughout the day I had contact with nine 
individuals or groups. 
 One member suggested that I come to the upcoming Quarterly General 
Meeting that all members are requested to attend, so on my return home I 
emailed to see if this was possible. After a delay of a few days I was invited to 
come, on the understanding that a vote would be taken at the beginning of the 
meeting to see if I could attend. If the membership decided against it I would not 
be allowed access. On the day, I drove to the external meeting venue and 
waited in the car park, chatting to members prior to the meeting. Once the 
meeting started, the vote was taken immediately and I was allowed in to 
observe. I managed to find my contact person who could explain to me what 
was going on and give me some background to what was being discussed. 
Hence I did achieve more than the initial day but still less than I had hoped for. 
4.3.2.2 Coop2 
Coop2 and COOP_Shop are the same organisation. It was not expected that a 
Phase 1 organisation would also be used in Phase 2, however due to the 
restricted access to Coop1 it was considered to be beneficial to get a better 
understanding of worker coops by revisiting this cooperative. The table below 
shows the updated information from the interviews, which took place only seven 
months after the Phase1 interview. 
Pseudo Name Coop2 
Ownership Type 100% Cooperative 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
18 years (1996) 
Number of 
Employees 
59 members and probationers, 20 casuals. 
Sector Food retail 
History of EO Created from the start as a worker coop, has 
continued to grow from its original three founders. 
Probationers serve a 7-month period after which the 
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entire cooperative votes as to whether they should 
become members and pay for their £1 share. 
National/Global Local 
Multi-site No. 
Turnover £6m 
Contact Person HR Director 
Access Method Via a contact at the University who introduced us. 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Coop2 history 
The organisation was created as a cooperative from its outset, based on a 
successful model from another shop. It quickly grew beyond expectations, 
leading to purchasing its own premises and extending the building where 
possible. It continues to remain profitable and busy. 
4.3.2.2.2 Coop2 ethnographic experience 
Following the initial interview for Phase 1 and the limited access to Coop1 in 
Phase 2, the contact within Coop2 was contacted again to see if further access 
could be given. This was willingly provided and a single date arranged later that 
month. On arrival, I was able to interview the HR director again to see what had 
changed in the intervening seven months. The remainder of the day was taken 
up with pre-arranged interviews with members. Initially this was done in a very 
hot office but then moved outside to a roof space which was cooler but made 
the voice recordings harder to capture. I had no time to find additional members 
but did purchase my lunch from the shop and was free to observe the business 
in action. In total I interviewed eleven individuals on the day. 
4.3.2.3 Direct1 
 
Pseudo Name Direct1 
Ownership Type Directly owned by employees with all other shares 
held in trust for all members of an umbrella 
organisation (made up of three EO business, that is 
Direct1, DIR_Eng above and another one, spun out of 
Direct1.) Within their first-year employees must 
purchase £1000 worth of shares in the organisation 
and have the option to buy more if they wish. Larger 
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holdings are required for more senior appointments. 
Approximately 25% of employees have the minimum 
amount and therefore 75% have more than the 
minimum, typically the longer the employee has 
worked there, the more they have. Shares can be kept 
on retirement otherwise they cannot be kept if leaving 
by choice. The founding two partners hold significant 
amounts of shares however to reduce their 
shareholding they have voluntarily chosen to give up 
half of their shares to an umbrella organisation which 
will hold them in trust for the benefit of the trust 
members. The transfer of shares is a 10-year process 
(finishing 2021). The trust also prevents the 
organisation from ever being sold for profit. A minimum 
of one third of post-tax profits is paid as dividend 
(enshrined in the articles). One of the founders (now 
retired but still a non-exec director) and some other 
non-executives hold some shares otherwise the 
ownership is 100% employees. 
 
Although this might appear to be a trust based or 
hybrid, the ethos of the organisation is very much 
about “direct” ownership. Employees must be personal 
share owners and at this point the trust has only been 
going for two years (started in 2011) so there has been 
little benefit or dividend for members. Eventually the 
trust will own 60% of the shares and no one person 
will own more than 10%. 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
25 years (1988) 
Number of 
Employees 
400 
Sector Manufacturing 
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History of EO See below. The company was formed in 1988 with 
employees given the option to purchase shares if they 
wanted to. In 2010 it was made mandatory for all 
employees to own shares (existing and newcomers). 
National/Global Global 
Multi-site Yes. 
Turnover £40m 
Contact Person Special Projects manager 
Access Method Originally through a contact within the University, the 
organisation was approached following some 
successful research for an MSc dissertation (Wren 
2011). 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Direct1 history 
The following history is based on an interview with the founder on 10th March 
2014 on-site at Direct1.  
 The founder of Direct1, who is still a non-executive director and a proud 
Yorkshire man, built his first manufacturing company in direct competition to a 
sole supplier with a monopoly. This was very successful and led to selling his 
company back to the competitor. During the sale he was aware that not only he 
had invested his effort in the organisation but his workforce had too.  
“I did very well out of the sale but I thought it was wrong that I should 
take all the money when everyone else contributed to making it. So part 
of the deal, what we did when we sold the business, was that 10% of the 
proceeds went to the employees.” 
 He then created Direct1 based around a unique, innovative product, 
along with seventeen employees to whom he gave the option of purchasing 
shares, thirteen of which chose to. Subsequently the company grew (though not 
always) and each year every employee has had the option to purchase shares. 
In 1996 10% of the company was sold to an investor (and has now been bought 
back - 2009) with the condition written into the articles, that one third of post-tax 
profits would be given as a dividend to shareholders. Mandatory ownership was 
discussed in 2006 and rejected however in 2010 it was introduced so that 
existing employees as well as any new employees had to purchase a minimum 
amount (£1000, although this is reduced to £50 for the office in India). At this 
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point an umbrella trust was set up, from three organisations (Direct1, DIR_Eng 
(sole supplier of raw materials to Direct1) and a spin off from Direct1). The 
shares from the two original owners are now being voluntarily given into the 
trust at the rate of £600,000 per year over a ten year period. The dividend from 
the trust is then shared amongst the trust beneficiaries (who are all the 
employees of the three companies) on an equal basis. The board members of 
the trust represent each company in a proportion to the number of employees in 
that organisation and are freely voted for. Now the organisation employs 400 
people and has a turnover of £40m. It is based over three local sites as well as 
having offices in France, America and India. 
4.3.2.3.2 Direct1 ethnographic experience 
When the research started I was allocated a hot-desk in the open plan office 
area and given free permission to go anywhere in the factory and office and talk 
to anyone I wanted to. I could attend at times convenient to myself and did not 
need to sign in or wear any form of identification. I made appointments to 
interview the Managing Director, Founder and representatives from People and 
Culture. On my first day I was booked in to see three team leaders and on 
another day I was taken to a different site to meet a director and his team. Other 
than these appointments, all other conversations were initiated by me and took 
place at the interviewee's work area (desk or machine) - I had been requested 
not to interview people in the rest room as employees would be on their break. 
The interview with the MD took place at his desk in the open plan office in full 
view of all other staff. Except for two people (one had poor English and the 
other was busy) everyone was happy to talk to me. Some of them were aware 
of who I was once I had introduced myself and this recognition grew as I 
continued to spend time on site.  
4.3.2.4 Trust1 
 
Pseudo Name Trust1 
Ownership Type 100% trust owned on behalf of all its employees. 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
100+ years 
Number of 
Employees 
50,000+ 
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Sector Retail 
History of EO See below.  
National/Global National 
Multi-site Yes. 
Turnover £1bn+ 
Contact Person Section Manager 
Access Method Contact was made at an academic conference (White 
Rose Consortium 2014) with a senior ex-employee 
who could provide contact details for a branch 
manager. This was followed up and access was 
agreed with the branch and central office. 
 
4.3.2.4.1 Trust1history 
Trust1 was originally a family shop which has subsequently expanded into 
being a national chain. It was converted into a trust owned business on behalf 
of all its employees, mid-way through the last century, primarily as a moral 
response to the inequality between the owners and the employees. Through 
acquisitions and new shops the organisation has grown significantly and 
provides an annual bonus for each employee dependent on the profits created 
in the previous year. The organisation is organised into branches and regions 
throughout the UK. Employees are elected on to governance boards to 
represent the workforce. 
4.3.2.4.2 Trust1 ethnographic experience 
Access to the specific branch was obtained at a meeting with the Branch 
Manager but had to be subsequently approved with the Central office. On my 
first day I was instructed to prepare a presentation to the management team 
within the branch to explain exactly what I was doing and what I wanted from 
them. In the end I delivered the same presentation three times; firstly to the 
management team, then to the managers who had been on the shop floor and 
could not attend the first briefing and then to the elected team that represented 
all of the employees within the branch. Subsequently I was taken on a tour of 
the entire building, including the shop floor, office space, stockrooms, staff 
canteen, unused office block and the loading bay. I was allocated my own 
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closed meeting room and given permission to go anywhere I pleased and talk to 
anyone I wanted to. 
 Each day, on entering the store I had to hand in my personal bag/coat 
and carry all other equipment (pens, notebook and voice recorder) in a clear 
plastic bag. This is standard procedure for all staff to help prevent theft. On 
leaving each night I had to press a red “Search” button; if it randomly stayed lit I 
then had to empty my pockets again to show that I was not stealing anything. I 
arranged specific meetings with the Branch Manager, HR representative, 
elected body chairwoman, and a regional representative; all other interviews 
were spontaneously carried out. Three people volunteered themselves to be 
interviewed (two managers and a member of Business Protection). I was free to 
attend when I wanted and able to participate in several daily staff meetings. I 
continued to attend the management meeting every week as well as have a 
catch-up meeting with my contact (an operations manager) on a weekly basis. 
Information was readily and willingly provided for me to take home and no one 
declined to talk to me. I usually ate my lunch in the staff canteen, which I found 
to be a very useful source of conversation. 
4.3.2.5 Trust2 
 
Pseudo Name Trust2 
Ownership Type 100% trust equally owned by two trusts; a charitable 
trust that gives away its dividend for good causes and 
an employee trust that distributes its dividend back to 
the employees. 
Lifespan (starting 
year) 
82 years (1932) 
Number of 
Employees 
380 
Sector Manufacturing 
History of EO In the mid-1960s, the 98% of the shareholdings were 
evenly put into the two trusts by the founding co-
directors and on their deaths, without children (1980s) 
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the remaining shares were transferred. This was done 
to prevent outside ownership. 
National/Global National 
Multi-site Yes. 
Turnover £25m 
Contact Person Finance Director 
Access Method Original contact made at an EOA event and 
subsequently phoned up to arrange access. 
 
4.3.2.5.1 Trust2 history 
The company was founded by three partners each with different skills. 
Following the Second World War, one partner dropped out, so the remaining 
two (one male, one female, both unmarried) continued to grow the organisation 
into a world leader in a niche field. Neither wanted nor needed outside help so 
shares were never offered outside of the business. To prevent the company 
ever being sold off, the two trusts were created that now hold all the shares on 
behalf of the employees or for charitable purposes. 
4.3.2.5.2 Trust2 ethnographic experience 
The ethnographic experience regarding Trust2 is limited to an email 
conversation to gain access and a single interview on site, with an 
accompanying site tour. One hour was spent with the Finance Director, 
including a detailed tour of the site. Although a prolonged period had been 
requested for the research, it became apparent that being able to walk freely 
around the site would be a safety hazard and was therefore understandably 
declined. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has explained the analysis process that was followed and how the 
themes were created from the data. A general inductive approach was adopted 
(Thomas 2006) and data was coded, with the aid of software, to enable 
qualitative data reduction to take place. The data was then split into different 
ownership types to allow individual investigation of each type as well as a 
comparison across types. From this, themes regarding the culture of each of the 
types (cooperative, direct, trust and combined) were identified. Examples of 
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performance and then reward are used to illustrate what was observed in the 
field. The cultural themes for that specific ownership type are then revealed, 
along with their explanation as well as examples of illustrative dialogue. These 
themes are now presented in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. 
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Chapter 5 - Cooperative ownership findings 
5.1 Introduction. 
This is the first chapter that focuses on the findings from the analysis stage. It 
considers employee owned businesses that are worker cooperatives and 
therefore aspire to the ICA (2014) principles of cooperative working. It considers 
the research questions for this specific ownership type, firstly by focusing on 
what was observed in the field concerning performance and reward 
management (Q2) and then theorising about organisational culture in worker 
cooperatives (Q1). The findings are drawn from the research at three worker 
cooperatively owned organisations, namely Coop1, Coop2 and Coop_Service. 
 Five key themes of worker cooperative culture are identified, these are: 
1. Whole life perspective 
2. Shared values 
3. Self-owner 
4. Self-control 
5. Secure employment 
Elements that are common to all three ownership types (coop, direct and trust) 
are investigated and reported in chapter 8. 
5.2 Performance and reward management within coops. 
This section highlights and provides illustrations of performance and reward that 
were observed in the field. In effect, this is looking at Schein’s (1992) artefacts, 
values and norms as an attempt to get at the underlying beliefs. From these, 
themes regarding culture are subsequently drawn out and explored. 
5.2.1 Performance management within coops. 
The probation period is a serious undertaking. It enables employees to 
demonstrate their character and prove their ability at being able to carry out the 
required tasks. This is a critical stage in the process of employees adopting the 
existing culture according to Schein's (1992) definition of culture that talks about 
teaching new employees "the correct way to perceive, think, and feel”. All the 
coops researched demonstrated significant time, effort and money being 
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invested into the recruitment and probation process. A lengthy probation period, 
typically seven to nine months, was the normal practice.  
 “And so they are all members? 
30 are, two are due to become members tomorrow, at the members 
meeting tomorrow. 
So is there a probation period? 
One year.” - Coop_Service. 
 
 “We put people through, say a nine months trial membership program 
which is very expensive, I think it cost us in the region of 10 grand [£10k] 
per person.” - Coop1 member 3. 
 During probation potential members would undertake a number of roles 
under the supervision of “overseers” (or team leaders). They were treated like 
full members as far as possible (for example access to members meetings and 
information) however there were limitations. Certain roles were excluded (for 
example payroll) and privileges (for example being able to vote in member 
meetings). Performance was monitored closely during this period, often 
reported on a monthly basis. At the end of the period, a vote was taken by the 
current membership as to whether to admit the employee as a member. If it was 
not approved, the employment was terminated. This rarely happened though as 
employees usually knew how members were feeling (from the regular feedback 
they received) and either improved to the required standard or voluntarily left 
the organisation prior to the vote. They might have already decided that they did 
not want to work in a worker coop environment or to avoid the potential rejection 
of being turned down.  
“People do get rejected; yes it is an interesting one because I think if they 
do they know about it quite early on. They don’t gel. They end up pulling 
out of it before it comes to the vote, but some people do get to vote and 
don’t make it in. Yeah, it’s a funny one. Some people, it’s just democracy 
at the end of the day. You can literally rub someone up the wrong way 
and it won’t happen for you but people generally do try.” - Coop1 
Member 1. 
 Rejection could be due to a number of reasons; inability to perform the 
role, not willing to accept the cooperative principles or simply a personality 
clash. The voting system allows the entire membership to decide who “fits” in 
with the current culture and who does not. 
“Does anybody not make it past the seven months? 
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Yes. It’s not like loads of people but it could be anything you know. 
We’ve had people with extreme lateness. That’s just unacceptable.” - 
Coop_Service. 
 This approval method is very different to other organisations where the 
decision to employ someone is usually taken by a very small group of people, 
possibly even just one person. Clearly in larger coops not everyone might know 
the new recruit in detail; this was off-set by rotating employees around different 
departments and the designated mentor providing written feedback for other 
members to see, putting them in an influential position. This can make the 
probation quite stressful for the new recruit, trying to impress a large number of 
people. Allowing potential recruits to drift past twelve months employment was 
considered unacceptable as it gave them a right to claim protected employment 
status but still not be a member of the cooperative, which was an untenable 
situation. 
 The financial rewards at Coop2 (flat salary of approximately £21k) 
attracted two distinct groups of people into becoming members. There were 
older members; these had had previous careers through which they had 
established an acceptable standard of living/housing and were therefore now 
content to maintain their current social and living standard. Alternatively, there 
were typically younger or foreign workers, who were just starting their working 
life (after university or travelling the world) who were excited to try something 
out and enjoy the experience but potentially had to move on to a different job if 
they wanted to buy a house or start a family in the relatively up-market locality. 
Hence new members were not school leaver age but already had some 
experience of life, either from working or travelling, before coming to the coops. 
“The organisation tends to recruit more mature people. There are very 
few school leavers who come directly to work here. The guy felt that this 
made sense as you had to have a degree of confidence and the ability to 
express it in order to take part in the debates that happen, and that many 
school leavers don’t yet possess that.” - Field notes from conversation 
with Coop1 member 6. 
 Being confident to speak and express an opinion mattered, otherwise 
members were restricted in their ability to participate in the numerous debates 
(officially in members meetings and unofficially around the canteen table). This 
however did not mean that only extroverts could work in a coop but it was 
observed that people either did speak freely or learnt how to do it (Kelman 
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1958). Hoffman (2016, p168) refers to a greater freedom to express emotions in 
coops as part of the interaction required, 
“Often, members would describe how they would first engage in surface 
acting and fake a required emotional response, but later would come to 
have altered their own feelings so that they truly felt the required 
emotions.” 
This was observed in the fieldwork to. 
“Do you have to be strong? Do you have to have a certain amount 
of self-confidence to work here, in order to express your voice? 
I don’t think so, I don’t think so. I was, when I started I wasn’t like I am 
now. If anything I think you gain confidence from working here. Like 
really shy, just a completely different person. It is almost like, the 
environment has been created that helps you improve but again because 
of emails and things, because you are communicating in a different way, 
I think it is easier for shy people, less confident to actually be able to 
speak up and share their opinions so I don’t think, and everyone is just 
very welcoming as well, so you feel like “Actually if I say something, I am 
going to be so taken seriously” so that does help. Yes I do genuinely 
think people gain confidence by working here.” - Coop2 member 11. 
 Support was provided to train people in public speaking and options were 
given for members to express themselves in smaller group settings rather than 
whole member meetings. Hence it appeared to be a supportive culture, 
welcoming people who might lack confidence in speaking, thus avoiding a 
power structure that excluded them instead. Although attending whole member 
meetings was required, speaking was optional. 
“some people find it very intimidating, they just don’t feel they can sit 
there and talk in front of lots of people” - Coop_Service. 
 Alongside self-confidence, there is an expectation for members to be 
able to self-manage themselves. Depending on the perspective there were 
either no managers present or everyone was a manager. Therefore they were 
responsible for how they utilised their time and how much discretionary effort 
was expended (Saks 2006). 
“..so in a way we have got 150 managers, working here… self-managing, 
that is a crucial thing because you have to be able to work on your own 
and manage your own time because you don’t have anyone looking over 
you necessarily and telling you what to do, so you need to be 
comfortable with that and that sounds like an easy thing, or something 
that everyone wants to do and do well but it is not as straightforward as 
you think.” - Coop1 member 1. 
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 “We are all managers of both ourselves and each other. I would say it is 
more like guidance than management.” - Coop2 member 6. 
This can lead to a tension between people wanting to do their own thing and 
having the support and cover of a leadership team above them who take 
responsibility for the difficult decisions that have to be made in organisations. 
“He explained that he thought a number of people will be thinking “What 
we need now is strong leadership but don’t fucking tell me what to do”" - 
The contradiction between wanting someone to take charge but not 
actually telling me personally what I have to do! - Field notes from Coop1 
all members meeting. 
 With regard to personal performance, there was an expectation that 
people would naturally want to do the best for the organisation and therefore 
themselves via the resulting increased profit share. Where members were 
considered to not be pulling their weight there was a feeling that self-guilt was 
the primary motivation for correction rather than actually telling them, however 
some peer performance management did take place either during appraisal 
feedback or face to face in team meetings. This however appeared to be 
confused with the attitude that no one is actually managed and therefore 
nobody has the right to tell anyone else what to do. 
“Researcher: So what happens if somebody isn’t pulling that 95% 
of the 95%? Do you just talk to them? Or do you just leave them to 
it? 
[Long pause]. Tricky subject actually. Not much is done, we have, there 
are people who are considered that they don’t pull their weight, piss 
takers and all the rest of it. It is just “okay, fine, be it on their own 
conscience”. It is not a sore subject”. - Coop1 member 3. 
 Performance appraisals were carried out in all of the coops researched 
but they were all done slightly differently. In Coop1, a member selected a group 
of approximately 15 fellow members to feedback on their performance. In 
Coop2 the entire membership (60 people) fed back on a member via an 
automated email system, the results of which were then collated by the HR 
manager and passed on anonymously to the member in a face to face meeting. 
Coop_Service focused primarily on the technical performance of a member 
(are they hitting all the necessary KPI’s?) and much less on development 
aspects. As long as the customer was satisfied, how it was achieved was of 
little consequence. The underlying feeling was one of complete autonomy:  
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“I’m a member you can’t tell me what to do, I’m a member. [Laughter].” - 
Coop_Service. 
Hence individuals saw themselves as being powerful, having significant self-
regulation in how they behaved. Appraisal frequency was usually yearly or 
sometimes even longer (up to two years in Coop1) which allowed for a 
significant time for a member to drift before corrective action would be 
acknowledged as being required. 
5.2.2 Reward management within coops. 
5.2.2.1 Financial reward within coops. 
All of the coops researched had the same basic financial reward structure of 
paying a regular salary enhanced with some form of profit or surplus share, 
distributed periodically during the year. 
 In two of the worker cooperatives (Coop1 and Coop2), pay was not 
bench marked against the market but was determined by being the maximum 
that the coop could afford based on current performance and the financial state 
of the organisation. Hence it could go up as well as down. However in 2015, 
Coop1 had a 5% rise and Coop2 had a 10% pay rise against a UK average 
wage increase of 2% (Scullin 2015). The wages paid were also consistent 
across the organisation for each member. In Coop2 everyone received the 
same hourly rate (£11per hour or full time equivalent (FTE) salary ~ £21k.) and 
Coop1 chose to pay everyone the same nett pay (FTE salary £29k), hence 
wages were individually amended to cater for different tax codes so that the 
final figure was the same for all members (subject to the number of hours 
worked).  
“[Coop1] is a fully democratic workers’ cooperative. All cooperative 
members and employees receive the same net hourly rate of pay, no 
matter what their job or responsibilities.”- Taken from Coop1’s ethical 
policy. 
Therefore compared to the external market, some manual workers (e.g. 
warehouse pickers, shelf stackers) were receiving more than the external 
market rate and for some office workers (e.g. HR director, marketing) they were 
receiving less than the external rate. Partly to compensate for this, employees 
undertook both technical/managerial roles as well as manual work within the 
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space of a normal week. Hence the HR director might perform an HR role three 
days a week and then drive a forklift in the warehouse for the other two. 
“Some people like [name] works in the canteen but she is also on the 
marketing and PR team, she does sales, she does credit control, in fact 
what don’t you do?” - Coop1 member 3. 
This rotation was also seen to dilute some of the stress related to responsible 
positions and balanced the workload amongst the members. 
“I get a day playing, here in the toy room [warehouse] on all the toys 
[forklifts, electric pallet movers].” - Coop1 member 3 (Sales account 
representative and warehouse operative). 
 The cooperatives employed temporary workers, either to cater for 
increased demand or as part of the journey of probation towards becoming a 
member. Coop2 choose to pay a reduced rate than those for members (80% of 
the members pay rate in 2014). Hence the added responsibility of being a 
member was recognised financially and it also included the profit share, which 
was not available to temporary members. 
 Although staff turnover was actually very low, retention of members using 
financial inducements was not possible, since the terms of reward were not 
individually tailorable and people had a free choice to accept or reject them. 
Hence retention focused on other aspects of work, for example by making the 
working week more amenable - reducing hours, term-time only contracts, 
changing work days or shift times and access to unpaid leave but not on 
personal financial inducements. This was particularly important for employees 
who had dependants or desired time away from work and was therefore seen 
as incredibly valuable. Once an employee had met the minimum requirements 
for hours worked per week, it provided a great deal of flexibility and individuality 
within the working week which is not always available in a traditional 
organisation. 
“I am part-time, which is also a really valuable part of the organisation, 
that a lot of us are able to flex our working week around childcare 
responsibilities and other things outside of work which is incredibly 
valuable for me. It is really crucial at this stage in my life” - Coop1 
member 7. 
 Coop_Service had a different pay policy and chose not to pay a flat rate 
across all members. This was considered necessary as some members were 
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highly skilled within a niche employment market, so in order to attract such 
employees a comparable market rate had to be paid, although it was 
acknowledged as being lower than the market rate. This could not be reflected 
in all members pay otherwise the coop would become unviable; therefore there 
were unequal rates of pay. Hence the pay rates were sector dependent. 
“We have some people that are much more skilled than others and in this 
industry we wouldn’t be able to pay people just a flat rate.” - 
Coop_Service 
 The surplus profit share or “interest on member’s shares” was relatively 
small in comparison to the annual salary and as such it was not seen as a great 
incentive (approximately £2k or 7% of the salary in Coop1 and £1600 (8%) in 
Coop2 per year). It was only paid to members and not to temporary workers. 
The allocation of the bonus to each member was also very specific to each 
coop, with a view to maximising it legally under current tax legislation.  
“now 50% we all get just because we are a member, we have those 
responsibilities so that is shared out equally regardless of how many 
years you have been here, 25% is for your service, length of service 
which is maxed out at 10, then 25% is your hours, contractual hours.” - 
Coop2 member 10. 
Coop-service, choose to divide the profit equally amongst all members 
regardless of whether they were part-time or full-time since they were all 
members who had paid £1 for their share. However the method of calculation 
can be a cause of tension amongst members. 
 “I feel I work just as hard as someone who is just starting here so I think 
it is very unfair and a lot of people do as well.” - Coop2 member 10. 
 “I thought it was quite unfair considering we are a workers coop” - 
Coop2 member 1. 
 In some cases the profit share was not a significant amount of money as 
shown below in response to hitting the sales target required to trigger a bonus:  
“There was one year when we nearly reached it but it became a bit of a 
joke like, “We’ve almost reached it, if we just get another hundred 
pounds we will get it!” so everyone did their massive shop to hit the 
target, it was bit like a joke. It’s definitely not an incentive; people are 
working hard here anyway.” - Coop2 member 1. 
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 In setting the pay rates and profit dividend, there was an emphasis on 
providing secure employment for both current and future members. Hence a 
conservative approach was often taken. 
 “We know we could definitely pay ourselves a bit more but it gives us a 
bit of a cushion” - Coop2 member 1. 
 This philanthropic perspective of providing future employment was 
important. The desire influenced the purchasing and renovation of property 
(therefore a significant cost) and impacted on the financial rewards that were 
available to the current membership. Hence there was an avoidance of short 
term, profit maximisation and instead an emphasis on building for the longer 
term for people who were not even part of the organisation. 
“No we are here to keep people in work that’s our main thing. We are 
here for employment, yes. It is nice to make a profit but if we don’t make 
massive profits then it is not, you know, it’s more about being here next 
year. Same as when we bought the building, it is more about the future 
generations that are going to work here.” - Coop_Service member.   
 A policy of avoiding redundancy wherever possible was also consistent 
although this was not always achieved. Members resorted to reducing wages 
and hours in order to maintain the membership however in dire circumstances 
even this was not enough. 
“so we had to make redundancies which is unheard of in a co-op, so we 
have lost a couple of major contracts and had to make some big 
changes…. So we just had to make the decision in a members meeting, 
we talked to the members and said we just cannot carry on. Obviously 
we had no redundancy matrix in place or anything so we had to do a 
matrix to work out who we had to lose. So it was pretty bad.” 
Coop_Service member. 
 Whether all workers should actually be members was a contested view 
point, which was vigorously debated in public. By maximising membership it 
fulfilled the desire for full employment and solidarity of working providing 
opportunities for all. However by minimising the membership and employing 
temporary workers it maximised the profit of members but reemphasised the 
dominant capitalist owner-servants status (Erdal 2011). 
“The guy who I had previously identified as “cigarette guy” expressed his 
opinion that it should be 100% membership rather than a large bank of 
casual workers - this received a round of applause, possibly 
demonstrating the schism between a utopian fully co-operative 
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organisation and a profit driven business.” - Field notes from Coop1 
quarterly general meeting. 
 The coops all demonstrated a flat organisational structure although 
people had different roles and responsibilities within the organisations. 
“Management committees” and “Executive committees” were used to facilitate 
the business but they were members who remained accountable, and were 
typically elected by the membership. Therefore the concept of promotion or 
moving up a career ladder was not observed in the coops, since there was no 
"life-long ladder to ever-high positions" (Rothschild and Whitt 1986, p56) or any 
additional individual pay obtainable. Instead members were encouraged to 
move around the coop, doing new roles, gaining new experience and becoming 
more flexible. This therefore is potentially an issue for retention and was most 
obviously counteracted by the joy and pleasure of working in the environment.  
“There are studies that have been done, so that after two years when 
people realise all of a sudden they have got everything they can get, and 
we have got this thing, people realise after two years they’ve got 
everything and they are driven by promotion so they will have to go 
somewhere else and we have got that.” - Coop2 HR department 
 “because we are all on the same pay, we all have the same job 
description; there is no competition to get that next promotion, to get that 
bigger bonus. There is none of that; it is in our best interests for us all to 
be happy and all to be working well.” - Coop2 member 6. 
5.2.2.2 Non financial reward within Coops. 
Non-financial rewards are a significant element of the total rewards package 
offered at the cooperatives that were researched (Kaplan 2005). An important 
aspect was the ability to be flexible about when people worked, extending to not 
being at work at all due to generous leave policies. 
“He had recently come back from a period of three months off. You can 
take one year off every five years which is unpaid but brings a massive 
amount of flexibility. He told the story of a casual worker who would work 
hard for a period of months and then take the rest of the year off 
travelling, repeating this over a number of years.” - Field notes at Coop1. 
 Especially in Coop1 and Coop2, members enjoyed a significant degree 
of alignment between their own personal values and those of the organisations. 
For example being ethical, ecological, vegetarian, organic, and supporting 
workers’ rights. This was often the first step in people becoming members as 
they would often be customers of the coop in the first place. This meant that 
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members were not at odds with their beliefs in the workplace, thus enhancing 
the potential for organisational commitment (Saks 2006). 
“What attracted you to the organisation back then can you 
remember? 
Primarily the fact that I am light on vegetarian and vegan so I think 
actually I would have wanted to work here irrespective of the actual 
management type structure. That is a definite bonus and all the organic 
side and fair trade, but primarily vegetarian and vegan.” - Coop2 
member 2. 
How did you get here? How did you get to this organisation? 
First of all I started off by being a customer, then I noticed on Facebook 
that they were recruiting so I applied.” - Coop2 member 8. 
This was not readily observed in Coop_Service, (where only one research 
interview took place so there was limited scope to observe it) however the 
service provided was automotive/engineering based and so the greatest 
espoused value was that of cooperative working. 
 There was an emphasis on equality, specifically gender equality allowing 
all members to be comfortable at work. 
“He explained that there was a great sense of equality between men and 
women, that anybody could do any job, as well as be paid the same 
amount. The management committee is deliberately split 50- 50 (three 
men, three women)” - Field notes from Coop1. 
“What is the ratio of male to female split or don’t you care about 
that? 
Do you know what, I have looked recently and I think it is about 50-50. I 
think there is a few more men than women.” - Coop2 HR. 
This also assisted in creating a diverse workforce representing many countries, 
races and sexual orientations. 
“That is part of the democracy as well, so I think in the Co-op we have a 
gay and lesbian community that is quite important. I do not know how it is 
in other places but in here for some reason we have this huge 
representation of lesbian and gay people. It makes the place more 
democratic as well, more diverse. So all of these issues are part of 
democracy.” - Coop1 member 2. 
By encouraging people from different groups to be part of the coop, it ensures 
that a wider representation of humanity is present during democratic debates. 
Therefore the voices heard are representative of a wider spectrum and there is 
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less chance of people groups being totally cut off from the opportunities that 
democracy brings. Democracy is not just about people having a vote but 
includes who is able to take part in the process. There is potential for whole 
groups of society to be ignored but by being more inclusive cooperatives can 
help to make a more democratic society. 
 Individual expression was celebrated and was most easily observed in a 
lack of standard uniform (subject to the requirements of health and safety, e.g. 
steel toe cap boots in the warehouse, hairnets in the food preparation area 
etc.). This allowed members to express themselves freely through what they 
wore and maintain their unique identity. 
“it is like there is no corporate brand as such. There is no dress code” - 
Coop2 member 4. 
 Happiness at work has to be considered as a reward in its own right. The 
vast majority of members spoken to clearly enjoyed their job very much. Not just 
the pleasure of working in a supportive, fun, team environment but the ability to 
have a direct influence on how the organisation was being run.  
“I took a 50% pay cut [from a large corporate multinational employer] and 
I am over twice as happy, so it worked out!” - Coop2 member 6.  
“everyone has got a say in how the company runs and there are not 
many places where you work where you can have the say in how the 
company actually runs so to me that is a big plus. You have got nobody 
on your back telling you “You should be doing this, you should be doing 
that and why aren’t we doing this and why aren’t you doing that”. You just 
get on with your job. To me, to work in that sort of environment is great.” 
- Coop_Service. 
 Members were actively encouraged to develop their skill base at work, by 
performing many different roles. People moved around the organisation, 
learning the necessary skills and thus providing a more flexible workforce 
overall. This helped to reduce boredom, provide greater security for the coop as 
well as satisfaction for the member as they developed themselves. 
"That variety, how much of that is part of the reward, the fun of the 
job then? Having different roles on different days. 
… I think it does add to it because it breaks it all up and it means you 
have more knowledge of the business as a whole so you are not just 
pigeonholed in something." - Coop2 member 10. 
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Rothschild and Whitt (1986) suggest that this can have both positive and 
negative effects. Rotating staff around hinders critical knowledge from being 
built up in a select few members thus creating the potential for the associated 
power to be abused. They also suggest that rotation can lead to significant 
stress for members when they are asked to do a role for which they have no 
aptitude or appetite for and it can lead to ill-defined levels of quality so that 
members are unclear as to whether they are performing the role well enough. 
 Recognition of hard work was not always acknowledged. There was an 
expectation that members should all be working hard so there was no need to 
appreciate the normal way of working. In addition, with a flat organisational 
structure, there was a question as to who should give the recognition? Typically 
it is handed down from more senior positions, but without such a management 
structure that was not an option. 
“because “thank you” is more I am giving you something, we are all 
working to the same end so it is not quite like that, I think it is slightly 
different.” - Coop1 member. 
 For all the coops observed, personal financial risk was negligible. Each 
coop required new members to purchase a single share, valued at £1, hence if 
the business collapsed, the immediate loss of ownership would be insignificant 
but the loss of employment would be. 
“we all have £1 share capital in the business” - Coop2 member 10. 
Therefore stress caused as a direct result of capital investment was not a factor 
but stress caused by being an owner and running the business could be very 
significant. This could easily lead to burnout and hyper engagement. Burnout  
(Saks 2006) was observed with people taking on a large workload and having to 
deal with multiple opinions. This was potentially exacerbated by not receiving 
any reward for the role over and above what other members were receiving 
doing manual/mundane work. Dealing with other members who had their own 
opinion of how the company should be run was a potential source of stress 
without the ability to resort to a hierarchical power structure to implement 
change. This was what Rothschild and Whitt (1986, p158) found that a 
management layer could be shrugged off as “as a fool or worse” but that 
“criticism from peers carries more sting”. 
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 “He himself had come very close to two nervous breakdowns, due to 
working in the organisation - not because of the work but to do with 
people issues/interaction.” - Field notes from Coop1.  
“People do have a love hate relationship, more love than hate but you 
can fall out with the organisation and I think most people fall out with their 
place of work anyway but we don’t have a shared adversary. We don’t 
have a boss “that bastard up in that bloody office, I hate that twat!” We all 
have different adversaries and it can be each other, which is quite 
interesting, the dynamics.” Coop1 member 3.  
Hyper-engagement was due to the responsibilities involved in running the 
company and not being able to mentally leave the work at the “factory gates”.  
“I think we have a problem to disengage people sometimes. People take 
work home, I am like one of these people on Saturday evening I am 
quickly checking my emails and that is definitely, definitely a problem 
here. People carry on worrying about if they have ordered enough 
carrots!” - Coop2 HR. 
 Members chose to divert some of the coop's profit (hence their own 
personal wealth), into supporting causes that were selected by the membership 
or in line with the values of the organisation. In Coop2, 5% of our previous 
year’s wage bill was put aside to spend and Coop1 support causes such as: 
animal welfare, Amnesty International, homelessness, women's refuge as well 
as promoting cooperative working (taken from Coop1's website, September 
2015).  
 Rather than money, emphasis was placed on a whole of life perspective; 
that work was an integral part of the whole (partly due to the proportion of time 
spent there) but not seen as more important. Hence a healthy balance with 
work and life was important as well as a common sense approach based on 
trust, rather than regulations. This was demonstrated in members actively being 
told to leave the building at the end of their shift rather than hang around to 
help, even when it was busy or being given permission to go home if there was 
no work to do, either paid or unpaid. 
“you are not expected to work overtime if you are rota’d 9-to-5, you work 
nine till five.” - Coop2 member 6.  
“you can go home at 3 o’clock if you’ve got nowt to do”. - Coop_Service. 
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5.3 Organisational culture within the cooperative 
ownership model 
All the different issues above concerning performance and reward in the 
previous section are represented in the diagram below (figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6 Performance and reward in cooperative EOBs. 
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Using the detailed nodes highlighted above and continuing with the thematic 
approach to analysing the data, five overarching themes emerged whilst 
studying the cooperative culture. These are: 
1. Whole life perspective 
2. Shared values 
3. Self-owner 
4. Self-control 
5. Secure employment 
The overall culture that is exclusive to the worker coops that were researched 
(or shared at most with only one other ownership type) is shown in the diagram 
below (figure 5.7). Elements of culture that were shared across all three 
ownership types are explained in chapter eight, hence this chapter does not 
provide a complete picture of cooperative culture but highlights it’s unique 
features. 
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Figure 5.7 Cooperative culture values 
Each of these five themes will now be expanded in turn. 
5.3.1 Whole life perspective  
Whyte and Whyte (1988, p274) point out that “there is or there should be, 
dignity to any human labor, blue collar as well as white collar or managerial 
work.” Work in itself is of value and should be respected, not simply endured to 
enable life. The emphasis within the coops was on a whole of life perspective. 
That work, regardless of role, was an integral part of life and as such should 
allow a seamless continuation of values and identity of the individual whether at 
work or at home.  
I feel like we are all very different people but there seems to be a 
common thread, like in valuing time and travel, life aside from work. I feel 
like this style of work does fit in a bit more with your character, you don’t 
suppress yourself until the weekend, like a lot of jobs do. You put your 
Monday hat on, we don’t do that. - Coop2, employee 5. 
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 Considerable effort was also put into helping members to achieve a 
pattern of working that most suited their personal requirements. This could 
mean a bespoke work pattern (term time only, early/late shifts or restricted 
days) or helping people to be away from work by providing extended periods of 
leave (paid or unpaid). Once an employee had become a member, significant 
flexibility was shown to enable them to remain in work rather than lose them 
from the coop because of conflicting work/life demands.  
 Time away from work was important too. Holiday time was very flexible, 
being able to accrue additional hours off as well as take large amounts of 
unpaid leave (up to a year) and still have a job to return to (thus guaranteeing 
employment). 
A significant reward is the ability to take large amounts of unpaid leave. 
The paid leave is 30 something days per year when you start but then it 
goes up by one day for every year of service up to a maximum 
(unknown). - Field notes from Coop1. 
 This perspective also included looking outside of the organisation to the 
wider community and even the world. There was recognition that the coop and 
its members were part of a community and therefore influenced it, consciously 
and unconsciously. Time and resources were freely given to building the local 
community in ways that were in line with the coop's principles (e.g. free apples 
for kids, promoting a healthy lifestyle) and not purchasing supplies from 
countries with a poor record on workers' rights; instead, actively promoting 
cooperative working as a method of employment. This included providing 
sufficient financial reward for members to contribute to society (via taxes) as 
well as have their own financial independence. The underlying belief was that 
cooperative working was beneficial to its members and therefore was worth 
sharing with the business community to assist in the creation of further 
cooperatives.  
 With a significant proportion of the week spent at work, as Bakke (2005) 
points out, it is good if you can have fun at work. This was repeatedly 
demonstrated by members talking about their own experience and comparing it 
with previous jobs at non-cooperative organisations. Members liked coming to 
work and benefitted from the social life that it provided.  
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The reason I am talking about this is I feel that, for us what we are 
working for the reward is, and it is in our mission statement, is a 
rewarding working environment. That means good holidays. - Coop1 
member 1. 
Whenever we have a party here it is pretty good. Yes people are very 
good I think at, what I love about this organisation is, we are very good at 
having fun with very little money which doesn’t happen a lot much in the 
bigger wide world. Corporate do’s are so expensive now. We just have a 
laugh on not very much, which is quite refreshing really. - Coop2 
member 10. 
 It is recognised though that not all employees saw their role within the 
coop as anything more than a job that paid a wage. They were seen as the 
minority and different as they did not fit the social norm. However it also 
reduced their chances of succeeding at applying for full membership, since 
compliance with the cooperative principles was one of the requirements for 
gaining membership. The majority of staff embraced the cooperative as it gave 
them greater potential control of their own personal destiny. 
 “I think the best thing is feeling that you work for your own, for your 
interests, not for... That is what keeps people here, I think it changes 
everything when you don’t have a kind of organisation with a different 
hierarchy, controlling people’s lives. People here have more control of 
their life, I think that is the main issue for most of the members to be 
here. Control of your life, the independence of managing your time and 
your life work.” - Coop1 member 2. 
5.3.2 Shared values 
Recruiting potential members, who are then approved by all of the current 
membership, after a significant probationary period helps to ensure a good 
organisational fit. This is in line with Gibson et al. (2006) understanding of 
bringing about cultural change or, alternatively, maintaining the cultural status 
quo by recruiting and socializing new employees that fit in with the culture. 
Members were specifically monitored against their adherence to the ICA's 
(2014) seven principles and not approved without conformance, hence the 
cooperative mind-set was maintained, even if the new member knew nothing 
about it at the start of the selection process (Taylor 2008). Therefore the culture 
is actively controlled by its current membership. New members could be seen to 
go through the three levels of attitudinal change that Kelman (1958) refers to, 
namely compliance, identification, and internalization as they became more 
immersed in the organisation. Initially they were often ignorant about 
cooperative ways of working, but keen to have a job and maintain it, so were 
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compliant with the rules regardless of how they viewed them. However in order 
to belong to the body of members they needed to identify with it, otherwise it 
remained as just surface acting. To achieve identification, they needed to want 
to establish a relationship with the coop rather than simply being required to, to 
persist in employment and hence apply for full membership. The final stage of 
internalization happens when a member “adopts the induced behavior because 
it is congruent with his value system” (Kelman 1958, p53). In this final stage 
members lived the values of the coop and were often very passionate about the 
cooperative they worked for.  
“I wouldn’t leave the organisation, I love him <pointing at my contact 
person>. I love the spiky relationship I have with him <pointing at 
someone else through the window>. You know, I do. Perks here are 
amazing, working conditions are astonishing. Every now and again, in 6 
½ years I’ve been here, the organisation comes along and gives you a 
great big hug and you think “God that is why I love it here” - Coop1, 
employee 3. 
 Shared values were not just limited to purely organisational ones though 
and frequently included values such as a passion for travelling and being 
environmentally friendly. Under the Equality Act 2010 discrimination based on 
gender or sexuality orientation is unlawful. Within the coops observed, equality 
and diversity were more obviously celebrated as a strength. Whyte and Whyte 
(1988, p273) list the cooperative principle: "All human beings should be 
considered as having been created equal, with equal rights and obligations." In 
this sense, there was no distinction between male and female. Job roles were 
shared on ability not gender and in addition a wide spectrum of nationalities was 
also present. For example, at Coop2, there were members from Slovakia, 
Germany and Argentina. 
 Although people were like minded, leading to a homogenous group 
(Rothschild and Whitt 1986) it did not mean that they agreed on everything; in 
fact, healthy debate was a key aspect of decision making and everyone was 
encouraged to share their opinion. 
5.3.3 Self-owner 
Although all the organisations being studied in this research are employee-
owned, the coop members expressed the greatest level of self-determination 
(as in the ability to influence their own path) because of ownership. They had 
direct personal (as opposed to indirect) involvement in decisions that affected 
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the running of the business, due to the one member, one vote system and the 
frequency of debate.  
 Members who deliberately chose not to take part in membership 
meetings were potentially punished, with the ultimate sanction of losing their 
membership. However it was unclear if this would lead to the termination of 
employment under disciplinary procedures, therefore participation was 
expected. 
"We have just changed all our constitution, our domestic rules if you like, 
to say that if you don’t turn up for 50% of the meetings in the year then 
you will lose your membership. Because we had the same people not 
turning up" - Coop_Service. 
 Practical steps were taken to enable members to express their voice, if 
they were not confident in doing it. This included providing training in public 
speaking as well as opportunities to speak in smaller groups which were less 
intimidating. This is in line with Pateman's (1970, p45) evaluation that 
"individuals should receive some 'training' in democracy". Expressing a person's 
opinion was valued and desired, although it could not be forced, since that 
would be making members do something they didn’t want to do. Being present 
at the meeting was considered as participation, not necessarily having to speak. 
“Apart from getting people to the meetings and getting them to, not 
participate as such, as I just said you can’t force people to participate." - 
Coop_Service. 
 Clearly within the cooperative structure it allowed for participation at level 
5 (Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013) and involved a lot of self-regulation. Frequent 
use of public meetings with democratic voting (or consensus) allowed all 
members to decide what was discussed and express their opinion with regard 
to implementation. 
 In the cooperatives observed, ownership was low risk in terms of 
personal money invested (all the coops researched were nominal £1 shares 
although it can be more reflective of the actual value of the business). This 
made a low barrier for entry and reduced the liability of each member, although 
if the organisation were to fail, the impact would be the loss of employment. As 
such the stress of financial ownership was low. 
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 However being a co-owner could potentially be very stressful with regard 
to being responsible for the organisation (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). There 
was no higher management level to blame or shoulder the weight of the 
organisation. Members who perhaps were not used to taking part in significant 
strategic decisions had to vote and work with the outcome of the majority, 
whether they agreed with it or not. In this case, each member had direct 
involvement in the running of the business and the responsibilities that incurred, 
as well as the benefits. As Holmström (1985, p11) points out,  
 “If workers in a private firm are dissatisfied, they can blame the 
management rather than individual managers, who in turn may blame the 
owners. Management is an outside force representing another interest, 
to be fought or compromised with. But in a co-op, management is the 
members' own power, delegated through the Council to managers who 
are expected besides to listen to workers in their departments.” 
This is also similar to what Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991, p141) point 
out,  
“[a] joint responsibility for organizational failure entails a personal cost. It 
will, for example, be more difficult for the employee-owner than for the 
non-integrated employee (or non-integrated employee-owner) to walk 
away from work at night and leave organizational problems and 
decisions at the door.” 
Ridley-Duff and Ponton’s (2011) research also showed that people do not 
always want more involvement and at times they desire to be less involved in 
some aspects of the organisation. Therefore constantly pushing for greater 
participation can actually be against the wishes of the employees. 
 Stress through inter personal relationships was also present. Being part 
of the decision-making process potentially brought members into contact with 
other members who held opposing views but still had to be listened to. Opinions 
were observed to be expressed with great passion and forcefulness, primarily 
due to a desire to see the right outcome as thought by that member but it could 
also be construed as aggressive. As an outsider, I was surprised by the 
boldness of members during an all member meeting at Coop1: 
“The first item on the agenda was open forum. This enabled any member 
to stand up and say anything about anything. Immediately one member 
stood up and explained his serious misgivings with the way in which the 
current [project] implementation was going. He called for an immediate 
cessation of the project as well as for the management committee to step 
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down immediately.”  - Field notes from Coop1 at the all members 
meeting. 
 According to Gibson et al. (2006), intergroup conflict in itself is not 
necessarily harmful to organisational performance. However it becomes an 
issue when there is too little or too much conflict. With too little, ideas are being 
suppressed or not voiced, hence potential new ideas or solutions do not see the 
light of day. With too much conflict, people can argue and fight for the sake of 
fighting and personal ego, which is not for the benefit of the organisation. Hence 
a middle ground is required, whereby members can be comfortable with 
expressing their opinion in a potentially hostile environment and in this case 
conflict is constructive (Bratton 2015). Rothschild and Whitt (1986, p167) quote 
Olivarius who found that from a survey of 400 producer coops in the UK there 
was a strong correlation between "economic vitality and the degree to which 
decisions making procedures are democratic” confirming the need for robust 
debate. 
5.3.4 Self-control 
In line with being a self-owner, there is an expectation of "self-control" within the 
cooperative. Members were expected to work hard, contributing to the 
organisation and not abusing their position. This extends to managing 
themselves as well, recognising what is required and making it happen, without 
being told what to do. 
“Sometimes you need a degree of leadership of people but the difference 
between a management body here and somewhere else is you begin to 
take responsibility on yourself. You are encouraged to, so you start to 
think “well I don’t know about this, I need to learn more” as you start to 
learn more…, I have had people teaching me, showing me the ropes and 
then within a few months asking me questions about things, or weeks 
actually. I think there is a sense of humility rather in not knowing, then I 
felt like I was managing something more because of that responsibility” - 
Coop2, employee 9. 
This is in contrast to a hierarchical organisation with micro-management, in 
effect McGregor’s Theory X approach (McGregor 1960). It therefore relies on a 
high degree of honesty and (personal) trust to be shared amongst the 
members, which must be demonstrated as part of the probationary period 
otherwise membership approval is unlikely. However once membership has 
been obtained, withdrawing it (in effect terminating employment) is harder to 
achieve. This can lead to “free riding”  
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“enjoying the benefits of a collective good without contributing toward its 
continuation, potentially negating the sacrifices made by active 
participants over the long term.” (Bohr 2014, p362).  
Bohr goes on to say that people with low levels of trust are less likely to 
contribute to collective goals because of the fear of being abused. To mitigate 
this, trust is required (which is discussed more fully in chapter 8). Social 
exclusion and internal shame were used as weapons against people who were 
deliberately not contributing appropriately but also recognition that people did 
not always know the reasons why it might be happening so should be allowed a 
degree of freedom. 
Like I say we are not very good at criticising each other, we tend to 
expect each other to be getting on with the job I think. Very occasionally, 
particularly in team meetings I would say you might raise a criticism. You 
seem to be doing a lot of work and you notice that other people seem to 
be hanging around and talking. - Coop2, employee 2. 
 Grey (2013, p79) sees that culture “is crucially concerned with the 
promotion of self-managing, self-disciplined individuals” primarily through 
surveillance, either actual observation or using KPIs and other such metrics. 
Clearly there were examples of colleagues observing fellow colleagues, but this 
would be normal in any form of organisation and is not limited to EOBs. 
However within an EOB, there may be more personal concern and a desire to 
speak out, for the wellbeing of the organisation since it is their organisation10.  
 As self-control is a normative value, individual recognition did not appear 
to be widespread, since everyone is "just doing their job". Therefore personal 
praise was less prevalent in cooperatives. This again increased the reliance on 
self-control and self-motivation. 
5.3.5 Secure employment 
Employment is good in itself and as such it should provide a living wage11 that is 
for life, not just for current members but for future generations of workers yet to 
come.  Secure, affordable, maximised regular pay (monthly salary) within the 
constraints of a viable, ongoing business is considered better than trying to 
optimise the profit share and paying lower wages. External wage comparisons 
                                               
10“Who washes a rental car?” An expression used at the EOA conference 2013, by the 
representative of an EO business. 
11
 The “Living Wage” is a wage level determined by an independent charity (Living Wage 
Foundation) based on the cost of living in the UK, rather than specified by the UK government. 
See http://www.livingwage.org.uk/what-living-wage. 
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to market rates were irrelevant; what mattered was paying a wage that enabled 
people to live within their local community to the best of their ability. A 
significant, permanent salary allowed people to access mortgages and removed 
the need for government intervention in alleviating poverty (“tax credits”). Since 
the coops had no external shareholders, all profit generated was shared 
amongst its members. 
“There is nobody here on working tax credits or extra benefits from the 
government. Whereas Tesco’s pay everybody a minimum wage and they 
are all claiming working tax credits so we are contributing massively to 
our local economy. All these people own houses, well some of the young 
boy’s own stupid cars but they will grow out of that. They are all spending 
the money, you know, their kids are doing fine so it is benefiting the local 
economy because we pay people a fair wage” - Coop1 member 3. 
 Pay differentials were minimised as far as possible, whilst being able to 
attract appropriate employees. For Coop1 & Coop2 this was achieved through 
setting a consistent pay scale for all members (nett and gross respectively). In 
order to recruit technical staff Coop_Service paid a wage premium to 
engineers but the share dividend was then the same to all members regardless 
of pay rate. This is in stark contrast to the average pay of CEOs in the UK 
FTSE100, which in February 2016 was 183 times the salary of a typical 
employee (People Management 2016). Hence each member was valued 
through financial reward. 
 Alongside the value that employment was a valuable part of normal life, it 
was also important that employment should be ensured for future generations 
as well. Therefore, a proportion of profit was invested in the future (for example 
purchasing property) rather than distributing it to the current membership. This 
appeared to be much more than simple business logic, making wise decisions 
to maintain the organisation but instead a genuine desire to ensure that there 
would be employment for future generations, a demonstration of philanthropy. 
“No we are here to keep people in work that’s our main thing. We are 
here for employment, yes. It is nice to make a profit but if we don’t make 
massive profits then it is not, you know, it’s more about being here next 
year. Same as when we bought the building, it is more about the future 
generations that are going to work here.” - Coop_Service. 
This influenced the decision to employ temporary workers who were not 
members. As Whyte and Whyte (1988, p289) point out, when a coop becomes 
successful, there is a temptation on the existing membership to only then recruit 
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non-members, so that the profit is shared amongst a smaller pool of people - 
what they refer to as “Collective selfishness”. This tension was observed at 
Coop1, however it then fosters the traditional owner/worker hegemonic 
situation that cooperatives actively seek to surpass (Erdal 2011). 
“One member expressed his concern about the high rate of casual 
workers that were being employed as this was “ethically denying 
permanent jobs for people” and that temporary people are unable to get 
mortgages and participate in society as they would like to.” - Field notes 
from Coop1 quarterly general meeting. 
 As part of the expression of secure employment, within all the coops, 
redundancy was seen as an anathema and avoided at all costs. Priority was 
given to maintaining employment of all existing members. McDonnell, 
Macknight and Donnelly (2012, p39) give an example from Mondragón,  
 “When the global financial crisis took hold in 2009, Mondragón members 
voted for a nine per cent reduction in salary rather than making any 
workers redundant. This ensured that Mondragón protected the welfare 
of its worker-members by reducing business costs and ensuring 
sustainability.”   
5.4 Conclusion. 
In comparison with the two other ownership types, it was found that the worker 
cooperative culture has a substantial reliance on the character of the individual; 
for members to have significant self-control and self-management ability. This 
was assisted by a strongly held set of common values and a perspective on 
work of being a part of the whole of life’s tapestry. Thus secure, rewarded 
employment was important, not just for the member but society as a whole. 
Overall there is a great deal of freedom of personal expression at work, both in 
voice and dress. People dress to express themselves, rather than to a 
corporate brand and uniqueness is celebrated. Members are relied upon to 
manage themselves and exert appropriate effort, circumventing the need to be 
told what to do and being offended if it were to happen, since no-one has the 
managerial authority to do that. 
 The culture appears to be a blend of Handy’s (2009) Task and Existential 
cultures. Significant emphasis is placed on team working and joining different 
groups of people for a specific task, with employees being members of many 
different teams, therefore task orientated. As well though each member was 
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expected to work independently and did not necessarily have a managerial 
control over other members where there were in effect no managers - hence 
more existential. 
 This chapter has specifically looked at the cooperative form of EOBs, to 
determine the aspects of culture that are either unique or shared with only one 
other form of ownership and are therefore not common across all three forms of 
EO. The next chapter repeats the same exercise, but instead focuses on 
directly owned organisations to determine the organisational culture values that 
specifically make up direct ownership.  
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Chapter 6 - Direct ownership findings 
6.1 Introduction. 
This is the second chapter that focuses on the findings from the analysis stage, 
specifically regarding EOBs that are directly owned. It considers the research 
questions for this specific ownership type, firstly by focusing on what was 
observed in the field concerning performance and reward management (Q2) 
and then theorising about organisational culture in directly owned organisations 
(Q1). The findings are drawn from the research at six directly owned 
organisations, namely Direct1, DIR_Professional, DIR_Consultancy, 
Dir_Service, DIR_Eng and DIR_Manuf.  
 Four key themes of directly owned culture are identified, these are: 
1. Personal reward 
2. Personal development  
3. Founder’s input of values  
4. Limited servant leadership  
Elements that are common with all three ownership types are investigated more 
thoroughly in chapter 8 however there are some elements that are common with 
another type, either trust or cooperative but not both. 
6.2 Performance and reward management within 
directly owned EOBs. 
This section highlights and provides illustrations of performance and reward that 
were observed in the field, again looking for artefacts, values and norms of 
behaviour (Schein 1992). From these, themes regarding culture are 
subsequently drawn out and explored. 
6.2.1 Performance management within directly owned EOBs. 
Individual performance was assessed via performance appraisals with an 
emphasis on developing the employee and looking for opportunities to grow 
rather than negatively criticising performance. Discussions were frequently 
based around the values of the organisation, which were typically defined by the 
founder(s).  
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“Told me what I was doing well, what I could improve on and all that. And 
I did the same for him. It was a very, very frank conversation; he came 
out of it knowing that I had got some gripes with how my career was 
going and things like that. In general, I really enjoy myself but that was 
my forum to get my opinions across. He thanked me for my honesty and 
things have started happening. It was a very, very frank conversation; I 
think I was in there for two hours and a quarter, just me and him. Not 
battering each other but very, very frank conversation, very honest. 
Some of the stuff has started happening for me so, can’t complain about 
that.”- Direct1 employee 35.  
The two-way unrestricted, dialogue also provides a forum for the employee’s 
voice to be heard, acknowledged and responded to, with subsequently, positive 
action taken (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). Contact with the line 
manager was the most obvious form of direct involvement with the running of 
the organisation rather than elected committees found elsewhere. 
Following the appraisal a secondment to the USA branch was created to 
enable him to see if a longer term move was appropriate - Direct1 field 
notes. 
There appeared to be a supportive environment that encouraged honest 
communication, rather than a fearful or controlling one, looking to dictate what 
could and could not be talked about. 
 The values also fed into the recruitment process which looked to select 
people against the values of the organisation. This attempts to ensure a 
workforce that hold to a similar set of values, thereby restricting access as to 
who can become owners of the organisation but still permitting a diverse 
workforce in nationality, gender and age. Potentially this could lead to a mono-
culture, if the hiring managers (a limited group of people within the organisation) 
restrict the process even further. Values were widely proclaimed; printed on 
appraisal documents or displayed on external websites as well as very visibly 
within the buildings visited. This helps to remind and reinforce the espoused 
values of the organisation (Schein 1992). 
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Figure 6.8 Values printed on internal wall (Direct1). 
 “When we do interviews we look for cultural fit.” - DIR_Service. 
 There were examples of employees giving their colleagues 
encouragement to improve their performance or even chastising them for poor 
performance, directly because of being employee-owned. The negative 
performance of an employee would have a detrimental effect on the overall 
profitability, and hence share price, for all the employees. This gave justification 
for colleagues to pick up on each other’s performance. One potential side effect 
of this, if taken too far, is that it could lead to a culture of bullying and 
intimidation although there were no intimidating examples observed or 
discussed. 
“...you get one guy saying “I’m not bothered, I don’t want to do it” but 
then somebody, a peer in the same team, might come back with “well go 
and get a job somewhere else then, because we don’t want you here if 
you are not bothered”. It was fascinating to see that. And they have every 
right, because they are shareholders.” - Direct1 employee 17. 
 The organisational structures were deliberately hierarchical with minimal 
layers (three or at most four at Direct1); however a key aspect was the visibility 
and availability of senior management. Offices were open planned and the 
leadership actively encouraged employees to talk with them, via planned 
walkabouts or simply being available and willing to talk, either at their desk or 
the communal coffee area. 
“There is a non-hierarchical style. Management is approachable. Offices 
are open plan.” - DIR_Service. 
 At Direct1 the managerial hierarchy pyramid was turned upside down; 
the managing director saw that it was his role to serve the employees and 
provide what they needed so that they could do their job to the best of their 
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ability, without hindrance. In essence this was a servant leadership approach as 
advocated by Greenleaf (1998). Hence he served the managers who reported 
to him and so on, until the front-line workers (who were the majority) were given 
the support they needed to fulfil their job and create the profit (Sauser 2009). 
The style was in line with MacGregor’s Theory Y rather than Theory X 
(McGregor 1960). Affinity with colleagues was helped by the MD wearing the 
standard office uniform (logo emblazoned polo neck shirt and work trousers) 
reducing the status difference, as advocated by Pfeffer (2008) in his list of HRM 
best practices. 
“Unfortunately hierarchical, command and control businesses, often in 
the West, totally misunderstand all of that and believe that everyone is 
here to serve me as the top guy and that is very indulgent but not very 
effective as a business.” - Direct1 Managing Director. 
 The companies researched had ambitious plans to develop their 
organisation, increase profits and develop whole new markets. Standing still 
was not considered an option and constantly pushing targets and being 
innovative was the norm. Although this was directed from above by the senior 
management, it was also embraced from below by the shop floor workers who 
stood to gain from the potential doubling of the share price. 
“That set us with a series of different things to work on, the outcome of 
which is if we did all those things we believed we could double the size of 
the business in three years.” - Direct1 managing director. 
As such, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were widely available so that 
employees could very quickly see if they were on track, which ultimately 
increased the share price, or enabled corrective action to be taken. Therefore 
information was freely provided to enable employees to be aware of the overall 
performance of the organisation and how their particular team was doing 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). This meant the employee owners could 
have a meaningful discussion with the management team regarding the current 
strategy, as to its success or otherwise. 
Sat in the canteen. Somebody put financial information onto each of the 
three tables in the canteen showing that they had hit the target, sales 
were up 8% on last year approximately £X00,000. It includes a 
breakdown of sales per country. - Direct1 field notes. 
 Employees could see a correlation between the results of their team, 
dependent upon the personal effort that each person put in, and the profitability 
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of the organisation. This leads onto the financial rewards from working in a 
directly owned business. 
6.2.2 Reward management within directly owned EOBs. 
6.2.2.1 Financial reward within directly owned. 
In directly owned organisations, employees own personal shares which have a 
realisable monetary value. The shares may be given to them by the 
organisation, voluntarily purchased or the mandatory purchase of them may be 
a condition of employment. All three scenarios were encountered during the 
research. It is the personal acquisition of a variable number of shares with 
monetary value that makes direct ownership different to the other models of 
employee-ownership.  
 Direct1 and DIR_Eng make it a condition of employment, requiring at 
least £100012 worth of shares to be purchased by the end of the first year. In 
Direct1 senior positions have an even greater requirement: 
“In terms of the shares, have you bought the minimum amount or 
more? 
As a director, you are compelled to hold half of your salary in shares. 
I didn’t realise that, I’ve not heard that before. So that is quite a lot. 
Yes! So you have to go and borrow it”. - Direct1 director, employee 37. 
By making it mandatory, they force the employee to become an owner, whether 
they agree with the policy or not. Complete disagreement with the policy would 
prevent them from being an employee all together, so dissent may not be visible 
to maintain employment. DIR_Manuf require 5% of the annual salary to be 
purchased during the initial year.  DIR_Service and DIR_Professional give 
employees the option whether to purchase shares (56% and 66% respectively 
have chosen to). When employees have only purchased the minimum 
requirement or not purchased shares at all, it primarily appeared to be due to a 
lack of available finance however a small minority did object on ideological 
grounds. 
“Gut feeling is that: 56% think it is a good idea and have shares, the 
majority of others think it is a good idea but are not in a position to buy 
shares (say new graduates with student loans) and only a small 
                                               
12
 This reduces to £50 in the Indian office where there are lower wage scales. 
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proportion object on ‘ideological’ grounds.” - Notes from conversation 
with DIR_Service. 
“I like it to be fair, but it is almost racketeering in a way, because you 
don’t have a choice. You come in and, not immediately, obviously you 
have to buy into the culture or you would just leave, so it is not too bad 
but you don’t have a choice. That could be money in your bank, I’m not 
saying it’s not safe but it’s almost like “you have to give me money”. So it 
is almost racketeering.” - Direct1 employee 35. 
Clearly the employee in this quote felt that they were being financially abused 
by having to purchase shares, even though there is the potential to gain from 
the transaction. The concern is the lack of choice whether to participate or not; 
a fully informed choice would satisfy this employee but then goes against the 
founder’s desire to ensure that everyone is a shareholder, which was how the 
organisation was initially set up. This would therefore appear to be a state of 
compliance, according to Kelman (1958) and as Griseri (1998, p115) points out 
“the absence of dissent is not the same as the presence of assent”. 
 Where shares are purchased, it brings a degree of personal risk, as the 
share value can go up as well as down. This brings a tangible link between 
ownership and the performance of the organisation. 
So the net asset value of the shares dropped substantially. Down to less 
than a pound, that they paid for them. It went down to 69p. And it was 
probably one of the best things that happened because it taught 
everybody that they can go up and down. It isn’t that we just make 
brass.” - Direct1 founder. 
People genuinely do own the business and as you know it is a pure 
employee ownership, and they have to put their hands in their pockets to 
make the investment which is not gifted to them in any way shape or 
form. They actually have to put their hands in their pockets. - Direct1 
employee 25. 
If the company was to go bust, they would lose their money. - DIR_Eng 
Unfortunately, I know from when I started and what I have put in, the 
shares are worth a lot less now than they were then but I think that is just 
the economy as it is. - DIR_Manuf. 
 Where employees only have the minimum or a limited number of shares, 
the dividend was not considered to be of any real value and hence not an 
incentive; however there was still a tremendous sense of ownership.  
"To me I’ve not got many shares in the company, because I have not got 
much money, but it don’t make no difference to me, those shares. I have 
not got enough to make me rich or wealthy. The dividend will pay for a 
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takeaway pizza and a bottle of wine. So it doesn’t make any difference to 
me". - Direct1 employee 17. 
“Incentive [dividend] is nice but it is not a big driver. It is better than 
having money in the bank.” - Direct1 employee 26. 
In this case the employee was comparing the increase in value against bank 
interest rates, which in 2014 were very low (Bank of England interest rate - 
0.5%), so there was an expectation that the share price rise would supersede a 
return purely on interest. However when employees had built up a large 
number, either over the years or as a one off purchase then the dividend 
became a noteworthy amount. 
‘another story, one of the factory workers came in and said “I don’t know 
whether to buy shares in the organisation or [elsewhere].” 
So I said "well it is up to you … So I said “How much are you thinking of 
putting in?” 
“£30,000”. 
A shop floor worker!’ - Direct1 founder. 
"She has 38,000 shares, which provides a dividend of between £3000 
and £4000… The dividend pays for 2 to 3 holidays a year definitely an 
incentive to her." - Direct1 field notes. 
 By their nature, shares are usually a long-term option. Where employees 
have purchased them, they are seen as a long term financial plan, for example 
as additional funding for retirement to supplement a pension or to pay off a 
mortgage on a property. This can be used as “golden handcuffs” (Sengupta, 
Whitfield and McNabb 2007) to lock employees into the job and reduce the risk 
of them leaving the organisation. For example, Direct1 shares cannot be sold 
within the first 3 years; if the employee leaves they are returned at the face 
value they were bought for and not at any increased value. 
Customers recognise that we are trying to be around in the long term and 
we are looking to retain people so there is not this constant churn. I think 
a lot of our clients get very frustrated with this churn within companies; so 
if they are providing consultants and one day they are not there and 
they’re working for a competitor then that becomes a frustration for them. 
If we can find really good people to tend them for the long term, that 
benefits our clients. - DIR_Consultancy.   
In this case, the organisation is looking to provide secure employment for its 
employees. This can be seen as a reward in itself since stable employment 
helps to foster a less anxious environment. 
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 The purchasing of shares was usually limited to an annual window 
(typically the month after the share price had been evaluated) and the selling of 
shares was positively discouraged. Only on leaving the organisation (voluntarily 
or via retirement) was it encouraged or mandated. This maintains a level of 
control over purchase and disposal and therefore the share owners themselves. 
Forcing employees to sell when they chose to leave the organisation removed 
their influence at the same time, to not do so is potentially dangerous and 
dilutes the employee ownership. This is what McCarthy and Palcic (2012) 
observed when the retired employees had significant control over an 
organisation they no longer worked for. Ellerman (1977) suggests that on 
leaving employment (voluntary and retiring) shares should be paid off, over a 
five-year span rather than on termination. Potentially, owners might choose to 
leave the organisation because they feel that the share price has reached an 
attractive maximum value, so is it in their interest to quit maximising their 
personal income, which has resourcing implications for the organisation, should 
lots of people leave at the same time. 
“Officially people can sell although we don’t encourage the selling of 
shares unless they really need it. A house move, or a new car although 
we try and say look, you’re in and those shares are there till you leave 
and that’s some of your retirement fund. We don’t encourage a stock 
market with buying and selling. We want people to come in and buy and 
keep those shares throughout their term, though people do get into 
financial difficulties and they do sometimes need to cash them in.” - 
DIR_Eng. 
“When you retire you can keep your shares, if you leave you must sell 
them13.” - Direct1 Shares administrator. 
 Salary was determined on an individual basis, based on the skills and 
experience the person brought with them alongside the initial role they 
undertook. Flexibility within the organisations allowed for rapid, non-linear 
progression, depending upon task requirements rather than pre-determined 
steps. Therefore people were given the opportunity, and encouraged, to move 
through the organisation utilising their full skill set for the benefit of the 
organisation. For example, at Direct1, qualified graduates recruited as machine 
                                               
13
 Unfortunately, exactly why retired employees could keep shares was not asked. 
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operators on the shop floor were given roles within their speciality if such a 
need subsequently arose. 
We needed a graphic designer, because we were really busy and we 
were desperate. “Can we get somebody in an agency or something?” 
and we have never been asked to bring agency staff into the office 
before. There was a lad in the factory who had applied, and I went down, 
when we employed our last graphic designer and he wasn’t in but the 
team leader said “[NAME], he’s a graphic designer, he’s got a degree in 
graphic design ”so went straight up to [NAME], “come here”... And now 
he has got a full-time position down at the other site doing graphic 
design. - Direct1 employee 17. 
We pay the salary rate for the advice you can give. So obviously if you 
are graduate the rate you can be charged out at is less than if you have 
25 years’ experience. This encourages people to develop themselves to 
increase their pay. - Dir_Service. 
 Salary was not specifically tied to the market rate for the job. Being 
employee owned, with a greater control regarding the use of profits within the 
organisation, they could deliberately choose to pay above the market rate, 
assuming the business could afford it (Pfeffer 2008). Maximising shareholder 
value (MSV) at the expense of low wages for the employees was not the goal. 
Ensuring that everyone had a good wage mattered, regardless of position within 
the organisation although there were wage differentials. This therefore 
particularly benefitted employees who had a smaller shareholding but 
subsequently received a larger wage. 
“We have just increased the minimum wage to £20,000, so if you come 
in here at 16, 17 you’re going to be on 20,000 + overtime. So you can 
imagine they all want to work here. 
Absolutely! What is the normal rate them? 
I think ours works out at £9.40 an hour. 
And the minimum wage is £6.30. [Feb 2014] 
So we really look after people.” - Direct1 employee 17. 
 Similarly, individuals received performance related pay, to reflect their 
personal contribution (Kauhanen and Piekkola 2006, Shields 2007). This was 
decided by their immediate manager (not collectively), in relation to their 
colleagues. However, no other types of bonus were paid (for example 
commission on sales or “Good idea” bonus) as these were considered to benefit 
the whole company, with the reward ultimately reflected in the increased share 
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value and dividend. This was a particularly difficult policy to apply for sales staff 
that normally expects to receive a commission as part of their total reward and 
required the Sales manager to be more inventive in incentivising the staff. 
Therefore the non-financial rewards were important to attract and retain skilled 
and experienced staff. The reputation and culture of the organisation was part 
of the attraction. 
"Biggest challenge is motivating people without money, they must be 
self-motivated" - PhD field notes, following discussion with Sales 
manager at Direct1. 
 Having looked at financial rewards and recognising that they are not the 
entire reward, I now look at non-financial rewards within directly owned EOBs. 
6.2.2.2 Non-financial reward within directly owned EOBs. 
Status within the organisations was not dictated by seniority or title but had 
more to do with ability to carry out the role. 
“People move around from different sides, they will go from office into 
Ops, other way round as well. It is not seen as, necessarily a promotion 
to come into the office, it is just a different job, different skills.” - 
DIR_Manuf 
“In most companies you either move up or out… Here, it is more 
important to do the roles required, so someone might be invited to be an 
office manager for several years and then move to a different role, 
perhaps a technical role, without any loss of face. It gives a great degree 
of flexibility and people are rewarded in the recognition of their ability to 
do the role.” - DIR_Service. 
This encouraged a flexible workforce where employees could and were willing 
to undertake multiple roles as required. The driving force, being to get the work 
done rather than objecting to a task that was not on their job description. 
Direct1 explicitly avoided job descriptions for this very reason. 
“We don’t have any job descriptions. Because if you see the ball 
dropping you catch it! Job descriptions stop people doing that. Everybody 
just gets on with it.” - Direct1 founder. 
Job flexibility also rewarded employees with a greater range of opportunities 
rather than progressing through an organisation only following a pre-determined 
career path. However career moves were not guaranteed and did rely on the 
performance of the employee. 
“A good example is the cleaner here on this site, she wanted to get more 
involved so they trained her up and helped her out and now she is 
 163 
helping with some of the webbing machines on the shopfloor. That is the 
thing, you can go and talk to anyone, and they will give you a shot to try.” 
- Direct1 employee 35. 
 The ability to communicate personal opinions and receive information, as 
is common with other forms of EO, was however, not impacted by the quantity 
of shares held in the organisation. Information was freely available to everyone 
regardless of their stake and everyone could express their voice. 
“What about information, how much information is shared around 
the company? 
Everything. Even down to the point where, we have only just started 
doing it now, but we never locked up even salary levels. Somebody 
found all the salaries, that everybody was paid and distributed it. Which, 
for me, if you can’t hold your head up and justify your salary, then you 
shouldn’t be there.” - DIR_Eng. 
“We are all here to put our ideas forward, because we also benefit from 
it. Ultimately, the people offer their ideas and suggestions for 
improvements because they can see it is benefiting them in the long run 
anyway. 
Is it easy, if someone has an idea? 
Yes, ideas come through because it is continuous improvement anyway. 
We do run quite a lot of improvement ideas and we have meetings every 
morning. It doesn’t have to come from the meetings. People offer their 
ideas in how we can improve.” - Direct1 employee 2. 
6.3 Organisational culture within the directly owned 
model 
All the topics in the previous section are represented in the diagram below 
(figure 6.9) - which highlights the features of performance and reward observed 
in the direct organisations researched.  
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Figure 6.9 Performance and reward in direct EOBs. 
Using the detailed nodes highlighted above and continuing with the thematic 
approach to analysing the data, four overarching themes emerged whilst 
studying the directly owned culture. These are: 
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1. Personal reward 
2. Personal development  
3. Founder’s input of values  
4. Limited servant leadership  
These themes are shown in the diagram below (figure 6.10) and each one is 
then explained in detail. 
The overall culture that is exclusive to the directly owned EOBs that were 
researched (or shared at most with only one other ownership type) is shown in 
the diagram below (figure 6.10). Elements of culture that were shared across all 
three ownership types are explained in chapter eight; hence this chapter does 
not provide a complete picture of direct ownership culture but highlights its 
unique features. 
 
Figure 6.10 Direct culture values 
Each of these four themes will now be expanded in turn. 
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6.3.1 Personal reward  
The key differentiator for directly owned organisations is the variable 
accumulation of personal shares which may also involve risking their own 
wealth in the organisation. The value of this investment has the potential to 
increase or decrease, leading to financial gain or loss. The expectation of the 
benefit of both share dividend and increased share price can therefore lead to a 
greater sense of ownership (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks 2001) and hence 
motivate employee owners to perform and succeed (Armstrong 2015). Paton 
(1989, p102) refers to this form of ownership as “Worker Capitalism” (instead of 
“Popular Capitalism”) since it relies on capitalism’s foundations of profit and loss 
but allows the workers to gain from it, rather than a more restricted group of 
external shareholders.  
 Personalised share ownership also has a more direct effect on owners. A 
reduction in the share value leads to a tangible financial loss, that is, money is 
effectively taken away from an employee. Since shares are frequently held as 
part of a financial plan for retirement, it will have a notable effect on the 
expected standard of living available on retirement. This is different to the 
reduction of a bonus which has yet to materialise, for example, in the form of a 
trust bonus, where nothing further is paid upon leaving the organisation. It is in 
the owners’ interests to increase the share value which is often based on a 
rolling profit calculation agreed with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC). Hence fear of actual loss can be a motivator in directly owned 
organisations, rather than just the pleasure of gain. Therefore individuals that 
stand to lose a lot might have a greater desire take it upon themselves to 
actively try and coerce the behaviour of poor performing colleagues. This could 
take the form of simple persuasion but could also include bullying, blaming and 
scapegoating, leading to increased conflict. 
“[The share price], it’s going to go up eventually, so I am hoping! Plus I 
have got five years after I have retired, so if it hasn’t gone up by then it 
will be a worry! - DIR_Manuf. 
A second silly story, the guy who ran the warehouse, four years ago 
maybe five. Before the AGM we all got the accounts and he said “Now 
then [name], I told my missus that I bought the shares to pay off our 
mortgage.” And I knew roughly how many shares he had got, about 
12,000. So I asked him "how many shares have you got?”  
“12860”. 
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And the share price was about £3.60 at that time, so I said “How much is 
that worth then?” 
“£42,100”. 
And before that I had asked him how big his mortgage was, £45,000. It 
was a big mortgage he had taken out. So I said “You can’t be far off 
paying it off then”. 
“No its £42,100 - so can you get your fucking finger out!” - Direct1 
founder. 
 The amount of reward each employee receives as an owner is unique to 
the individual depending on how many shares they have acquired either 
through purchasing them or being given them. This is what Pendleton and 
Robinson (2015) also found from their survey of UK EOBs. Hence it is a more 
personalised form of reward so motivation because of financial gain is not 
necessarily consistent across all employees and discretionary effort is 
individual, not collectively, determined (Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). Those 
that have a larger accumulation of shares stand to gain more than those with a 
smaller allocation.  Shares were observed to be gained over time, with 
employees purchasing more once the previous loan for shares had been paid 
off. Therefore longer serving employees typically had more shares in the 
organisation (especially where they were gifted dependent upon length of 
service) than newer employees, so length of service also indirectly affected the 
reward. Staff turnover rates were very small in all the EO organisations 
observed (typically less than 5% where the information was available) so there 
were employees with a considerable service length.  
 Although there was a notional limit on the number of shares an employee 
could hold in each of the organisations, strictly to avoid the right of transfer or 
liquidation being exercised (Gates 1998), other than the founders, no 
employees were known to be anywhere close to this limit. Therefore the option 
whether to add to a share allocation was a choice, usually more often restricted 
by a lack of finances. 
“Nobody is allowed to hold more than about 1% of shares, but nobody is 
anywhere near this total.” - DIR_Service. 
 Although each employee has an equal status of being an employee 
owner and the allocation of reward derived specifically from shares is fair (since 
the process has to be documented for HMRC approval (procedural justice)), the 
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reward is not equal. Some owners will receive significantly more than others 
and can directly influence that outcome using existing wealth (distributive 
justice) (Shields 2007). Therefore this form of ownership can help to perpetuate 
existing inequalities in the society of owners, irrespective of actual work 
contribution but solely on existing wealth. However, compared to a traditional 
organisation, it does permit the opportunity to gain from the profit of the 
organisation which would not necessarily be available. Spedan Lewis’ aim in 
transferring ownership of the John Lewis to the partners was not to completely 
remove inequality but to bring everyone up to at least a “middle class” standard 
of living thereby helping to reduce poverty (Lewis 1948, 1954). 
 Some employees see a mandatory requirement to invest as an intrusion 
in their personal choice of where to spend their own money. Could it bring 
greater benefit if invested elsewhere? Hence they react against the requirement 
and although maintaining their employment, do not agree with the enforcement 
of share purchasing. A few people were observed that held this position and 
one organisation (DIR_Service) suggested around 4% of employees objected 
on ideological grounds. This can therefore be a negative consequence of EO, 
where employees are working under duress at odds with the underlying 
philosophy of the organisation, creating a sub-culture within it (Martin 2002).  
Ownership - not convinced it makes a difference. - “Does a person with 
£75,000 of shares care more than someone who has none?” Implying 
that he cares whatever level of shares you have and maybe none! He 
does not agree with a compulsory purchase of shares he just sees it as a 
bond. - Direct1 field notes following discussion with Direct1 employee 
11. 
 Acquisition of personal shares can also enable a form of control by the 
management, specifically making it harder for employees to be able to leave the 
organisation voluntarily. Restrictions are placed upon selling shares for a profit 
during the initial years of employment, therefore if employees want to realise a 
profit, they must stay until the embargo is over. Hence employees who do not 
feel suited for the organisation might stay longer than necessary to maximise 
their personal gain but lack organisational commitment (Saks 2006). 
 Overall, the rewards available to an employee owner in a direct 
organisation can lead to greater engagement and commitment, driven by 
personal benefit from a direct alignment of both personal and organisational 
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profit (Matrix Evidence 2010). It does not automatically lead to an equal 
distribution of wealth amongst employees and a very small number of 
employees see direct ownership as an imposition, if the purchase of shares is a 
condition of employment. 
6.3.2 Personal development 
A lack of job titles allows employees to perform in a variety of roles and not be 
measured specifically against one. For example, performance appraisals were 
values based in Direct1, with both the employee and manager appraising 
against a list of five characteristics (Passionate, team player, personality, 
ambition and fun). The results and subsequent discussion remained between 
the two participants and it was not aggregated into departmental level 
assessments, but remained purely as a development tool. Objectives set as 
part of the appraisal did not immediately relate to the current role but were 
much wider, looking to develop the whole person. This comfortably fits 
Townley's (1997) definition of a developmental appraisal scheme rather than a 
judgemental one. 
Appraisal after three months and very recently, objectives set are very 
different, not reduce failure rate by X percent but: 
1) Find some companies we can learn from and visit. 
2) Find out what charities are relevant to you and the quality team. 
Field notes from Direct1, from talking with Quality control manager. 
 Individual status recognition within the organisations came from having 
done multiple roles rather than progressing up a career ladder. Thus a much 
broader repertoire of skills was encouraged to be developed and not limited by 
building a career in just one field. This has similarities to the flexibility within 
coops but within direct organisations the role would be for a longer period 
(years rather than a daily rotation). There were no visible trappings of 
grade/status, for example a private office, different uniform or being treated 
differently by “lower” staff (Pfeffer 2008).  
Sat in the waiting room for [Contact person] to appear. Entrance lobby is 
full of awards… [Contact person] took a while to come down, so the 
receptionist was confident enough to chase him up again. I was 
surprised by her boldness - Field notes from Direct1.  
Employees were therefore encouraged to keep developing new talents and 
discouraged from simply maintaining their position. This reduced “empire 
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building” as the method of progression was not to have a bigger department but 
to have a more diverse capability. 
6.3.3 Founder’s input of values  
All the direct organisations researched had either been created from scratch as 
employee owned or transferred into employee ownership under the instructions 
of the initial founder(s). As such the founders’ values have had a significant 
bearing on the culture of the organisations (Schein 1992). The founders were 
held in high regard and their influence was still very visible, from pictures on the 
wall, to stories told about them (Yiannis 2000) even when they no longer ran the 
companies. 
“we had a man came in from, a wealthy bloke, I don’t know what 
business it was, but he came up and says ‘I want to buy the company’. 
He went up to the MD, and said ‘I want to buy it’. And he said ‘Well it is 
just not for sale’. ‘Maybe I should talk to your chairman then, I need to 
talk to the owner.’ So he says ‘Well if you just have a walk down onto the 
shop floor, there was about 317 of them, why don’t you go and ask them! 
They all own the company’”. - Direct1 employee 1. 
He gave me his thoughts on “Chairman [Founder]”, a clear reference to 
Chairman Mao14. - Field notes from Direct1. 
 This was also similarly observed in Trust owned organisations as well 
where the founders had made a significant impact on the culture and were still 
held in high regard, however it was not observed in cooperatives. This was 
thought to be for two reasons. Firstly, an overarching assent to cooperative 
principles as the underlying foundations which therefore defines the primary 
values of a cooperative. Secondly, the cooperatives were continuously 
revaluating their identity, dependent upon the current membership group, who 
have an equal level of influence to the founders who were now no longer 
present. 
6.3.4 Limited servant leadership   
Daft (1999, p374) defines servant leadership as  
 “Servant-leadership is leadership upside down. Servant-leaders 
transcend self-interest to serve the needs of others, help others grow and 
develop, and provide opportunity for others to gain materially and 
emotionally. The fulfilment of others is the servant-leader’s principal aim.” 
                                               
14
 On a subsequent visit after the research period, there were mocked up pictures of the Marxist 
revolutionary Che Guevara in his traditional beret, with the face replaced by the founder’s. 
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The purpose of the leadership team was to bring about the best possible results 
for all the owners rather than profit maximisation for a limited number of external 
shareholders. Hence their purpose was to serve the employees rather than to 
bolster their own personal position. This leads to a form of servant leadership 
(Greenleaf 1998) where each layer is there to serve rather than dictate over and 
hence creates an inverted management pyramid organisational structure.  
 Hierarchical layers were kept to a minimum with front-line employees 
being given as much responsibility as possible. When problems emerged that 
could not be solved at that level, only then it was pushed further up the 
management chain. Planned weekly management walkabouts gave shop floor 
workers guaranteed access to the necessary managers. 
He has a weekly meeting “tattooed into my soul”, that he should be there 
unless he is not. - Direct1 Quality Control manager. 
“So when you say autonomy, I think we have a philosophy that says 
‘better to have done something and ask for forgiveness, than never to 
have done it.’ So they should get on with something”. - Direct1 employee 
21. 
 Management was deliberately very visible. From board meetings in the 
middle of the open plan office, to the MD’s desk situated opposite the coffee 
area. Employees felt comfortable in approaching management, who 
encouraged dialogue as well. 
Sits opposite God (G.O.D - Global Operations Director), his boss. Talks 
to him any time. No separation, always visible. Observed this. No fear in 
that. Previous companies where God flies in by helicopter you are fearful, 
but not here. - Field notes from Direct1 employee 11. 
Well yeah. I’m friends on Facebook with a lot of them. I know what they 
are all doing and they know what I’m doing. Yeah, this is me personally; I 
like to think I have got a good relationship with the staff. If there is 
anything ever going on I’ll join them and muck in. That’s just me; it 
doesn’t apply to all the managers. Yeah we do, I hold events. I have held 
barbecues at my house and invited everybody in the summer, when we 
weren’t quite as big as this, about two years ago. Yeah, quite a lot of 
people came. - DIR_Eng Managing Director. 
This is an example of one of Pfeffer’s (2008) suggestions for best practice, that 
of reduction of status differences, leading to a greater sense of equality 
amongst employees with their managers. 
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 Involvement levels within the organisation would be at most to depth 4 
(Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2103). Employees were encouraged to comment on 
management suggestions (for example the name of the new intranet at Direct1) 
and they were invited to make suggestions during the planned senior 
management tours. These were duly considered and enacted if appropriate (for 
example shipping a manufacturing robot to the USA instead of sending the 
output of the robot) but the decision ultimately remained with the management 
team. 
6.4 Conclusion. 
In comparison with the two other ownership types, it was found that the direct 
ownership culture has an emphasis on personal, rather than collective, reward 
compared to the other two types, which does encourage a high level of self-
regulation. Although there appeared to be less democratic involvement in the 
running of the organisation, the management were held accountable through 
demonstrable information sharing and open access to senior leaders. In the 
companies researched all of them transferred into direct ownership at the desire 
of the founders and as such the founders’ values still held significant sway on 
the way the organisations were run. Looking at Handy’s (2009) culture typology, 
elements of Role and Task based culture were most apparent where the 
original owner had moved on, but previously they might have been a more Club 
orientated, with a powerful owner holding sway. 
 This chapter has specifically looked at the direct ownership model. It has 
reported the influence of the ownership type on how performance and reward 
management are handled as well as looking at culture within direct 
organisations. Finally, it has addressed the connection between performance 
and reward, and the culture of direct organisations, specifically under the 
themes of: personal reward, personal development, the founder’s input and 
limited servant leadership. The next chapter repeats the same exercise, but 
instead focuses on trust owned organisations, the third and final type.  
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Chapter 7 - Trust ownership findings 
7.1 Introduction. 
This is the final chapter that focuses on the findings from a specific ownership 
type, which is regarding EOBs that are owned by a trust on behalf of the 
employees. It considers the research questions for this specific ownership type, 
firstly by focusing on what was observed in the field concerning performance 
and reward management (Q2) and then theorising about organisational culture 
in trust owned organisations (Q1). The findings are drawn from the research at 
three trust owned organisations, namely Trust1, Trust2 and Trust_Service.  
 Three themes of trust owned culture are identified, these are: 
1. Protective 
2. Structured 
3. Effort and reward linked 
 Elements that are common to all three ownership types (coop, direct and 
trust) are investigated and reported in chapter 8 however there are some 
elements that are common with another type, either direct or cooperative but 
not both. 
7.2 Performance and reward management within trust 
owned EOBs. 
This section highlights and provides illustrations of performance and reward that 
were observed in the field, as well as artefacts, values and norms (Schein 
1992). From these, themes regarding culture are subsequently drawn out and 
explored. 
7.2.1 Performance management within trust owned EOBs. 
Expected levels of performance were prescribed in detailed appraisal 
documentation (copy provided by Trust1) and clear objectives set and 
monitored. This allowed for employees' performance to be continuously 
monitored and feedback applied. This was done, working in conjunction with 
their line manager. Appraisals were also used across the other two ownership 
types, but there was a greater degree to which conformity to the process and 
expected behaviours was applied in the trust owned EOBs.  
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“I asked for a copy of some job descriptions and she gave me a copy of 
the manager and coach… She … very briefly showed me a copy of her 
recent appraisal.” - Field notes from Trust1, employee 40. 
Clear, work-related objectives enabled employees to demonstrate how they had 
achieved or surpassed the requirements, and therefore, were due some form of 
reward. This fits well with Townley's (1997, p267) definition of a judgemental 
appraisal system with "links to an organizational system of punishment and 
reward". 
“We have a PDP, personal development plan, so I keep that updated 
every year so the manager has got visibility of that, so I just think the 
more I am logging on there, he has seen it. Like I say, he does delegate 
a lot to me, people would say or some people’s mind-set might be “I’m 
getting all this extra work and I’m not getting paid for it” but then I’ve 
always seen it from the other side, the more he delegates to me, the 
more I do, the more chance I have got to move my pay.” - Trust1 
employee 6. 
 Effective appraisals were dependent upon the management skills of the 
line managers to manage, to whom significant training, resources, information 
and support were provided. In the vast majority of cases this was recognised 
and line managers were respected in their role to manage the performance of 
their staff. They, in turn, were assisted by their managers and so on through the 
hierarchy. 
“Her management style was very much about relationships with the team 
and having strong relationships. She expected them to work hard but 
also respected them and supported them. As part of her strong 
relationship with the team she has lunch with them several times a week 
which is what I have observed and been able to be part of. During those 
times she is blunt and speaks her own mind.” - Field notes from Trust1, 
concerning a line manager. 
 The organisational structures were hierarchical with clearly defined 
management layers that required linear progression to move through. Different 
behaviours were expected and prescribed by Trust1 for management positions 
which then fed back into their appraisals. Hence there are defined career paths 
within the organisations, which are dependent on previous performance. 
 As well as managing performance, adherence to a uniform policy was 
also strictly enforced. Details were provided, as well as financial support to pay 
for the necessary clothing. I did not observe any deviation from the dress policy 
whilst on the sites. 
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“Uniform - Ties for men. White clinic dresses for women on shop floor 
with corresponding white blouses for women in offices.” - Field notes 
from Trust2. 
“I also asked for a copy of the uniform policy and she printed that as well 
(“business dress and appearance”).” - Field notes from Trust1, employee 
40. 
 Alongside the financial success, emphasis is placed upon excellent 
customer service and quality of product, which was underpinned by a proud 
feeling of ownership. There is a genuine desire to be the best at what they do. 
“the [competitors] sell them for £2.50 - £3. There is no way that we can 
compete on that, so what drives everything in this company is quality and 
service and that is drummed in all throughout.” - Trust2. 
This also drives a strong desire to understand what customers’ perspective of 
the company is, including asking them directly what they thought, and 
significant efforts are made to satisfy the customer. 
“we have complaints meetings, internal and external, supplier 
complaints, everything where we address any complaints, anything like 
that.” - Trust2. 
“I would rather know what it is really like. If we try and influence it, it is 
just meaningless. We really want to know what our customers think 
about us and we can deal with it.” - Trust1, senior manager talking about 
the weekly anonymous customer feedback system. 
 The ownership of all three organisations researched were put into trusts 
at the instructions of the founders, after they had already successfully run the 
business for several decades. Although they are all now dead, they are still held 
in high esteem and their memory is kept very much alive through details on the 
company website, pictures on the walls and stories told by current employees. 
They each had an active role in creating the conditions of the trust (for example 
choosing to split the profits of Trust2 equally between the employees and 
charitable concerns) which continues to influence the organisations now. 
“So the founder started the company with his brother in 1946 and it was 
a partnership so was owned by the founder and a number of partners 
and then at some point in the early in the mid-80s when the founder and 
fellow partners decided to retire it was the decision of the partners at the 
time to put the ownership of the firm in to trust for the benefit of future 
employees.”  - Trust_ Service. 
 The ongoing fulfilment of the trust is via the trust board, which is mindful 
of the history and has a strong desire to maintain the original ethos of the 
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founders. In effect, they enacted the principal-agency theory where the trust 
board are the principals and the employees are the agents. By providing a 
democratically elected voice within the board it helps to prevent the principals 
from creating abusive demands (Shields 2007). 
“First of all the founder set the culture, with his very strict disciplines, but 
if you work hard you get the rewards. The managing director who worked 
with the founder, he was managing director for 16 years, he is still a 
director of the group, like a non-exec type director, his role is what the 
founder wanted someone to do, to make sure the directors are doing 
what they should to be doing and not abusing their powers.” - Field notes 
from Trust2. 
 The next section looks specifically at rewards from working in a trust 
owned business. 
7.2.2 Reward management within trust owned EOBs. 
7.2.2.1 Financial reward within trust owned EOBs. 
In a trust based EO organisation, the ownership of the company is held by a 
trust and the trustees ensure that the trust deeds are observed. Employees are 
then beneficiaries of the trust. A key reward is the bonus each employee 
receives from the profits generated by the organisation. The amount paid is 
partly determined by the articles of the trust, which vary from organisation to 
organisation and the actual amount of profit made each year. Of the three 
Trusts researched, two (Trust1 & Trust2) paid a fixed dividend (dependent on 
profit) which was a defined percentage of an employee’s wages (typically 
around 15% or 8 weeks wages, but had previously been as much as 24%). This 
allocation policy was considered fair but is not necessarily equal since 
employees on a higher wage receive a greater fiscal amount. This can lead to a 
tension between “all employees are equal owners” and not everyone receiving 
the same financial reward, typically between managers and non-managers. 
“So I’m not sure there is equality, if I’m honest. I think there is fairness, 
and we strive for fairness whenever we can and I think we achieve it in 
most counts but I certainly don’t feel there is equality in place and 
actually think equality can be quite damaging to a business.” - Trust1 
senior manager. 
 Trust1 choose to pay the bonus annually and make a significant public 
relations exercise of it, ensuring that the amount is reported by national press 
outlets. Trust2 estimate how much the bonus will be (based on previous years) 
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and pay the bonus in quarterly amounts with the final payment correcting the 
difference between the estimated and actual value. 
 Trust_Service’s scheme for distributing the dividend was quite different; 
they allocated a share of the profits depending upon how many shares an 
employee had acquired (the company is 100% EO). On starting work at the 
company, a new employee is immediately given 100 shares and can only 
accumulate more shares through length of service (1.5 shares added per year) 
or increased grade and seniority. The shares are a theoretical notion and 
cannot be purchased, sold or kept after leaving the company. In reality, the 
majority of employees are on little more than the original allocation (so typically 
receive 4%-6% of their wages as dividend) and only senior employees 
(approximately 15% of the workforce, for example directors) will have more. 
This method rewards length of service over current ability and can lead to 
tension between high-performing new employees and low-performing long 
standing employees. Although this organisation is clearly trust owned, the 
distribution method has some overlap with the direct method, since employees 
own different share amounts but they cannot sell them and there is no monetary 
value to the shares themselves. 
“The negative aspects of employee ownership are: complacency, there is 
a 99.9% chance of getting the bonus but people still complain though but 
“15% is better than nowt!” - Trust1 employee 6. 
 “this issue of poor performance is that you and I could be sat side-by-
side doing the same job at the same grade at the same level of salary. I 
might have one or two years’ experience, you might have 30, I might be 
an outstanding performer, you might be sitting with your feet on the desk 
twiddling your thumbs. But when it comes to profit share you walk away 
with more than me because you have been there 30 years.” - 
Trust_Service. 
From this quote it can be seen that the uneven distribution within 
Trust_Service caused some resentment amongst employees; this was also 
seen in Coop2 which had a very person specific method of calculating the 
bonus. However it wasn’t seen in the direct models, which although also 
uneven, owners still had control of how much they invested. 
 The dividend is seen as important and looked forward to with excitement; 
although some employees being paid closer to the minimum wage, saw it as 
simply topping up their wages to an acceptable amount, and hence making 
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them comparable to other organisations who were not employee owned. This 
situation has improved with the recent UK government budget changes (2014) 
that allowed for the first £3200 to be paid tax-free (for those on minimum wage 
that would mean the entire bonus was tax free). The bonus is only payable 
whilst the employee remains in post and stops once they leave the organisation, 
either through retirement or voluntarily. 
“Reward - the bonus is nice as well as all the excitement around it.” 
“It is a good day, a lot of buzz and excitement about it.” 
“Reward - the bonus is “brilliant”, is a reward for the hard work and 
everyone gets excited.” - Trust1 employees. 
 Individual employees were clearly seen to identify a link between their 
own personal behaviour and the financial reward received either as 
performance related pay or employee bonus, even though it also relied on 
hundreds or thousands of other staff as well. By maximising their revenue 
generating behaviour, it also increased their personal wealth. This was a key 
motivator for staff to maximise their opportunities but not at the moral expense 
of the customer. 
“Employee ownership is important to her now “our own company”, you’re 
working for your bonus. Likes the atmosphere, it’s a nice place to work. 
We work hard especially over Christmas it’s nice to get the bonus.” - 
Trust1 employee 21. 
“That’s the thing, the thread throughout the sessions we have run, is that 
it is not about the hard sell. So we have said that as a business we will 
never ever get to the hard sell.” - Trust1 employee 41. 
 There was an emphasis on being commercially successfully for the 
ongoing longevity of the organisation. This can lead to wage levels being set in 
comparison to external organisations, down to minimum wage levels, rather 
than entirely for the employees’ benefit. Hence some employees received less 
than the “living wage” and it created a moral dilemma as to the well-being of 
staff. From internal staff communications and conversations, it was clear that 
the issue had been raised and for the board it “kept them up awake at night” as 
a significant issue but it was unclear what was going to happen. In this case the 
majority of employees were unable to "force" their opinion through. 
“What we want to do is provide a good level of employment and 
remuneration packages to 380 employees for the rest of their lives and if 
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we do that, that’s good and become more efficient at what we do all the 
time.” - Trust2. 
“Strategic vision - Investing for long-term sustainable growth and a strong 
legacy” - taken from Trust1 company documentation. 
“I asked if he was going on the [company sponsored large celebration] 
for employees to attend. Surprised when he vehemently said “No!” I 
asked why and he explained that “75% of employees here aren’t on a 
living wage. Why are we wasting money on that?” 
I said “that the employees could bring the living wage in.” 
 “There is very slow progress here”. - Field notes at Trust1 with 
employee 5. 
 The long-term perspective was helped by not having external 
shareholders who could demand short term profits. This allowed for the 
employee’s preferences to be considered. 
“in a lot of businesses, is that they trade very much short term. They 
have got shareholders to please, they have got a dividend to pay, they 
have got external market pressures. They manage month to month, six 
months to 6 months etc. We on the other hand don’t have some of those, 
we have some but not all of those issues and challenges so we get to 
manage more for the long-term and part of the challenge is with leaving 
the [organisation] in a better place than when you took it over.” - Trust1 
senior manager. 
 Individualised performance related pay, dependent on the rating given in 
annual appraisals did give scope to reward staff with personalised increases 
(for example between 0% and 8%). This was seen by the management to 
effectively contribute to retaining high performers as well as encouraging low 
performers to improve or leave the organisation, since a nil increase is in effect 
a pay cut. 
“dependent on where you are currently paid, dependent on where your 
performance is, I might be able to give you more than the average or you 
might justify less than the average and these are the reasons why” - 
Trust1 HR manager. 
So it depends on what your drivers are. If your drivers are pay, you have 
got to do your development to push yourself forward because as a 
business we don’t stand still so if you carry on doing the same at some 
point you’re going to fall back so you need to be upping it all the time - 
Trust1 employee 41. 
 As well as financial rewards, non-financial rewards were highly relevant 
to employees as well, these are discussed below. 
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7.2.2.2 Non-financial reward within trust owned EOBs. 
Individual praise and recognition (including financial rewards and time off) was 
encouraged, especially between colleagues rather than just from management.  
People were valued and felt supported in their career aspirations. Trust1 
displayed the "Employee of the month" in the staff entrance alongside an 
explanation as to why, as well as in the local staff newsletter. This could also 
include a token financial reward too. 
There is the “big thank you” which can be gold, silver, or bronze. Any 
employee can nominate any other employee, it just has to be signed off 
by their manager. A bronze award could be chocolate and wine, silver 
might be chocolate and wine and £10 voucher, gold could be a £25 
voucher. - Field notes Trust1, employee 7. 
This could be seen as paternalistic; with the management either recognising 
those employees worthy of an award or utilising peers to do their work for them. 
This is different from the cooperatives where there was no management role to 
do this. 
 All three trusts researched were created by founders who elected to pass 
the company onto its employees. As such the requirements of the trust were 
written by the founders and are unique to each one. Each organisation has a 
desire for the long-term employment and benefit of its staff. Without the need to 
satisfy external shareholders, the companies can focus on the whole person, 
both financially (via the profit share and quality pension scheme) and 
physically/emotionally. This can include private health care (free or discounted 
and supporting employees in ill health) as well as social events (for example, 
holiday homes, art enrichment, celebrations) not only during employment but 
beyond into retirement (for example on-going health support). This support also 
extended to family members, so that employees were not seen in isolation but 
part of a family unit (where appropriate) and hence has influence on society by 
reducing the burden on the state. However from the quote below it could be 
argued that EO is also being used for the economic benefits that it brings to the 
organisation. 
“What we want to do is provide a good level of employment and 
remuneration packages to 380 employees for the rest of their lives and if 
we do that, that’s good and become more efficient at what we do all the 
time.” - Trust2. 
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“The trust also, it is set up to look after beneficiaries in need that is what 
the founder did. Beneficiaries are defined by employees, past, present or 
their siblings” - Trust2. 
 The trust boards have a mandate to maintain the ethos of the original 
founder; typically this includes a clause that prevents the organisation from 
being sold, an action that would benefit current employees to the detriment of 
future employees. Hence there is recognition of wanting to provide employment 
opportunities. In maintaining the founders’ wishes, it can lead to idiosyncratic 
values being passed from generation to generation.  
“First of all the founder set the culture, with his very strict disciplines, 
but if you work hard you get the rewards.” - Trust2 (emphasis added).  
 There is a sense of ownership by the employees but also a lack of 
individual financial risk.  There is a commercial requirement to succeed in order 
to continue existing; however each individual employee does not bear the 
weight of the organisation on their shoulders. A hierarchy of management runs 
the organisation on behalf of employees with varying levels of participation 
(voice). This includes access to information, whereby almost everything (except 
personal salary levels) is obtainable. The management is held accountable to 
the trustee board, which may include elected employees. 
“Our [company] Board is different to most other Boards, bringing relevant 
skills and experience to the table through a mix of appointed and 
democratically elected employees.” - Trust1 annual report 2015. 
 As employee owners, considerable effort is put into giving employees a 
voice within the organisation. Their opinions are sought via employee surveys, 
elected representatives and open meetings. Due to the hierarchical 
management structure, it does not mean that they have full democracy but do 
get to vote on who represents their voice to more senior management. 
Ownership was equal amongst employees and governance was one person 
one vote but the management structure was hierarchical. One employee at 
Trust1 explained it as, “Leaders are paid to lead, to make decisions. The 
purpose of democracy in the organisation is to hold the leaders to account for 
those decisions.” Employees place their faith in democratically elected 
representatives, who are free to cast their vote in decisions as they please but 
must still face their colleagues the next day. Large scale, national democratic 
meetings were televised and shown live so that employees who were not 
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physically there could still see what was happening. This provides a level of 
accessibility and accountability to all the employees. 
“If we didn’t have a democracy, somebody probably at the top would just 
go “you are going to have a new pool table, you’re going to have a TV”. It 
would be decided for you, whereas the difference, I guess, for us here is 
actually we are going to ask every employee “you have got a voice, it’s 
up to you if you use it but if you would, how would you want that money 
spent?” They gather those opinions, we then cost it out. We look for the 
majority vote of what people want.” - Trust1, employee 37. 
“meeting which happens four times a year I think is streamed into the 
[building] the employees can come up and actually see the meeting 
happening live. It’s been mentioned in the morning and so long as 
employees cleared it with their manager they were free to come up and 
have a look. I went along and found an empty room and stayed for 
approximately 40 minutes and was the only person all the time.” - Field 
notes from Trust1. 
It was unclear why employees did not attend the televised briefings; whether it 
was a lack of interest, being disengaged, pressure from management not to 
attend or for some other reason. 
 As well as expressing voice through a hierarchy of meetings with elected 
representatives, individual employees are given the permission to question the 
senior management directly via an internal newsletter. This is an explicit clause 
contained within the details of the founding trust at Trust1, so therefore 
operates with greater authority than any individual manager within the 
organisation. This allowed for dissenting views to be expressed without any fear 
of punishment (they could be anonymous if so desired) however management 
still had to provide an accountable response. As Cox Edmonson and Munchus 
(2007) point out dissent can be seen negatively as an “indication of disapproval 
of the message” however it can also be with the aim of inducing “decision-
makers and superiors to do things differently or to reconsider and perhaps 
reverse earlier decisions” in which case it is very positive. 
“The [newsletter] has stinging letters about pay and a complaint from an 
unhappy employee, these are all answered. Any letters that aren’t 
published are also acknowledged and what has happened to them.” - 
Field notes from Trust1. 
 This section has highlighted and demonstrated different ways in which 
employees are rewarded for being part of a trust owned organisation, set up 
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specifically for the benefit of the employees. The following section seeks to 
theorise upon the culture that relates directly to being a trust owned EOB. 
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7.3 Organisational culture within the trust owned model 
All the different issues in the previous section are represented in the diagram 
below (Figure 7.11) - which highlights the features of performance and reward 
observed in the trust organisations researched as well as organisational values. 
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Figure 7.11 Performance and reward in trust EOBs. 
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 Using the detailed nodes highlighted above and continuing with the 
thematic approach to analysing the data, three overarching themes emerged 
whilst studying the trust owned culture. These are: 
1. Protective 
2. Structured 
3. Effort & Reward linked 
 These themes are shown in the diagram below (figure 7.12) and each 
one is then explained in detail. 
 
Figure 7.12 Trust culture values 
7.3.1 Protective 
The trust model provides the lowest level of risk (both financial and personal) of 
the three ownership models under consideration. On acceptance into the 
organisation, employees automatically become beneficiaries of the trust; this 
does not require anything of them other than their continued employment. The 
 187 
 
hierarchical management system in place takes responsibility for the ongoing 
operation of the business rather than each employee’s direct involvement in day 
to day running of the organisation, which was observed in the worker 
cooperatives. Hence the majority of employees (who are not managers15) 
benefit from the profit-sharing scheme without the weight of responsibility of 
running it. They do however contribute to it through their on-going effort within 
their role. This is therefore a low risk environment and along with the bonus, 
leads to a win-win scenario for staff. Only temporary/seasonal workers or 
consultants did not receive the bonus, otherwise the reward was universally 
applied. 
 All the founders of the organisations created their trust for the ongoing 
benefit of employees, not just financially but their all-round well-being.  As such 
they are still held in high regard and referred to in conversations, recorded in 
company documents and have their photographs displayed prominently in the 
buildings. 
“Lots of history everywhere! - Founders pictures throughout - in 
boardroom, corridors, and reception.” - Field notes from Trust2. 
 According to Schein’s (1992) definition of culture, the founders have a 
significant role in setting the organisational culture, which has been 
subsequently passed down through the generations of employees. Current 
business decisions are still weighed against the expressed wishes of the 
founders and rejected if not in line. 
Picture of founders looks down on the table to ensure that no-one forgets 
the original principles. - Field notes from Trust2 in the boardroom. 
Whilst discussing the principles of the original trust, “which is what the 
founder wrote back in the day, which is about, successful, rewarding 
employment etc. where he basically first talks about the importance of 
investing in the people and sharing the rewards to get a better outcome 
for everyone. Then we sort of look at more recently how our business 
has tried to bring that to life” - Trust1 - senior manager. 
                                               
15
 From conversations and official information provided by Trust1, I calculated that over 80% of 
the staff were on the lowest pay scale of non-manager. 
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 The protective nature of the culture could, according to Legge (1999, 
p253), be seen as “benevolent paternalism”, whereby management exercise 
control which is “for the ultimate good of all family members”. (All the founders 
of the EOBs researched happened to be male apart from one female.) Non-
management employees did not become “children” in the relationship though 
and do not lose all their rights. They maintain their right to speak and especially 
to speak against the organisation, if they so feel. Employees were formally and 
informally invited to express their opinion and senior management listened and 
considered what had been said. This is only depth 3 in Ridley-Duff and Ponton’s 
(2013) levels of participation, whereby employees are being invited to discuss 
management proposals but cannot suggest or enact them. 
“This is my third attendance at leadership meeting, it started early at 9:30 
AM so that they could specifically discuss the results of the recent 
employee opinion survey… The first hour and a half was reviewing the 
survey” - Field notes from Trust1. 
“We have a number, as you properly expect, of employee councils, 
works councils, those kind of thing. Some are required by law others 
more on a voluntary basis” - Trust_service. 
This implies a greater level of participation (perhaps level 4), but the 
participation can vary within each different grouping. This was most easily 
observed at Trust1, where there were layers of democratic functions (for 
example branch level, regional level and board level). At branch level, all 
employees of the branch voted on who represented their individual team and 
were also able to suggest items to be discussed within the representative 
meeting. Therefore it was democratic but the participation appeared to stop at 
level 4, whereby management did screen out weak proposals. Perhaps this was 
also reflected in the high number of employees on the minimum wage rather 
than the living wage? 
 The protection granted by the organisation extends to the well-being of 
the employee and in some cases, that of their family as well. This includes 
generous pensions, health care and life enrichment - for example providing 
opportunities to experience different art forms that would normally be 
inaccessible. This relates directly back to the conditions of the trust, and the 
founders’ initial desires for the employees as people rather than “commodities” 
(Legge 1999) and providing a common benefits package (available to all 
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employees) and standardised terms and conditions of employment across 
grades. 
“We are all the same, I am a director but we are all employees. We all 
work the same hours, we work a 4 ½ day week, we get 10 weeks holiday 
a year. We get a pension scheme, we share in profits. Everybody gets 
private healthcare, for themselves their wife and their family.” - Trust2. 
“There is one guy on the shop floor, you have to be with us two years to 
get healthcare, it’s a qualifying period. We have got one guy who joined 
this year, who is married with seven children, so that is nine lives, 
straight away. He is not in a high profile position.” - Trust2. 
 A significant form of protection for employees is the explicit requirement 
that the organisation could not be sold into external ownership (Gates’ (1998) 
transfer rights). This ensures that the trust board, who are selected for their 
adherence to the founders’ initial desires and bound by the constitution of the 
trust, cannot force employees into employment of another organisation. This 
was the case in the trust EOBs researched however it may not be universal 
amongst all trusts (see Eaga in Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011)). 
 The trust does however retain the right (as was exercised by Trust1, for 
example, in 2006) to make employees redundant if a location becomes 
commercially unviable, thus protecting the organisation as a whole. 
Alternatively, functions (for example cleaning) can be outsourced, again 
providing a degree of vulnerability for employees. Acquiring external 
organisations and bringing them under the umbrella of their protective trust is 
acceptable, although the adaptation to a new culture is not always 
straightforward. 
“Another company called [name] who we acquired 10 years ago and we 
TUPE transferred them. There were 60 employees who we transferred 
…, it wasn’t disciplined and was a bit relaxed, into this [highly disciplined 
environment] and probably 10% of them couldn’t hack it.” - Trust2. 
In this case the culture was considered to be oppressive by a proportion of the 
transferred population. This is a different scenario though, to where new 
employees willingly move to the organisation so people did not have the option 
to self-select. 
 Employees felt safe in criticising the management decisions taken. 
Negative opinions were invited through the communication channels created 
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(either face to face, group meetings or written letters) and employees had high 
levels of trust that it would not or could not lead to dismal. Hence according to 
Cox Edmondson and Munchus (2007), this form of dissent was actually 
“Organizational Communication”, an “upward feedback from subordinates to 
leaders”. 
 The culture was observed to be protective within the constraints of the 
environment created by the trust deed. For some employees, the idiosyncrasies 
(for example strict discipline) created resentment; however the majority 
appeared to flourish underneath its care and were queuing up to join. 
7.3.2 Structured 
The trust based organisations demonstrated the most hierarchical structures of 
operational management of the three models, in-line with benefits being handed 
down from above by a benevolent benefactor. There were layers of 
management (potentially up to ten) with the vast majority of employees on the 
lowest level. 
“What is the structure of the company then? You are not a flat 
structure company then are you? 
No, not really. We talk about being flat but we aren’t in reality” - 
Trust_Service. 
 Access to the management structure was via an employee’s line 
manager; hence this was a key relationship for the on-going performance and 
reward of the employee. Most employees appeared very satisfied with the 
service of their immediate manager however some implied that it could be 
better. This therefore creates a reliance on the ability of the line-manager, which 
is not apparent in cooperatives that avoid management layers preferring a 
flatter structure. 
“Well I have got quite a good relationship with my line manager, I do 
speak to him a lot every day. He knows what work I’m doing. When we 
come to my performance review each year, I know it wouldn’t take as 
long a discussion somebody else because I work quite closely with him.” 
- Trust1, employee 6. 
“She spoke about the performance appraisal which happened every year 
but was also a meeting at three monthly intervals. It is useful but it 
depends on your manager, and you get feedback which is good and bad. 
I asked her if you could feedback on your manager as part of the 
appraisal. She implied that the [name] department was particularly bad - 
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“go and talk to [name]” - although I didn’t specifically look for this, I never 
found any anecdotal experience that backed this up, however she was 
obviously convinced it was the case from her experience.” - Trust1, field 
notes with employee 12. 
 Control was further demonstrated through defined policies on uniform, 
which helped to differentiate different levels within the hierarchy as well as 
define what employees could and could not wear. In this way, individualism was 
not welcomed and a common look required. Some of this was dictated by health 
and safety requirements (Trust2) but it was also a deliberate policy at Trust1 
and Trust_service to create an expectation of professionalism. 
“the plant managers they wear white coats. It is strange, you walk around 
and they are referred to as “the white coats”. It is lots of people’s 
ambition is to be a white coat. It sounds a bit strange.” - Trust2. 
 The irrevocable trust created by the founder of Trust116 and similarly for 
the other trusts, defining that the shares are held in trust for the benefit of 
employees, allows for a longer-term perspective to be taken regarding the 
running of the organisations. There is not an immediate need to satisfy external 
shareholders at the expense of the longevity of the organisation. Thus decisions 
can be taken that not only include the views of the employee/shareholders but 
also assume the shareholders are not going to suddenly change, as well as 
their demands. Hence the overall aim of the organisation is not simply short 
term profit but about building something for future generations. 
“The founder would talk about, doing it just to make the world that little bit 
better place … and he talked about it being a good use of one’s life, to 
get involved in a social experiment of this kind.” - Trust1, employee 25. 
 Greater emphasis within the trust organisations was placed upon 
customer satisfaction than the other types. This is not to say that it was not 
important to cooperative or directly owned but it was expressed much more 
vocally within the trusts and especially Trust1 and Trust2. Systems were in 
place to find out what the customer thought of the service or to tell them what 
they required to know (for example an audit on the ethics’ of suppliers). 
7.3.3 Effort and reward linked 
The employees researched expressed a keen desire to work in such a way as 
to maximise the bonus they would receive directly for being an employee 
                                               
16
 It would require an act of parliament to revoke it. 
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owner. They perceived a strong correlation between effort and reward in the 
bonus as well as in their personal performance and reward, via performance 
related pay (Shields 2007). The bonus was a significant factor in affirming their 
ownership status and the vast majority of employees were proud of that status. 
Several employees commented on previous jobs within the same sector that 
were poor or non-existent in comparison, particularly regarding sharing the 
profits and having access to information (Kaplan 2005). Bonuses were limited to 
the duration of employment, once an employee left the organisation the bonus 
stopped, although healthcare potentially carried on into retirement. The bonus 
(in both frequency and quantity) was considered to be significant enough to 
impact on employee performance. 
Employee ownership is important to her now “our own company”, you’re 
working for your bonus. Likes the atmosphere, it’s a nice place to work. 
“We work hard especially over Christmas it’s nice to get the bonus.” - 
Field notes from Trust1 employee 21. 
“Whereas in the other business where you didn’t get any recognition, you 
didn’t get any thank you, you didn’t get any reward, and your pay was 
very static, whereas here your pay is measured by your performance. So 
if you come to work and do a really good job, then you get recognised for 
it. If you choose to come to work and think “I’ll just come to work and do 
my job” your pay will reflect that as well. So you get out of it actually what 
you put into it.” - Trust1 employee 8. 
 Therefore as an employee owner, the increased effort was seen to 
directly relate to increased personal wealth and hard work for personal gain was 
a characteristic observed. However, initial wage levels were set at market 
comparable rates, often at the minimum wage level for non-managerial roles17, 
which was not the case in the cooperative and direct organisations. This agreed 
with Bratton’s (2015, p383) view that “the logic of capital accumulation - profit 
maximization - necessitates that managers relentlessly minimize costs, 
including labour costs”, however performance related pay provided a way out by 
offering good performing employees the opportunity to progress. Performance 
was managed via well documented and structured annual appraisals. 
“… so we might have 40 ladies in the [department], there could be 40 
different rates of pay in there. They start on the same money but they 
might go there [indicating more] because they give a bit more or they 
might just plod along. You do get people, what they want to do is come to 
                                               
17
 Taken from internally and externally advertised roles at Trust1. 
 193 
 
work, earn the money and go home. But some will give a bit more, they 
have some ambition.” - Trust2. 
 Peer recognition was actively encouraged, with the recipient being 
rewarded financially, usually at a token level. The greatest recognition 
expressed though was simply being thanked for what they had done. This was 
role modelled by the senior management team at Trust118 and affirmed by 
publicly displaying “employee of the month” prominently, showing the nominator 
as well as the nominated person. This was also observed at a departmental 
level as well. 
“We do have a thank you where anybody can nominate somebody for a 
thank you. So you can have vouchers or an iTunes gift card but I think 
sometimes it is just a thank you. A "thank you" means a lot more to you 
sometimes than a voucher. A heartfelt thank you, not “thank you very 
much for today, thank you very much for today, thank you very much for 
today”. If you have done something well, then they will say “you have 
done a really good job, thank you very much” and that means more than 
the other bits I think sometimes.” - Trust1 employee 8. 
The recognition provided here is a motivator under Herzberg’s (1968a) 
motivation-hygiene theory, leading to greater job satisfaction. Peer recognition 
is a form of motivation by joint owners of the organisation. Encouraging other 
employees to perform, which ultimately improves the organisational 
performance, is then reflected in their personal bonus. Hence it can be seen as 
giving recognition or encouraging performance for selfish gain. From the 
employees observed, it appeared to very much be the former. 
7.4 Conclusion. 
This chapter has specifically looked at the trust ownership model. It has 
reported the influence of the ownership type on how performance and reward 
management are handled as well as looking at culture within trust 
organisations. The trust environment appears to be the most structured, 
providing a level of protection to the individual employee. There is a clear line of 
sight between effort and the reward obtained. This is the clearest of all Handy’s 
                                               
18
 During a management team discussing successful previous results, a senior manager 
handed round a box of chocolate champagne truffles, whilst apologising that he had not had 
enough time to organise real champagne! 
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(2009) culture typologies, that of a Role based culture, with formal hierarchies 
as the operating structure. 
 This chapter has specifically looked at the trust form of EOBs, to 
determine the aspects of culture that are either unique or shared with only one 
other form of ownership and are therefore not common across all three forms of 
EO. The next chapter repeats the same exercise, but instead focuses on the 
elements of performance, reward and culture that were consistent across all 
three types of ownership - cooperative, direct and trust owned EOBs.  
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Chapter 8 - Employee ownership common 
findings 
8.1 Introduction. 
Having looked at each of the ownership types in isolation, this thesis now turns 
to observe what was common to all of them. What aspects of performance and 
reward did the ownership types share? Initially, the data is presented, complete 
with illustrations from the field and from this a set of common values are 
developed. This leads to an overarching interpretation of the culture within the 
EOBs researched. That is, one of a high commitment culture, based around 
trust, openness and fun. 
 A summary of the ownership types is re-presented. This was originally 
shown in chapter 2 but has now been revised (with highlights) following the 
experience from the fieldwork. 
EO Type Gain ownership Reward Hybrid (?) 
Cooperative Purchased (either 
nominal value £1 
or % of actual 
value). 
Share of surplus 
allocated using 
system 
determined by 
members. Can 
have similarities 
with direct model 
Cooperative of 
cooperatives. 
Direct Purchased via 
shares in the 
organisation or 
given by the 
organisation. 
Share dividend 
and increase in 
share value on 
sale. 
Yes with trust 
type. 
Trust Ownership 
remains with the 
trust but the 
benefits are given 
to all qualifying 
employees. 
Bonus 
determined by 
trust from the 
profit created. 
Yes with Direct 
type. 
Table 8.9 Summary of ownership types (revised) 
8.2 Performance and reward management common 
within EOBs. 
This section provides illustrations of performance and reward that were 
observed in the field as a vehicle for understanding the culture by looking at the 
artefacts, values and norms (Schein 1992). From these observations, themes 
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are drawn out to theorise about culture, which are then detailed in the 
subsequent section. 
8.2.1 Performance management common within EOBs. 
Low staff turnover rates were frequently observed at the EOBs. Trust1 had a 
target (KPI) of staff turnover to be 10% or less and during the period of 
observation it was achieving 5%. This figure, along with all the other KPIs, was 
permanently displayed for all staff to see, although there was no distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary turnover. Low turnover has the benefit of 
reduced recruitment costs, increasing experience of employees and avoids 
losing employees/knowledge to competitors (Taylor 2008) thereby increasing 
overall profitability. Whereas high turnover rates lead to lower profitability and 
customer service and a loss of human and social capital (Shaw 2011).  
“So the perks actually make it a good place to work and our staff turnover 
is probably the lowest in the country.1%? Somebody retired last year.” - 
Coop1 member 3. 
“Our people tend to stay with the business for many, many years and 
swap over jobs many, many times. We want that agility that people can 
do that. We don’t want to limit people. We are trying to liberate people 
fundamentally.” - Direct1 managing director. 
From Shaw’s (2011) meta-research, he found that there was a linear negative 
relationship between turnover and organisational performance or in some cases 
an “inverted U” relationship. The potential downside of very low turnover is a 
lack of employees entering the organisation with fresh external ideas and 
outside experience. This was noted by some of the organisations.  
“We aim for about a 90% retention, which is deemed healthy. In 2010 
someone clocked up 50 years' service, I've been here 18 years. I know a 
lot of people who have been here 5 years or more, so the workforce is 
not particularly transient, which can have a downside of not bringing new 
blood in.” - Dir_Service. 
“What I always say is they don’t know what they don’t know because if 
you have worked here for 30 years unless you go outside and look at the 
big wide world you don’t know. But we have brought some newer people 
in and we are working in partnership with other companies now. We are 
having to change.” - Trust2.  
 The EOBs researched either aspired to be “employers of choice” or 
already were. This is appropriate since the employees had a voice to influence 
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how the organisation was run to make it employee friendly and a place that 
people wanted to work at. 
"We are well-known in the area, for general jobs in the factory we don’t 
need to advertise or anything because we have a pile of CV’s in the HR 
office and we just flick through them." - Trust2. 
"I think we are an employer of choice, we promote ourselves as an 
employer of choice. The industry is a hard industry to work for, but I hope 
people see us as that." - DIR_Professional. 
“He had taken a £4000 pay cut from another Yorkshire company, one of 
the top 20 companies in Yorkshire because he realised the harder he 
worked it just increased the owners pockets - gave them “bigger 
pockets”. - Field notes from Direct1, employee 10. 
 Flexibility within the job role not only benefitted the organisation but also 
the employee as well. Employees that were able to perform diverse functions 
helped with work management dealing with fluctuating demand (Watson 2006). 
For employees, it helped to reduce boredom, allowed them to utilise skills that 
may have remained dormant and hence developed themselves, which in turn 
might be financially rewarded (in trust or directly owned). Flexibility could take 
the form of significant job rotations, spending months or years in a position or 
simply being able to work on many different stations of a shop floor. A 
preference for promotion from within an organisation (where promotion existed) 
meant that skills that were developed early in a career could still be called upon 
during busy periods (for example senior managers operating cash tills at 
Christmas in Trust1.) 
“I know a lot of people who work here because, I’m not an office job 
person but working on the shop floor all the time would be a bit boring, so 
it is nice to have this variety.” - Coop2 member 11. 
"People move around from different sides, they will go from office into 
Ops, other way round as well. It is not seen as necessarily a promotion to 
come into the office, it is just a different job, different skills". - 
DIR_Manuf. 
"We just have informal chats anyway. So if people are “can’t handle it, 
I’m really struggling”, we will move them off, we will give them a change. 
We try to make sure nobody gets like that. I can’t remember the last time 
I had anybody come to meet saying “I’m fed up” because we move them 
around so much. It is better for them." - Direct1 employee 1 a team 
leader, talking about machine operators on the shop floor. 
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 How poor performance was handled was specifically looked for whilst 
carrying out the research. It was discussed in all the ownership types but 
implemented differently in each (see chapter nine). 
 A consistent theme amongst the types was that of the decision-making 
process and the employee involvement therein. The frequent remark was that 
the decisions made were accountable and better quality however they took 
longer to make, which could lead to frustration. As employee owners, it reduced 
the effects of power, since everyone had a voice, therefore increasing the 
opportunity for Habermas’ notion of ideal speech (Johnson and Duberley 2010) 
leading to better quality decisions. 
One of the biggest misconceptions of employee owners is this thing that 
says “every decision happens as a collective”. The accountability is as a 
collective, but the decision-making is absolutely and more strongly, has 
to be strong leadership. More so than in other companies because the 
accountability is that much stronger. I wouldn’t see that as a downside as 
a leader I see that as a positive thing. - Direct1 managing director. 
"Are there any downsides to employee ownership, do you think? 
Decision-making I think. So I suppose sometimes when you want to 
change something there is a bit more of a consultation process there so 
it does take longer so that is probably the downside that you have to 
involve more people. You can’t say as a manager “I’ve decided I want to 
do this and I’m going to do it whether you like it or not”, you do have to 
talk to people and get people engaged in things. Obviously with that 
things are more drawn out than they would be by a business that just 
said “Right we are your managers and we are going to tell you what to do 
and that is it” [finger hitting the table for emphasis]. So that can be a bit of 
a [negative thing]." - Trust1 employee 41. 
 This section has illustrated common aspects of personal performance 
within EOBs which illustrate the values of the organisations. The next section 
looks specifically at rewards from working in an employee owned business, a 
significant aspect of EO. 
8.2.2 Reward management common within EOBs. 
8.2.2.1 Financial reward common within EOBs. 
All the EOBs researched, which were deliberately selected because they were 
for-profit organisations, provided some form of financial rewards for being an 
owner on top of a standard wage. EOBs that are designated as not-for-profit 
cannot do this and must find other ways to motivate and reward their staff but 
that is outside the scope of this research. Although financial provision due to 
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ownership is therefore common to all ownership types, the way it is done is 
different in each, so it has been covered in detail in the relevant previous 
chapters (Chapter 6 - cooperative, Chapter 7 - direct and Chapter 8 - trust). 
 All the ownership types were seen to provide additional benefits to their 
staff, which although not directly financial, saved the employee from using their 
own money to purchase instead. This ranged from relatively small (bicycle 
servicing free of charge at Coop2) to significant (providing holiday 
accommodation at a reduced rate at Trust1) and were available to all staff 
irrespective of grade. 
“We provide services like, we have an independent financial adviser who 
does a surgery here once a month and anyone can put their name down 
to see him.” - Trust2. 
 “We have up to 50% [staff] discounted …, so if you [purchase the 
service from the organisation] you will get up to 50% off the discounted 
rate. Which is significant, that is a £10,000 benefit.” - DIR_Professional. 
This is in stark contrast compared to the results of CIPD’s (2015b, p7) Reward 
Management 2014-15 survey that suggests the 5th most common benefit 
offered to all staff is free tea and coffee.  
Reward approaches % of respondents 
Paid leave for bereavement  80 
Training and career development 73 
Pension scheme 71 
25 days and over paid leave 66 
Tea/coffee/cold drinks – free 65 
Table 8.10 Top 5 benefits offered to all staff CIPD (2015b, p7). 
 All the EOBs provided a pension (which is now mandatory by law); 
however, the terms were more favourable than the average values reported by 
the CIPD. For example, Direct1, have a 0% employee contribution and a 15% 
employer contribution for their pension, compared to average UK values of 
5.8% and 4% respectively (CIPD 2015b). The pension is both a financial reward 
as well as an emotional one in that it gives employees more security and 
confidence in looking forward to life after work and not having to be solely 
reliant on a government pension. 
“How many people pay 15% non-contributory pension, to everyone 
including the cleaner?” - Direct1 founder. 
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 Benefits extended to family members as well, acknowledging that the 
employee was a person as well, with a life outside of work. This ranged from 
spouses’ free participation at social events to providing private healthcare for all 
family members. 
“The trust also, it is set up to look after beneficiaries in need, that is what 
the founder did. Beneficiaries are defined by employees, past, present or 
their siblings or anything like that so basically, for example there is a guy 
coming in now whose wife is in a wheelchair and is severely disabled, is 
a pensioner now but we have paid for a special lifting device to be fitted 
into his car” - Trust2. 
 Although providing benefits is common amongst UK employers in 
general (CIPD 2015b), the level of benefits amongst the EOBs researched 
appeared to be a significant factor, more than the norm. As well as financial 
rewards, non-financial rewards were very relevant to employees as well. These 
are discussed in the next section. 
8.2.2.2 Non-financial reward common within EOBs. 
A significant reward observed at all the organisations researched was that of 
employees being happy at work and having fun. Although there were people 
who were unhappy with their situation, the number of unhappy people observed 
was very small in comparison (in the region of 0%-5% of all contacts). Even 
employees who were merely satisfied to be at work were dwarfed by the clear 
majority of employees who appeared to be genuinely happy to be there (Bakke 
2005). 
“I’d love to leave. Sometimes I hate the place, but no I wouldn’t leave this 
organisation. Jesus! It is the best company in the country even compared 
to some of the other worker Co-op’s.” - Coop1 member 3. 
There was an understanding that employees should be happy at work, if they 
own the organisation and have a voice to influence it, then why not? Hence 
positive steps were taken to make it happen. 
“One of the other strong values is to have fun. If you were belly laughing 
out loud in the office you wouldn’t ever get into trouble. We do some 
really daft things, you know, at the other site we play cricket in the office 
in the afternoon and if the MD or someone walks in, they might join in!” - 
Direct1, employee 17. 
“So at the moment it is very, very, extremely happy workforce.” - 
DIR_Professional 
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“So first and foremost I have to achieve a happy [location] to work in, 
which is measured by the [employee] survey, so we continually will work 
on culture, we continually will work on leadership development, 
employee development etc., we will enter into discussion through the 
[employee] voice mechanism to understand how employees’ feel working 
in [this location] and we will spend a considerable amount of our time 
trying to make it as good an experience as we can to work here.” - 
Trust1, senior manager. 
This agrees with Pfeffer (1998, p112) who suggests that  
“People do work for money - but they work even more for meaning in 
their lives. In fact, they work to have fun. Companies that ignore this fact 
are essentially bribing their employees and will pay the price in a lack of 
loyalty and commitment”.  
Therefore by making the work place an enjoyable place to be, they were helping 
to retain employees as well as increasing their commitment to the organisation. 
 Significant pleasure was obtained by employees through the opportunity 
to take part in charitable giving of time and money to external organisations. 
This was encouraged and assisted by the organisations, which recognised the 
dual benefit of helping the community and gaining useful experience from it. 
Direct1 explicitly used the experience as a development tool for their staff, even 
down to putting it as an objective as part of the appraisal (employee 11). A 
portion of the profits for Trust1 are set aside to backfill for staff who want to 
work six month secondments in charities for the same reason. Colleagues are 
kept informed of their progress and the lessons learnt via the internal 
newsletter. 
We have got pictures from where we did Leonard Cheshire, it’s an old 
people’s home for people with mental illness and we totally revamped 
their lounge. If you see the before and after and how happy it made 
them, people were coming out crying. It was hard work but, God, what 
you give back to them, it’s unbelievable. It is rewarding. - Direct1 
employee 1. 
 “I guess we are also looking to be a contributor to the local communities. 
We are looking to divert some of our profits to supporting the local 
communities. We are looking at this from a long-term perspective.… Last 
year’s budget was £10,000, there is a nominating voting process and 
they identified four major charities which each received donations of 
£1500 and staff were able to self-nominate charities for donations of up 
to £200 on their behalf. It is really about putting something back into local 
communities but doing it in a way that allows staff to have a say. - 
DIR_Consultancy 
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Not all employees were fully supportive of the charitable work, but the 
overwhelming majority were very keen, especially regarding local charities or 
ones that had a direct impact on colleagues. 
 “Charity week – got involved with taking blind people around Tesco, 
didn’t really enjoy it but did my bit.” - Field notes from Direct1, employee 
5. 
 This section has highlighted and demonstrated different ways in which 
employees are rewarded for being part of an employee owned business. The 
following section now looks specifically at values that appeared to be common 
across all the forms of employee ownership. 
8.2.3 Values common within EOBs. 
The ability to influence through the expression of an individual’s voice, both 
opinions and ideas, was demonstrated across all the ownership types, although 
the channel of expression was different. This is one of the three fundamental 
tenets of employee ownership defined by the UK government (BIS 2013) and 
suggested by Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991). This research found 
empirical support for this assumption. All employees researched knew that 
there was a way of expressing their thoughts and the choice whether to do so or 
not was then a personal one. In worker cooperatives attendance at all member 
meetings was expected, and mandated if necessary, however there was no 
reprimand for not contributing, although it was encouraged. 
“If someone has something in their head they will go around and speak 
to a few people and if everyone agrees it they should put a proposal in.” - 
Coop2 employee 1. 
“So the manager will drop you a postcard with a little chomp bar in it and 
they will invite you for a chomp and chat. How you can exactly chomp 
and chat at the same time, we have a laugh but that is the idea of it. You 
come in and have a cup of tea and a chocolate bar and sit down and 
relax and say whatever you want to say.” - DIR_Professional. 
 “we get our groups together and say “is there anything you want me to 
take to the agenda setting meetings?”, discuss what is on the agenda so 
that when the meeting comes up it is all about escalating employee 
opinion really.” - Trust1 employee 6.  
 The value of employee voice is diminished if either side of the 
conversation is considered to be dishonest, hence honesty was frequently 
declared as a value as well as being enacted amongst the workforce. This 
extended to the relationship with customers as well. 
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“The values, trust, honesty, integrity, endeavour and respect. They are 
written down in our handbook and they are our values.” - DIR_Eng. 
“Values - respect, honesty, openness, commercial sense.” - Field notes 
from Trust1 employee 18. 
“He very much brought the ethos of the founder with him, which is about 
honesty, we are all the same, we work hard but we enjoy rewards.” - 
Trust2. 
“We would like to be accessible to all, a regular grocery shop selling 
good honest food, as transparent and traceable as we can.” - Coop2 
member 5. 
 Honesty is then a pre-requisite of having access to information, another 
pillar of EO (BIS 2013), since access to deliberately inaccurate information is of 
questionable value. The ICA (2014) lists “honesty” as one of the ethical values 
of cooperatives. Once again the organisations researched all actively 
encouraged the dissemination of organisational information (company 
performance, sales figures, intended growth), both formally and informally. This 
was often done via large display boards with up to date information or informally 
having conversations around the coffee machine with the managing director. 
Almost all information was available; only two examples were given where 
information was being deliberately withheld: 1) employee’s personal salary level 
and 2) the acquisition of an external organisation including its current staff, 
which risked the staff leaving if they were to find out. This was in stark contrast 
to some employees’ previous experience at non-EOBs where information was 
deliberately limited to senior management only (for example Trust1, employee 
8). Therefore honesty had boundaries, within which it was applied, not that 
people were dishonest but they actively chose not to share sensitive 
information. As Rothschild and Whitt (1986) point out it is possible to 
democratically agree not to share all information. 
Everyone knows everything! It’s amazing! That’s one of the reasons I 
actually really like working here. Everyone will know I met with you here 
today because I put it in our diary because I knew you would ask 
someone and they would say “who’s he?” So email really helps, we have 
got good minutes from meetings, which people read. We have got our 
diary, so in the morning is the first thing, we read it out to everyone who 
is in. Some people at the forum will go and tell people in the teams and it 
gets discussed. So you might find a lot of people stay around and talking 
but this is because this is how information gets shared. And I really 
believe this is one reason why the coop works so well. Constant, 
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constant, constant talking, information sharing. Some of it is a bit 
overload but it is kind of nice. - Coop2 member 1. 
“To what extent is information shared within the organisation?  
There is too much information! We have the intranet, dashboards, 
webinars! Everything is available somewhere.” - DIR_Service 
 At a business level, honesty appeared to be bi-directional, managers to 
staff and staff to managers. People’s personal opinions (for example on what 
they thought about a manager) however were more restricted, although there 
were formal channels that could still be used to communicate this (for example 
employee opinion surveys, anonymous letters). In these cases, respect and 
honesty were held in tension with each other; by not speaking up it could be 
considered respectful but is it fully honest? Or by being completely honest, if 
done for the wrong motives, it could easily be disrespectful. The key issue here 
is whether people are lying, “there must be the intention to deceive the 
addressee” (Eenkhoorn and Graafland 2011) rather than the omission of 
information, hence the intent is to be honest. 
 Access to genuine, up to date information and being able to express an 
opinion upon it without fear of punishment or ridicule, fosters an environment of 
trust between members or employees and managers.  
“there is a lot of trust in the culture. Disappointment occurs when 
people’s capabilities aren’t up to the job, so they fall short. That is 
different to not trusting somebody. Not trusting somebody is saying “I 
think this person has got some other agenda, I don’t think they are going 
to do a good job”. But you know what, if you think someone is going to do 
the best they can then you are trusting them. If the best that they can do, 
through no fault of their own, is not good enough, then that is a different 
issue then. - Direct1 employee 37, a director. 
“For me the values are about being open and honest with each other, 
and you trust your colleagues and I think a lot of it, you need to have the 
skill in what you do, but also you need to have the right behaviours.” - 
Trust1 employee 8. 
In Trust1 the “right behaviours” are explicitly defined through the appraisal 
system and enforced by the line management on behalf of the senior 
management. The system was created with involvement of employees from all 
levels prior to rollout and again can be questioned through the official channels, 
hence all the owners are helping to define what constitutes “right”. 
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 The Oxford Dictionaries (2015) defines respect as “Due regard for the 
feelings, wishes, or rights of others”. This was apparent in the EOBs regarding 
their colleagues as co-owners as well as the wider population. Many of the 
organisations specifically included respect within their published set of values. It 
was acknowledged that people could have different opinions but that did not 
diminish the person, so robust debate was acceptable and expected in many 
cases. 
"Although people made noises to show their agreement or disagreement 
with what was being said, nobody actually interrupted the speaker or 
stopped them from speaking. Throughout it was a civilised, organised 
debate where anybody who wanted to was able to make their point. At 
one point [name] stood up to speak and could not be heard due to the 
general background noise so people made a shushing noise in order to 
make people quiet so that they could then hear." - Field notes from 
Coop1 taken at a members meeting. 
This shows a respect for each voice, that everyone’s opinion was important. 
However it could be questioned whether paying the majority of staff, at Trust1, 
less than the living wage is respectful? Or does the total reward (environment, 
pension, benefits etc. Kaplan (2005)), make it acceptable? 
 “I think that is the key bit really, it is living up to your responsibilities if 
you want to get your rights. Some of it like, respecting other people, if 
you want to be treated with respect you expect the same to come back, 
don’t you.” - DIR_Manuf. 
This suggests that rights, like respect, are conditional; that they are balanced 
against responsibilities and are not freely granted. 
 Equality (treating people the same) and fairness (treating people without 
bias or discrimination which Bakke (2005) argues that "Fairness means treating 
everybody differently") were both observed in the different ownership types but 
their application was different. Coop1 and Coop2 both chose to pay people 
equally (either in hourly rate or actual take home pay) and all members of the 
coops had an equal vote in decisions ("one person, one vote"). Bonuses were 
then dependent on the individual (length of service, hours worked), and were 
subject to constant revision and debate as some members perceived the 
allocation rules as unfair. From an external perspective, the equal pay seems 
unfair where employees have responsible positions (for example HR manager), 
however the daily job rotation then helps to equalise roles. Coop_service took 
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the opposite view. It had individual pay levels based on role and then a common 
shared bonus, regardless of other factors.  
 Trust1, in which all employees are equal owners of the organisation, 
chooses to be fair in its bonus allocation (a fixed percentage of wages for 
everyone) which does not lead to an equal pay out, since employees are on 
different pay levels. 
So the [organisation] has never put its self out there to say that it is 
equal. What it has said is, it’s fair. So fairness is very different to equality. 
Fairness means that if somebody worked really hard and gets 
recognised for that, and somebody doesn’t work as hard and doesn’t get 
recognised for that, that’s fair. The fact that one may take home 
something as recognition and the other doesn’t means that it is not 
equal, in one way of looking at it. So I’m not sure there is equality in the 
[organisation], if I’m honest. I think there is fairness, and we strive for 
fairness whatever we can and I think we achieve it in most counts but I 
certainly don’t feel there is equality in place and actually think equality 
can be quite damaging to a business. - Trust1 senior manager. 
Trust1 sees fairness as recognising people’s different contributions, whereas 
the coops see fairness as recognising everyone’s right to work, irrespective of 
how they perform. 
A lot of companies say “our employees are our biggest asset”, you see 
that strapline everywhere and we actually believe our employees are, 
because everything we do is for the benefit of us. We are all the same, I 
am a director but we are all employees. We all work the same hours, we 
work a 4 ½ day week, we get 10 weeks holiday a year. We get a pension 
scheme, we share in profits. Everybody gets private healthcare, for 
themselves their wife and their family. - Trust2. 
However this is a selective equality, since pay was personalised. Being equal 
owners in the (trust) organisation did not provide equal pay, as it did in some 
coops (but not all). External market forces, on-going business viability and 
personal performance levels were cited as reasons for accepting unequal pay 
amounts. 
 It is recognised that EO is not a utopian society though and not 
everything was fair and equal by all employees, which did cause a degree of 
irritation. 
"I think there is some noise from the lower levels of the firm that the profit 
distribution isn’t really fair." - TRUST_Service. 
 In recruiting employees, it was important to confirm that the values of the 
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potential new co-owners were compatible with those stated by the organisation. 
Hence in most cases considerable effort was applied to verify this. This ranged 
from prolonged probationary periods (up to nine months at Coop1), to group 
activity observation during the interview phase, specifically looking for 
demonstration of the values (at Direct1). The same value set was then often 
used as part of the appraisal process to reconfirm and reemphasise what was 
seen as important, helping to further maintain and even control appropriate 
behaviour, since poor adherence would lead to negative feedback and reduced 
opportunity for pay increases, encouraging employees to leave. Interestingly, 
only a few of the employees interviewed said that employee ownership was a 
factor in applying for the job. Most were initially unaware of it and its 
implications but subsequently embraced it. 
"Do you make your values part of that recruitment process? 
Absolutely yes. What we have started doing with factory staff is recruiting 
based on values, so we bring them in and do an assessment. Set them 
challenges and see how they interact with each other. So is not all about 
the loudest or the funniest, you can just get a really good feel for their 
demeanour and personality. And we have started doing on the business 
side of things, the last management accountant we have recruited on 
values, because you get somebody come and they’ve all got accountants 
qualifications, experience and all that, so then we look at the person: are 
they going to fit in? Will they fit into the culture? Have they got good 
values?" - Direct1 employee 17. 
Again, “good values” are defined and used within the appraisal and recruitment 
process, so have been declared for all to see and are open to comment. Non-
adherence leads to automatic personal de-selection from the organisation, 
creating the distinct possibility of a mono-culture. Any deviation from it would be 
seen as incompatible (Willmott 1993).  
 Building on the observations made, the following section seeks to 
theorise upon the culture that is therefore common across all the forms of 
employee ownership. 
8.3 Organisational culture common within EOBs 
All the topics in the previous section are represented in the diagram below 
(figure 8.13) which highlights the features of performance and reward observed, 
as well as values that were common in the EOBs researched.  
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Figure 8.13 Performance and reward in the combined culture of EOBs. 
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Using the detailed nodes highlighted above and continuing with the thematic 
approach to analysing the data, four overarching themes emerged whilst 
studying the common EOB culture. These are: 
1. Trust 
2. Openness 
3. Fun! 
4. High Commitment culture 
These themes are shown in the diagram below (figure 8.14) and each one is 
then explained in detail. 
 
Figure 8.14 Combined EOB culture values 
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An alternative representation is below, with just the key words showing and 
representing the overlap between different values. 
 
Figure 8.15 High commitment culture of EOBs 
8.3.1 Trust 
 A core value that was observed in the field was that of trust. Rousseau et 
al. (1998, p395) define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behaviours of another”. A similar definition of trust was given by one of the 
directors of Direct1, “believing that the other person does not have a hidden 
agenda” - that the perceived intentions of another person are sufficiently 
transparent and for my benefit, so that I can choose confidently whether to 
follow them. Trust was an often publicly stated value within company literature, 
highlighting its importance and Leary-Joyce (2004) links a high trust culture with 
reduced costs. 
"I think the employee ownership culture makes you realise that you have 
to trust people more than maybe a culture where everything is driven and 
instruction based and totally, a more subjective set of values than purely 
just objectives.” - Direct1 employee 37, a director. 
“What are the values of the organisation? 
The values, trust, honesty, integrity, endeavour and respect. They are 
written down in our handbook and they are our values.” - DIR_Eng. 
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 Galford and Seibold Drapeau (2003, p90) define three kinds of trust: 
strategic (“the trust employees have in the people running the show to make the 
right strategic decisions”), personal (the trust an employee has in their direct 
manager) and organizational (trust in the company itself to make decisions and 
act in an appropriate manner). This is illustrated in the figure 8.16 below and 
shows that the different types are linked together, both negatively and 
positively. If an employee’s trust grows in their personal manager, it can be 
reflected in increased strategic trust, similar if the company is found to be 
distrustful (going back on a promise) then this will potentially reduce the 
strategic trust. However this model does not cater for the trust that a manager 
puts in an employee, to work autonomously for example. 
 
Figure 8.16 Types of trust (Galford and Seibold Drapeau 2003). 
 Strategic trust was observed in the EOBs. Having easily accessible 
information available to employees enabled them to ensure that the leaders 
were accountable for their actions. Employees were either directly involved in 
decisions or had access to the information in order to understand and challenge 
why they had been made. 
“He has trust in the senior management. That is the chairman of the 
organisation and thinks that employee ownership enables them to take 
the long-term view rather than short-term profit for external 
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stakeholders.” - Field notes from Trust1, talking to employee 24, a line 
manager. 
 Where there were line managers, personal trust was also apparent. Dirks 
and Ferrin (2002) say that trust in immediate managers can be relational and, or 
character based. That is, it depends on the relationship between the leader and 
the follower or it can be based on the character of the leader or both. 
Relationships between managers and team members were fostered through 
easy access, open information and shared goals and values.  
 An employee’s character (and therefore trustworthiness), regarding 
alignment with the organisation’s values, was assessed during the values based 
recruitment process and subsequent performance was also measured against 
the stated values. This encouraged more of the desired behaviour and 
discouraged unwanted behaviour through the appraisal systems used, thereby 
creating a “stronger” culture through the elimination of behaviours, and even 
employees , through the management of shared values / culture (Davis 2004). 
The appraisal system processes were observed to be open to employee 
participation, inviting feedback on their effectiveness and implementation 
(Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). This meant that the power within the process to 
chastise an employee, and ultimately dismiss them if required, had input from 
all levels. This helped to reduce management power simply to impose its mould 
on the workforce and create an army of employees that were created only in the 
management’s image, as was feared by Willmott (1993). 
 The character of a leader was a critical attribute, which influenced the 
ability of followers to have trust placed in them. Clark and Payne (2006) 
identified the factors of trustworthiness required by leaders for their 
subordinates to trust them as “ability, integrity, fairness, and openness”.  Again 
within EO, line managers were guided to have integrity, because of the 
openness of information which then made them accountable for their 
decisions19. 
“You feel that there is certain things that are confidential, might not be 
work related and you want to speak to your line manager about and you 
expect them to keep that in confidence, so you trust them with that. And I 
                                               
19
 One EOB founder told the story of an MD that had told different “truths” to two separate 
departments. When it was exposed that the accounts did not agree, the MD had no option but 
to resign. 
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have never had anything that has ever come out, if you know what I 
mean.” - Trust1, employee 8. 
 This example also illustrates that at times trust was not aligned with 
being open. Certain personal information was not publicly available, for example 
personal salary levels in the non-cooperative EOBs, as well as some strategic 
decisions; details of relocating a whole branch in Trust1 or a potential 
acquisition in DIR_Manuf. In both cases the management actively decided not 
to involve the entire workforce, as it was thought to hinder or jeopardise the 
process. This therefore requires strategic trust on behalf of the employees that 
the management are acting on their behalf. 
"For the [acquisition] we bought the people as well. Partway through the 
process if they find that that that company is being sold off they could all 
leave. So you can’t tell everybody then, which really hurt people, it was 
like “we didn’t get to hear about the acquisition until it was all signed, 
sealed and delivered” but you couldn’t actually get to know about it. You 
have got to trust the board, are doing it for the right reasons." - 
DIR_Manuf. 
 Trust in line managers was dependent on the character of each 
individual manager though and it is acknowledged that consistency could not be 
guaranteed, regardless of how thorough the recruitment process was.  
 “Trust - could be more consistent trust. Someone says something to 
your face then does the opposite amongst the [senior] managers (no 
names were mentioned). She felt it was more of a personality thing than 
an actual trust level.” - Field notes from Trust1, employee 35. 
This dishonesty was observed to be the exception rather than the rule; the clear 
majority of employee spoke positively about trusting their manager and being 
trusted themselves. They were empowered and encouraged to carry out their 
duties without overt supervision. 
"You know, they are flexible, there is a lot of trust there, there is nobody 
sat on my shoulder making sure I am doing XYZ. When I do something I 
am trusted to get on with it. I’m not pinned down to 8:30 to 5 o’clock. As 
long as we are getting the work done, they are pretty flexible in terms of 
working hours. There are often times when you might need to put a few 
extra hours in an evening but at the same time I know that if I need to go 
and pick the kids up from school early, I can do that and work from 
home." - Direct1, employee 38. 
In this case, trust allows for autonomous working. Employees are trusted to 
perform their role without supervision and they are responsible for its outcome. 
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In some cases there were levels of trust to be earnt; employees were not 
necessarily given it carte blanche. This was illustrated at Trust1 where 
employees were not permitted to carry mobile phones on site (to prevent 
photographing account details) and were subjected to random searches on 
leaving the premises, due to the availability of cash and high value retail goods. 
 Organisational trust was aided by an alignment between the 
organisational values and the individual’s values, which was confirmed via the 
recruitment process and appraisal system. Value statements including 
“integrity”, “honesty”, “ethical” and “trust” were common place however, 
espoused values were seen to match up with the enacted underlying 
assumptions (Schein 1992). Examples were given to back this up. 
"You came because it was vegan, where does the Co-op fit in or 
was that an extra? 
Yes, just from the ethics front, I had been for interviews, we hadn’t 
decided to live in this city at this point, we were looking all over the place, 
my partner and I. Ethics wise I was going to interviews at big corporate 
companies, I guess with the vegan frame you realise you don’t want to 
work for the corporate Dragon, while going to interviews, it was very 
much just, it wasn’t a fit for me. You can tell that from the word go can’t 
you? The structure and style of an interview tells you a lot about the 
company I think. It just wasn’t me at all. I came here and instantly felt, 
much more at ease I guess. The cooperative working structure, I was 
amazed at the start how successful it is for us." - Coop2, employee 5. 
 Hurley (2006, p56) suggests ten different factors of trust, three of which 
depend on the individual giving trust and seven on the situation they are in. 
They are listed here:  
Personal factors: 
1. Risk tolerance (natural inclination to take risks) 
2. Level of adjustment (ability to build relationships to lessen risk) 
3. Relative power (between the "truster" and trustee, the more power the 
truster has the easier it is to trust) 
Situational factors: 
4. Security (of employment). 
5. Number of similarities. (Common values held, membership of the same 
group, personality traits - introversion/extroversion).  
 215 
 
6. Alignment of interests. (Do both parties share the same goal?) 
7. Benevolent concern. (Does the leader care for their followers and are 
they willing to fight on their behalf?)  
8. Capability. (How capable is the leader? If they are ineffective at what 
they do, then they will not be able fulfil their promises.) 
9. Predictability and integrity. (Is their behaviour reliably predictable and do 
they do what they say they will do?)  
10. Level of communication. (To what degree is there open and honest 
communication?) 
Regarding EOBs, how does a proposed high level of trust compare against 
these requirements?  
Risk Factors Application within EOBs 
Risk tolerance This is a personal factor so outside of the immediate control 
of the EOB, however the level of personal financial risk is 
different in each of the ownership types therefore employees 
can self-select the risk they want to take. In directly owned 
EOBs, the individual can set their level of risk (once the 
minimum share purchase has been met) even up in to the 
tens of thousands of pounds. In trust owned EOBs, the risk 
is held collectively by the trustee board and in coops, which 
require the most personal involvement, the prolonged 
probationary period, allows members (and co-members) to 
decide whether they fit before fully embracing the 
organisation. Hence the type of EOB might influence who 
works there. 
Level of 
adjustment 
This concerns the individual’s unique personality and 
previous experience; as such this does not relate specifically 
to EO but is a wider societal issue for the employee. 
Relative power Readily available information in EOBs, which holds the 
leader accountable, reduces the power differential helping to 
build trust, since information is a form of power. The lack of 
demonstration of status differences due to a similar or non-
existent dress code (particularly in Direct1 and the coops) 
also helped to reduce the power differential. 
Security 
(employment) 
The EOBs researched stated an ability to take a longer-term 
perspective, of which secure employment was a key part. 
The coops explicitly stated that employment (even for future 
generations) was an aim of the organisation hence this 
would help to build trust if one of the organisation’s aims 
was to maintain the employment of its staff. 
Number of 
similarities 
Employees of an EOB all have ownership in common, and 
values are shared through being recruited into the 
organisation. Personality is less important, except perhaps 
in cooperatives, where being able to behave in an 
extroverted manner can be of benefit in large member 
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meetings. There is an alignment of interests; at the core 
level of creating a profit that is then shared amongst co-
owners but at a higher level too, of shared corporate values 
(for example integrity, ethical, customer focused) and 
personal values (environment, workers’ rights and desire to 
travel). 
Alignment of 
interests 
Again, ownership brings a shared goal in the on-going 
success and profit of the organisation. This alignment can 
be reduced when the total reward for management is 
excessive, when compared with non-management positions 
although this can be magnified further in non-EOBs. 
Benevolent 
concern 
Benevolent concern was best demonstrated in the servant 
leadership (Greenleaf, 1998) approach in Direct1 but 
universally in the shared desire for organisational success, 
dependent upon fellow co-owners. Alternatively, this could 
be seen, as Grey (2013) suggests, that caring is just a form 
of cultural manipulation for the benefit of management 
although that was not specifically observed. 
Capability EOBs invest significant resources in recruiting the right 
people to become co-owners, thereafter performance is also 
appraised to see if people can deliver. Investing in 
employee’s development also helped to increase their 
capability. With a low turnover culture, managers also had 
the potential to gain significant experience in an organisation 
rather than moving quickly from company to company. 
Predictability 
and integrity 
Honesty is a common value of the EOBs and employee 
voice and access to information makes leaders more 
accountable. Between them, it provides a control 
mechanism that fosters an environment of predictability and 
integrity.  
Level of 
communication 
Active dissemination and open access to organisational 
information, along with visible management within the EOBs 
facilitates high levels of communication. Training may be 
required to fully understand what is being communicated 
though, which was observed. 
Table 8.11 Risk factors of trust applied in EOBs (Hurley 2006). 
From this it can be seen that EO impacts directly on most of the factors that 
Hurley (2006) suggests which therefore makes trust more likely. 
"What about performance? How do you make sure everybody 
works to their highest potential? 
Well I don’t. One hopes that, their contemporaries, the people working 
with them, keep an eye on them. The thing is, we never have any trouble 
getting rid of people working in the factory. They don’t stay here because 
the others will say “Oi! Get bloody working.” It is trust." - Direct1, 
founder. 
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 The table below summarises how Hurley's (2006) model of trust maps 
against those ideas of Galford and Seibold Drapeau (2003) and Dirks and 
Ferrin (2002) already presented. 
Who is 
involved? 
Galford and 
Seibold 
Drapeau 
(2003) 
Dirks & Ferrin 
(2002) 
Hurley (2006). 
The 
"Truster" 
  Personal factors: 
1. Risk tolerance. 
2. Level of adjustment. 
 
The 
"Truster" 
and line 
manager 
Personal Trust 
(in an 
employee's 
direct 
manager) 
Relationship 
(Between 
leader and 
follower) 
 
Character (of 
the one being 
trusted) 
3. Relative power. 
 
Situational factors: 
1. Number of 
similarities 
2. Alignment of 
interests  
3. Benevolent concern 
4. Capability 
5. Predictability and 
integrity 
 
The 
"Truster" 
and senior 
leaders  
Strategic Trust 
(in the senior 
leaders) 
 6. Level of 
communication 
The 
"Truster" 
and the 
organisation 
Organizational 
Trust (in the 
company 
itself) 
 7. Security 
 
Table 8.12 Models of trust compared. 
 Another aspect of trust was respect for colleagues, as co-owners of the 
same organisation with a voice to be able to express their opinion and have it 
respected. Hence this was sideways trust, peer to peer. Relationships built 
upon respect, enabled personal trust to happen. Cockerell (2008) sees respect 
for all employees, regardless of role as one of the keys for a successful 
organisation in terms of financial return, customer satisfaction and low 
employee turnover. Job titles themselves were not worthy of respect but an 
employee’s contribution (or demonstrated ability (Clark and Payne (2006)) to 
the team was. 
“I think it is the work values, that is the most important thing and how we 
treat each other, how we should respect each other and help each 
other.” - Direct1, employee 21. 
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“Her management style was very much about relationships with the team 
and having strong relationships. She expected them to work hard but 
also respected them and supported them.” - Trust1, employee 35. 
“I think that the one thing that we all value and that makes it work is 
respect because we do have lots of different people with lots of different 
opinions and our decision-making sounds crazy to anyone unless you 
are there.” - Coop2, member 6. 
 Another contributor to trust regarding “positive expectations of the 
intentions” is that of being treated fairly (Clark and Payne 2006) and equally. 
Different forms of employee ownership apply these linked attributes according 
to their understanding. For cooperative members, the emphasis is upon 
equality, that all members are equal, for direct and trust the emphasis was more 
upon fairness (see chapter 9). They can both be “hygiene” factors (Herzberg 
1968a) regarding trust, since inequality and deliberate unfairness will hinder the 
psychological contract employees have (Rousseau 1995). 
8.3.2 Openness 
Overlapping with trust, openness, “the quality of being honest and not hiding 
information, … being able to think about, accept or listen to different ideas or 
people” (Oxford Dictionaries 2015) was clearly demonstrated across the EOBs. 
The willingness to spread information as well as hear people’s opinions is a 
tenet of employee ownership and was universally demonstrated (Pierce, 
Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). As has already been shown, Hurley (2006) 
considers communication to be one of the factors of trust and similarly for Clark 
and Payne (2006) who specify openness, as well as the ICA (2014) for whom 
openness is one of their explicit values, along with honesty and caring for 
others. 
 Openness, in the form of access to organisational information (for 
example sales figures, management meeting minutes, reasons for management 
decisions) was universally acclaimed by all employees, whether this was 
displayed on notice boards, via online systems, provided in mass briefings or 
simply face to face in conversations. All employees knew that any information, 
except for directly personal data (for example salary level), was available 
somewhere although exactly where it could be found was not always so clear. If 
the information was not readily obtainable then there were channels through 
which questions could be asked to obtain it. Therefore employees felt satisfied 
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that they knew what was happening with their organisation, looking both forward 
and backwards in time. Some employees pointed out that this had not been the 
case in previous roles for other, similar sector employers who were not EOBs. 
 Managers knew that they were required to be conduits of information as 
well; in a reverse of the corporate "need to know" culture, withholding 
information unnecessarily was not the norm. Therefore being physically 
accessible in the organisation, either in an open plan office or by simply walking 
around the organisation or contactable electronically was important. As Tierney 
(1988, p15) suggests the accessibility of the managers "fosters a widespread 
sharing of information and an awareness of decisions and current activities". 
"The managing director, he has an office, it sounds a bit strange but if he 
is in that office one hour a week I’d be surprised because he is constantly 
on the shop floor engaging with people, talking with people. If I walked 
round the shop floor I’ll talk to people, people come and talk to me." - 
Trust2, finance director 
“[Name] was in a meeting with the managing director and someone else 
but in full view in the open office on the middle table.” - Field notes from 
Direct1. 
 Openness was also extended to me as a researcher and the extent of it, 
shocked me20. I was given access to entire sites (Direct1 and Trust1) and 
permission to speak to whoever I chose, whenever I wanted. I was asked to 
avoid inconvenient times when interviewing (for example employees on a 
break), otherwise I was left alone to manage my time. This demonstrates 
confidence that the organisations had nothing to hide and were open to me 
being there. A number of the EOBs hosted business and educational visits to 
further expose themselves to the public. 
“Met by [name], but then given complete freedom of the factory and 
office area. I did not have any badges to wear, nor have to report to 
reception anymore. I could walk where ever I wanted to and talk to 
whoever I want to.” - Field notes from Direct1. 
“Took me on tour of whole site, starting from the basement up. All around 
the back stairs, basement. All the stock rooms, canteen, unused parts of 
the building, everywhere! Even told about the roof garden should I want 
to go there!!!!” - Field notes from Trust1. 
                                               
20
 In one instance, I asked to join a small meeting at the open plan table thinking it was a job 
interview in Direct1 only to be informed it was a return to work meeting so it was not 
appropriate. 
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 However as Birchall (2011, p16) points out, making information available 
is not the same as making it accessible  
“data can in theory be ‘transparent’ - can indeed be online - but, because 
of the sheer volume of data, the structure of databases, and the criteria 
of common search engines, much of it remains unseen and 
unprocessed. That much of the net is so-called ‘deep web’ means that 
information can be simultaneously transparent and opaque.”  
Hence effort must be made to translate the information into an understandable 
and accessible media, for all employees who might not have the necessary 
technical or financial background.  
“Sat in the canteen. Somebody put financial information onto each of the 
three tables in the canteen showing that they had hit the target, sales 
were up X% on last year approximately £X00,000. It includes a 
breakdown of sales per country - see the picture I took of this piece of 
paper.” - Field notes from Direct1. 
 
Figure 8.17 Sales figures freely available to employees on canteen table. 
 “He cleared a desk for me and gave me a copy of the management 
committee minutes. This was a large ring binder, showing all the minutes 
over a long period (unknown) up until the most recent which was two 
days ago - 15 July 2014. The ring binder also existed in the canteen and 
I did observe people sitting reading it. It is clearly freely available to all 
members and anyone on site in fact.” - Field notes from Coop1. 
 Running in parallel with access to information is the second tenet of EO, 
that of influence, by being able to express a voice (Pierce, Rubenfeld and 
Morgan 1991) and hence have a level of involvement or participation. In this 
case the management of the organisation is open to the employee’s opinions 
and to their taking part in decision making. Again, all the organisations actively 
encouraged employees to express their opinions through multiple channels, 
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with an assurance that they would at the least be heard. Hyman and Mason 
(1995, p24) make a clear distinction between employee involvement (EI) and 
employee participation (EP). EI is controlled and inspired by management to 
satisfy their need for “an adaptable workforce”, whereas EP is inspired by the 
workforce itself or a higher power (for example governmental desires) whereby 
employees “interests over company decisions can be addressed”. Both upward 
and downward communication in EI was evident, through published 
organisational information (as already mentioned) and actively inviting 
employees to take part in direct communication with senior management. 
“The auto assembly team presented their report rather than the team 
leader. Before the presentation the team were practising and nervous but 
the team leader coached than how to present. Overall, banter, laughter, 
confidence with the managing director. Managing director was very 
attentive, leaning forward to hear in a noisy environment.” - Field notes 
from Direct1, whilst observing the end of financial period regular factory 
tour. 
EP was clearly evident in the radical structure of the worker coops but also in 
the other forms of EO as well. Most notably through employee participation 
within senior management boards in Trust1 but also in the direct organisations 
as well. The different levels of EI and EP due to the ownership types are 
investigated further in Chapter 9  
 Openness is a vulnerability of the organisation towards its employee 
owners; as such it can potentially be exploited for personal gain in situations 
where the employee has no loyalty to the organisation or it can bring a 
significant personal advantage to the individual. This can be a risk if employees 
choose to abuse their privileged position and misuse the information for 
personal gain. Vadera and Pratt (2013, p175) see this as an example of  
“nonaligned-organizational workplace crime”. Access boundaries were placed 
around sensitive information to prevent it being disseminated unnecessarily. For 
owners the information was openly available but, outside of that group it was 
only released on a need to know basis. This protected the commercial interests 
of the organisations. Therefore openness was bounded and not universally 
open to anyone in the community. 
“This was then the end of the meeting and everybody got up and left the 
room, handing their information pack in at the door.” - Field notes from all 
member meeting at Coop1. 
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“She wouldn’t let me take the pay rate levels away with me nor the 
percentage increase for each grade within the "My Performance" process 
- this must have been too commercially sensitive I presume and would 
be of value to competitors. She did give me a printed copy of the "My 
Performance" information pack for employees and for leaders.” - Field 
notes from discussion with HR manager at Trust1. 
 Employee owners expressed a sense of ownership of their organisation 
as explained by Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2001). Although their individual 
share may be very small (for example 1/90000th in Trust1) for the vast majority 
of employees, they were proud of their status. In many cases choosing the 
organisation as an employer was not down to its ownership status and most 
people were ignorant of exactly what employee ownership was prior to working 
in an EOB. This concurs with Nuttall's (2012, p14) research in the state of EO in 
the UK, "a lack of awareness of the concept of employee ownership." However 
employees did develop a passion for ownership, as they spent time within it, 
conversing with colleagues and reaping the financial benefits. 
“And that is the environment that we create because we are so 
passionate about the company we work for, that we own, and that we are 
a member or partner of.” - DIR_Professional. 
"Everybody is more together. It’s more like a family unit. You haven’t got 
any negative people, which every company has them, without a doubt. 
They have gone, or they have eventually joined in. They have had to 
change, we have all had to change in a way because it is all about 
helping each other. So the difference from then [prior to EO] to now is 
massive and because you are employee owned it is on yourself to 
promote it. You are working for yourself, for someone to say to us “this is 
my company” and everybody out there [on the shop floor] can say that. It 
is quite a big thing for people, “yes this is my company.”" - Direct1 
employee 1 talking about Employee ownership. 
Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2001) suggested that there are three roots to 
psychological ownership, where what is owned becomes part of the owner. 
These are:  
1. Having the ability to bring about change - EI and specifically EP do 
enable employee owners to actively be involved in change within their 
organisation (Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). 
2. Enhancing self-identity through possession - Employees were often 
found to speak very proudly of the organisation they worked for and 
owned. They received reflected glory for the positive accomplishments of 
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the organisation and its status in the community. This leads to 
organisational based self-esteem (Pierce and Rodgers 2004). 
3. Having somewhere that can be called home – employee owners were 
able to relate ownership with the physical buildings that they worked in, 
since that was their normal place of work. They were often involved with 
the layout and decoration of the buildings. At Trust2 the employees 
included full time decorators, working to maintain a high standard of 
decoration and at both Trust1 and Direct1 the employees were involved 
in planning the rest room, complete with pool table and computer gaming 
section. 
 “What are the benefits of employee ownership? 
 “Tremendous pride”, sense of responsibility so when making decisions 
you stop and think a bit more than you would do otherwise. You also 
have a voice; you are listened to but not necessarily implemented 
though. The decisions you do make have more significance though and 
she referred to pride again.” - Field notes from Trust1 employee 40. 
 The most consistent negative aspect of employee ownership expressed 
was that of decision making and specifically the extended time it took; as 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986, p64) put it, "Democracy takes time." Providing 
employees with contextual information and allowing them to question it or 
express an opinion upon it, all took time to accomplish. Within the coops, some 
decisions could only be made by the entire membership which therefore might 
have to wait until the next membership meeting, possibly three months away. 
This was Holmström’s (1985, p12) experience - “Managers like the freedom of a 
co-op but complain about their lower pay and sometimes about divided 
responsibilities and slow decision making.” Time needed to be built into any sort 
of change plan to enable sufficient time for decisions to be made. However the 
resultant decisions were perceived to have a greater level of buy in by the 
employees, leading to fewer problems further along the implementation road. 
“Yesterday we had a massive discussion about, we employ some 
casuals, although no one agrees on anything it is still felt we can still talk 
to each other there is no shouting which is always a good indication for 
people. No one walked out of the room or anything like that; we are 
talking about over 30 people sitting in a room trying to reach a 
consensus. We didn’t reach a decision but at least, you know. I think that 
is a good indication that people want to work together, people seem very 
happy.” - Coop2 employee 1. 
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 In conclusion openness and trust are mutually constrained by each other, 
without one the other falters. Trust in management works because there is a 
plethora of available information to validate what is being said but trust is limited 
by the extent of the information. When it ceases to flow, trust is harder to give. 
8.3.3 Fun! 
An overwhelming, frequently expressed value and experience, was that of fun. 
A key benefit of an ethnographic approach is being able to spend a pro-longed 
time on site allowed opportunities to observe people doing their everyday tasks, 
to confirm whether people’s expressed opinions were congruent with their 
experience (Hammersley 1992). The most obvious expression of fun was 
simply people being happy to be at work and smiling as they did their tasks.  
“Smile. Almost without fail, every person I spoke to smiled, especially 
when I interrupted them for a chat and therefore it was spontaneous. A 
simple gesture but it underlines the impression that people are genuinely 
happy to be at work. Neither was it forced, in the way that “Greeters” 
greet people entering a shop and this is backed up by people hoping to 
spend the remainder of their working career with [organisation]. Clearly 
this is aligned with the “Fun” element of the [organisation] Spirit, again 
people genuinely appeared to enjoy the banter, camaraderie and strange 
challenges (e.g. Dragon boat racing) that work brings as well as the 
opportunities to develop.” - Reflection by researcher reported back to the 
leadership team at Direct1.  
As Homes and Marra (2002, p1687) point out, “Humour can function to 
construct and sustain relationships which contribute to workplace harmony by 
expressing solidarity”. Hence the fun experienced through humour has a 
positive effect on building relationships and uniting people together. The fun 
observed and described by employees was thought to be genuine rather than 
“surface acting” (Hochschild 1983) where the employee is employed to express 
an emotion.  
 In line with Abramis’s (1989) recommendation, a number of the 
organisations made “fun” an explicit value to be promoted and employees to be 
measured against in their annual appraisal; hence it was a serious subject. 
Abramis goes onto suggest that employees who do find fun in their work are 
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less anxious, more satisfied with their job, more motivated, more creative and 
less likely to be absent21. Hence it can be beneficial to the overall organisation. 
 “It is like something really difficult to describe but coming to work and 
actually looking forward to it, I think that is kind of fun. It is for me. 
Massively. I went to another employee owned company and the 
word that kept coming up there was “fun”. If you had a word to 
choose what would you choose? 
You said fun, I can’t really think of anything else! [Laughter]. It is really 
enjoyable, even the horrible bits you know, you are doing them because 
you like your colleagues and you are not doing it for yourself, you know it 
is the best for the Co-op.” - Coop2 member 1. 
“Watched the values video which the company use as part of its 
induction process, about 5 minutes long. It is more about the people 
laughing than anything else.” - Field notes from Direct1. 
 One aspect of fun was the positive attitude to celebrating success within 
the organisations. Direct1 had a deliberate policy of selecting employees from 
all parts of the organisation (shop floor to MD) to attend awards ceremonies in 
London or to opening ceremonies in Europe, with all expenses paid. Since 
everyone is an owner, they had a right to attend. Trust1 have a large annual 
celebration when they announce their employee bonus figures, gathering all the 
employees from a branch together. 
“The one that was a bit special for me was where we went to Venice for 
the day, when we had our first million profit. That was brilliant” - 
DIR_Manuf. 
 In addition, the organisation helped to bring about fun opportunities that 
were not usually available to the public. This brought pleasure and experience 
to the employee as well as developing them as individuals for the organisation. 
For example, under the constitution written by the founder, Trust1 provide the 
opportunity for employees to apply to work for six months in a charity (on full 
pay), recognising that the workforce is in a privileged position and that they can 
utilise skills for the good of the community. This was very much in line with the 
founder’s desires to have a positive impact on society not just for the 
employees. Similarly DIR_Professional have a mutual exchange which has no 
immediate financial benefit to the organisation, but is an exciting opportunity for 
                                               
21
 Employee 3 at Direct1, who was always very welcoming to me with a large grin on his face, 
was proud of his 10+ years employment without a single day off sick. 
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the employee. It helps to make the organisation a more attractive choice 
regarding recruitment and enriches the employee's lives. 
“We’ve got an exchange going on with Australia, we are going to send 
two practitioners over to Australia to a [site] there and they are going to 
send two Australians over to work over here. We are going to do that 
three times throughout the year. So those are the kind of things that most 
companies don’t do and so we call them once-in-a-lifetime opportunities. 
Because you are really only get that once in a lifetime.” - 
DIR_Professional. 
 Fluegge-Woolf’s (2014) research suggests that fun at work does have a 
positive effect, specifically regarding work engagement and it is related to good 
Organisational Citizenship Behaviour however it did not directly relate to 
individual performance, therefore is of questionable value regarding individual 
output. Fluegge-Woolf (2014) also points out that, “poorly managed and 
executed workplace fun can inhibit positive outcomes” and as such fun is not 
always a positive attribute. This is “organised fun” and can easily be cynically 
controlling people into have fun (Bolton and Houlihan 2009). However this was 
not what was observed in the field. Employees genuinely seemed to be having 
fun, typically through interaction with colleagues. The only negative observation 
relating to organised fun, was a single comment on the cost of a large 
celebration involving thousands of employees at Trust1: 
“I asked [name] if he was going on the 150 years celebration which is 
being planned in Birmingham for 10,000 employees to attend. Surprised 
when he vehemently said “No!” I asked why and he explained that “75% 
of employees here aren’t on a living wage. Why are we wasting money 
on that?”” - Field notes from Trust1. 
It was unclear if this was an isolated opinion or simply that I did not come 
across anymore people who verbally expressed it to me. Subsequently, a letter 
was written to the event organisers in the internal newsletter (dated 
11/07/2014), questioning the cost of the event and whether it was the right use 
of the money, so it potentially represented a larger population of dissatisfied co-
owners who would prefer the money used in a different way. 
 Reducing the opportunity for negative experiences was also actively 
managed. Employees that worked on manual tasks or semi-automated 
manufacturing production lines were rotated around different roles to help 
prevent boredom (for example Direct1, Coop1 and Coop2). Similarly, shop 
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floor employees in Trust1 were encouraged to expand their product knowledge, 
for the benefit of customers and enrich the role that they were in (Hackman and 
Oldham, 1976).  
“There are lots of ways to develop staff, through products knowledge 
("You know how to sell Parker pens but can you sell Schaffer pens?"), 
new skills (e.g. confidence, talking) as well as developing into 
management.” - Field notes from Trust1, talking to employee 24. 
 A different source of pleasure was derived from getting involved with 
charity or community projects. This was promoted by a number of the 
organisations, across all the ownership types. Often the causes were 
geographically close to the site or meaningful to the employees themselves. 
Giving something back to the community from which members of staff were 
drawn was a positive approach, or perhaps it was a way of placating guilty 
feelings of personal wealth whilst other members of society struggled? 
Typically, events were funded by the EOBs from a specifically designated pot of 
money either set up within the constitution or determined annually as a 
percentage of profits. This therefore had the consequence of reducing the 
amount of profit available to then share amongst the employees but this 
viewpoint was never expressed during the research. 
“We also have a charity committee that have a budget which allows staff 
to nominate four major charities. Last year’s budget was £10,000, there 
is a nominating voting process and they identified four major charities 
which each received donations of £1500 and staff were able to self-
nominate charities for donations of up to £200 on their behalf. It is really 
about putting something back into local communities but doing it in a way 
that allows staff to have a say.” - DIR_Consultancy. 
“I am very proud of what we achieve here because it is not the easiest 
way to run a business but it is definitely worth it. It enables us to run a 
kind of business we truly want and also give a lot back to both our 
community I hope, with things like the free apples for all the kids, 
supporting local charities, whether it be a hamper for a raffle prize and 
also offsetting unfair trade around the world. So we give thousands and 
thousands of pounds each year to a charity as well. I personally would 
never be able to do that, but I am doing that personally, it is just as a 
collective.” - Coop2 member 6. 
 The actual amount donated varied from organisation to organisation. 
Direct1 gave 1% of budgeted profit (~£50k), in 2015 Trust1 gave at least 3.5% 
of pre-tax profit, Coop2 donate 5% of wage costs to charities and the promotion 
of coop working and Trust2 donate 50% of their profit to charitable causes 
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under the terms of the trust. Mondragon, according to Spanish law have to set 
aside 10% of profits (or surplus) for "educational, cultural or charitable 
purposes" (Whyte and Whyte 1988, p42). Therefore, except where specified 
under the terms of a trust, co-owners are making the choice to forgo some of 
their personal wealth for charitable causes. This compares favourably with the 
FTSE 100, as highlighted by the Charities Aid Foundation (2014, p14),  
"The median proportion of pre-tax profits being donated to charitable 
causes by FTSE 100 companies was 0.7% in 2012, which is the highest 
level over the six years tracked. However, in a typical year only 22 
companies met the previously proposed minimum of 1% or more of their 
pre-tax profits being allocated to corporate giving. 54 companies donated 
less than half a percent of their pre-tax profits to good causes in a given 
year, with 20 companies donating less than a tenth of a percent." 
The combination of employee ownership (benefitting a section of the immediate 
society rather than external absent shareholders) and the expressed value to 
help other parts of society through charitable acts and giving, mean that EOBs 
fit within Ridley-Duff and Bull’s (2015) definition of a social enterprise and are 
part of the social economy. 
 Helpful involvement with the community helps to create a positive 
reputation outside of the organisations, influencing the employer brand and 
aiding with the desire to become an “employer of choice” (Leary-Joyce 2004). 
Employees that enjoy their work and have fun are more likely to speak 
positively about the organisation outside of work, creating a desire for people to 
work there. This was certainly my experience as a researcher during the initial 
interviews as well as whilst on site. 
"One final question, are you seen externally as an employer of 
choice? 
I would hope so, what do you think. 
Yes, I want to work for you! 
We try to promote that. So I have worked in a number of different 
companies but the difference is the person at the top really cares about 
people. And you see that through and through and through. So our staff 
love the company they work for… I think we are an employer of choice 
we promote ourselves as an employer of choice. The industry is a hard 
industry to work for, but I hope people see us as that." - 
DIR_Professional 
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In DIR_Professional it was the founder who chose to create an EO 
organisation as part of the expression of care for the employees rather than set 
it up with purely external stakeholders. 
 A fun environment makes for a desirable place to work. This was evident 
in the research undertaken and the low turnover of staff but what is the overall 
effect of trust, openness and fun? This leads to overall culture found within the 
EOBs, which is high commitment. 
8.3.4 High commitment culture 
Porter and Lawler (1968) defined commitment as  
“the willingness of an employee to exert high levels of effort on behalf of 
the organization, a strong desire to stay with the organization and an 
acceptance of its major goals and values”.  
All three aspects of this definition were evident in the employees of the EOBs. 
As will be shown below, they were particularly evident in: 
1) Personal investment of effort in reward for profit share 
2) Low staff turnover 
3) Alignment of personal values with organisational values. 
 Employee owners can reap the benefit of their own work, through the 
sharing of financial reward, therefore the greater the performance, the greater 
the potential for profits. Overwhelmingly, employees could directly relate the 
performance of the organisation with a personal financial reward. This then 
followed through into relating personal performance with the organisational 
performance.  
“Obviously we have an ethos that we all contribute and we all benefit. So 
you make a difference every day through your contribution.” - 
DIR_Professional. 
Although Ellerman (1997) queries whether profits should be shared out 
immediately after they have been announced and instead whether they should 
be paid into a capital account, as Mondragon do (Whyte and Whyte 1988), 
which is eventually paid out on retirement or leaving the organisation. He 
suggests that this provides for a longer-term perspective for the success of the 
organisation, rather than a “hand-to-mouth” mentality.  
 230 
 
 The Matrix Evidence (2010) review suggests that employee ownership 
can improve levels of employee engagement. Kahn (1990, p694) defines 
personal engagement as "the harnessing of organization members' selves to 
their work roles; in engagement, people employ and express themselves 
physically, cognitively, and emotionally during role performances."  During the 
research, through conversations with employees and observing them in the 
workplace, employees appeared to be genuinely engaged (Saks 2006). 
Everybody, most people go above and beyond on a daily basis. - 
Direct1, employee 17. 
And overall, our engagement scores are high when you compare to 
global norms. So we can always do more to engage with people. …The 
engagement scores and the sheer amount of pride and a number of 
people recommending the organisation as a place to work, where we are 
scoring high 80s in all of those questions, I think for me tells us 
something about the benefits of being an employee owned company. - 
TRUST_Service. 
Then of course, the things we are all trying to learn and be better at, is 
that when people have these ideas, and express them that we actually 
feedback to them so that it is not lost in space. Because if it gets lost in 
space then again it is another reason to say “well I tried, I’m fed up with 
that, I’m just not going to contribute” so engagement is all about the little 
things, funnily enough, not necessary the big things. - Direct1, employee 
21. 
 Similarly, Kahn (1990) defines personal disengagement as "the 
uncoupling of selves from work roles; in disengagement, people withdraw and 
defend themselves during role performance." In rare circumstances, employees 
did express opinions that suggested they were disengaged with the overall aims 
of the organisation however this did not prevent them from actively contributing 
to the success of the organisation. 
“Doesn’t have targets. Used to have them. Previously when she worked 
[in a different department] “they were set a target but as a group decided 
not to achieve it as they knew the target would just get increased!” No 
targets in current role. Just do your job, most people, but not all work 
hard.” - Field notes from Direct1, employee 14. 
This example illustrates that employees did have power to subvert management 
objectives, if they so wished, working as a group with the trust placed in them. 
“Is it fun? “It can be fun working here” - describing the organisation in one 
word he chose “dedication” and then “commitment”. Three times he 
repeated “I’m being honest with you”. The fact that he wanted to get off 
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the shop floor so that we could talk freely (he made sure he was aware of 
who was around us as we talked, another non-manager did walk past but 
he took no notice of him) was important. "Good job there are no 
managers around here!" Clearly he was frustrated with the organisation 
but nevertheless still committed to working hard as well.” - Field notes 
from Trust1, employee 22. 
In this case the relationship between the line manager and employee had 
broken down, through being set unachievable objectives, which then negatively 
reflected on his performance. Hence he felt frustration and anger towards his 
manager but maintained a level of commitment to the organisation, despite his 
experience. Clearly he did not want to be overheard by management telling me, 
what he thought therefore his openness was limited due to his personal 
experience and it did depend on personal relationships (Dirks and Ferrin 2002).  
 Sak (2006, p602) sees that organisational commitment "differs from 
engagement in that it refers to a person’s attitude and attachment towards their 
organization" whereas engagement “is not an attitude; it is the degree to which 
an individual is attentive and absorbed in the performance of their roles”. Pride 
in their respective organisation was often expressed by employees, 
demonstrating an affective attitude towards it. 
"A great sense of pride in working for the organisation. A great sense of 
pride in the quality of the work we do" - TRUST_Service. 
I am very proud of what we achieve here because it is not the easiest 
way to run a business but it is definitely worth it. It enables us to run a 
kind of business we truly want and also give a lot back to both our 
community I hope" - Coop2, member 6. 
Once again, only very rarely were wholly critical views of an organisation 
expressed22.  
"He questioned the whole employee ownership aspect. He said it was 
okay to say you get a share of the profits but not that you’re a co-owner. 
You are paid the minimum wage or a bit more but that was all. …. He 
seemed pretty hacked off. Previously worked for [same sector non-EO 
organisations]. Employee ownership wasn’t important." - Field notes from 
Trust1, employee 12. 
This respondent is expressing Hyman and Mason (1995) viewpoint that EO is 
about "the alteration of employee behaviour". However the founder of Trust1, 
                                               
22
 ln both cases the employees aspired to work in a different profession but were yet to realise it 
so had resorted to retail to simply get a job. 
 232 
 
who wrote extensively about the process of moving the organisation into EO, 
saw it as a moral response to share the wealth that was created and improve 
the lives of all the employees. 
 Employees that are engaged with their job (Saks 2006) are less likely to 
have "intentions to quit". Low staff turnover rates were observed across all the 
ownership types. This helps to reduce the cost of recruiting and training new 
employees, as well as maintaining organisational memory, not losing staff to 
competitors and keeping a stable workforce (Taylor 2008). Recent figures for 
general labour turnover during the life of this thesis are provided by the CIPD 
(2015c) below: 
Year Labour turnover rate overall 
2011 12.7% 
2012 11.9% 
2013 9.8% 
2014 13.6% (The year of the research). 
Table 8.13 Labour Turnover rates (CIPD 2015c). 
Year Labour turnover 
rate 2014 by sector 
Participant EOBs 
Manufacturing 14.7% Direct1, DIR_Eng, DIR_Manuf, 
Trust2 
Retail 24.5% Coop1, Coop2, Trust1, 
Services 22.9% DIR_Professional, Dir_Consultancy, 
COOP_Service, TRUST_Service, 
DIR_Service 
Table 8.14 Labour turnover rates by sector in 2014 (Murphy 2015). 
 Observations and discussions in the field (during 2014) suggested 
turnover rates of between 1% and 10%, lower than the rate CIPD provided 
above and lower than the sector turnover rates as well (Murphy 2015). It is also 
lower than the figures, 18% and 14% that Ridley-Duff (2005) found during his 
research into a hybrid EOB in 2002/3 (CIPD rates for those years were 26.2% 
and 18.2% respectively) and four times higher than would be expected for an 
organisation with CIPD qualified HR staff (Ridley-Duff 2010). 2014 was a period 
of economic stagnation in the UK economy; however the EOBs researched all 
appeared to be growing rather than declining, with plans to expand. 
"So what is the general turnover of staff here? 
Very low. The highest areas have generally been sales. I think mainly 
because that is the sort of environment, that it is. Very low turnover, high 
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retention. Haven’t got exact figures off the top of my head." Direct1, 
employee 22. 
"Turnover is still low? 
Yes. 
Because you are getting bigger? 
We have had one person leave. No two actually, someone has resigned 
just now." - Coop2, employee 1. Permanent staff level was 59, so 
turnover was around 3%. 
 Helping to keep turnover rates down, redundancy was typically avoided 
at all costs on both ideological and business grounds and even written into 
values statements ("employment protection through no compulsory redundancy 
policy (after two years’ service)" - DIR_Manuf.) Options to keep people on were 
investigated and applied where possible. These included reducing shareholder 
dividends, reducing wages, reviewing sales rather than overheads, redeploying 
staff and increasing profits to pay for maintaining staff. This contrasts with 
conventional Anglo-American organisations that opt to make staff redundant to 
increase shareholder dividend in the short-term. Erdal (2011) illustrates this in 
his book, looking at how Debenhams plc was severely pruned causing the 
share price to rise, however Trust1 has also had to make employees 
redundant, but for the different reason of maintaining the business rather than 
creating shareholder profit. 
“It’s interesting, the Barclays thing “we are going to chop jobs and we are 
going to pay bonuses”. You think there is something wrong here. Now, in 
a business like ours, we should never be making that kind of decision. 
We should be saying if we want to keep the people, we will reduce the 
dividends, to make sure we keep the people because we have put a lot 
of effort into training the people and they have livelihoods and they have 
families, which are dependent upon it, so that is the most important 
thing.” - Direct1, employee 21. 
"we lost the [location] contract. We have had it for them for 30 years so 
we had to make redundancies which is unheard of in a co-op, so we 
have lost a couple of major contracts and had to make some big 
changes… 
How did you make the decision to make people redundant? 
We had no choice because we couldn’t [carry on]. In the past what we 
have done is kept people on, if we lose an area and the [employee] really 
didn’t want to TUPE across to the other company we have managed to 
retain them… Obviously we had no redundancy matrix in place or 
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anything so we had to do a matrix to work out who we had to lose. So it 
was pretty bad." - COOP_Service. 
 White and Druker (2009) point out that low turnover can also be a result 
of de-motivated employees remaining whilst waiting for their share options to 
mature. This can lead to the organisation carrying inefficient, deadwood and 
reducing potential performance.  
 Significant effort was put into employee development. This helped to 
build an effective and flexible workforce that was more relevant to longer 
tenures of employment, so that employees could fulfil numerous roles. Specific 
skills that employees possessed were utilised for the benefit of the organisation 
as well as the pleasure of the employee. 
“So I guess going back to that attracting people and a good place to 
work, graduates are coming and saying “I will work on a machine 
because I can get my foot in the door”. So we are measuring talent. 
Other things, like they might be a karate coach, and we can have karate 
classes upstairs at lunchtimes. We do ballroom upstairs on Thursday 
lunchtime. Which is a really good laugh.” - Direct1, employee 17. 
 To obtain appropriate new owner employees for the organisations, 
recruitment was taken seriously, with significant effort and cost involved. 
Recruitment appeared to firstly be values based rather than skills, to verify that 
the recruit shared the same ethos as the company. This has the potential down-
fall of creating a mono-culture, where staff can be blinkered from seeing 
alternative viewpoints, leading to a lack of diversity (Grey 2013).  
 Linked to the previous cultural value of trust, Dirks and Ferrin (2002) 
point out that a lack of trust leads to a diversion of effort in attempting to cover 
"the backs” of employees rather than being focused on the required task. Hence 
a high trust environment does not have this attribute, helping to create a more 
productive environment instead. 
"we have a philosophy that says “better to have done something and ask 
for forgiveness, than never to have done it.” So they should get on with 
something."- Direct1, employee 21. 
 Poor performance, by which is meant a lack of effort or care in carrying 
out a task, rather than an inability to perform a role due to lack of training or 
natural ability, was seen by other co-owners as having a negative financial 
impact on themselves personally. In some cases it led to direct intervention 
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where employees were challenged to improve or leave the organisation. In 
other cases, particularly coops, there was an enormous expectation of good 
performance, so any deliberate poor performance led to holding such members 
in low esteem and emotional pressure but not necessarily action (Rothschild 
and Whitt 1986). 
“you get one guy saying “I’m not bothered, I don’t want to do it” but then 
somebody, a peer in the same team, might come back with “well go and 
get a job somewhere else then, because we don’t want you here if you 
are not bothered”. It was fascinating to see that. And they have every 
right, because they are shareholders.” - Direct1, employee 17. 
Most of the membership works damn hard and the ones who don’t, well 
“shame on you. If you can still hold your head, then that is fine, it’s 
entirely up to you.” You know, we employ a lot of people and we are 
doing the local community a valuable service. If people want to take the 
benefits, pay and the conditions and you know, take the piss; well be that 
on your own conscience.” - Coop1, member 3. 
“It feels a bit like a family and a family run business and I think that is 
why difficult conversations are avoided. It is hard to have a difficult 
conversation with one of your mates, one of your brothers, one of your 
family members. People don’t like doing it.” - TRUST_Service. 
 Therefore the overall effect of high trust, openness and fun within EO is 
suggestive of a high commitment culture, reflected in both directions of the 
manager-employee relationship. As Boxall and Purcell (2010, p32) point out  
“HRM research is increasingly taking on board the question of mutuality, 
examining the extent to which employer and worker outcomes are 
mutually satisfying and, thus more sustainable in our society over the 
long run.” 
This mutuality was observed in the field, most obviously within the worker coops 
where there was no distinction between member and manager but also within 
the direct type and perhaps to a slightly lesser extent the trust type, due to the 
hierarchical rather than servant leadership management approach. Mutuality 
took the form of respect and care for colleagues, joint rewards, combined 
investment of personal effort, shared goals and simply helping one another. 
This is in stark contrast to an adversarial approach where management and 
workers’ goals are at odds with each other. 
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 Storey, Basterretxea and Salaman (2014, p630) point out a 
“degenerative” argument against mutuality though  
“mutuality is always a transient phase on a deterministic trajectory either 
away from mutuality in order to prioritise commercial goals or towards 
further mutuality and accompanying commercial failure.” 
This suggests that management will always be against workers or if working 
together, that it will lead to economic failure. However this was not the 
experience in the field with considerable growth and longevity reported by the 
EOBs. Management and workers were seen to be working for mutual goals and 
succeeding. 
 Watson (2006, p425) considers the differing aspects of both low 
commitment and high commitment HR strategy. The strategies used in the 
EOBs observed fall very much in line with that of high commitment. This is 
illustrated in the table below (8.15). 
 
Direct Control 
/ Low 
Commitment 
HRM 
Indirect Control / 
High 
Commitment 
HRM 
Evidence of high 
commitment 
strategy in all 
EOBs 
Performance 
expectations 
Objectives met 
to minimum 
level, external 
controls, 
external 
inspection, pass 
quality 
acceptable 
Objectives 
‘stretch’ & develop 
people, self-
controls, self/peer 
inspection, 
continuous 
improvement in 
quality sought 
Appraisals used to 
develop 
performance. 
Continuously 
looking for better 
performance to 
increase profit and 
therefore personal 
gain. 
Coop Self-control particularly evident, as well as peer 
evaluation. 
Direct Appraisals developmental rather than judgemental 
Trust Highly structure appraisals, used to rate employees. 
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Communication Management 
seek & give 
information, info 
given on need 
to know basis & 
used for 
sectional 
advantage 
Two-way 
communication 
initiated by any 
party, information 
shared for general 
advantage, 
business 
information widely 
shared 
Open access to 
information, both 
published and via 
accessible 
management. 
Enshrined 
employee voice 
with involvement 
and participation 
able to influence 
the organisation. 
Coop Whole member meetings able to communicate with all 
other members face to face. Freely accessible 
management minutes. Level 5 employee participation, 
communication expected to be two way. 
Direct Frequently published information with direct access to all 
levels of management, not requiring any intermediary.  
Trust Frequently published information with access to 
information usually via the hierarchical structure or 
directly if required. 
Employee 
development 
Training for 
specific 
purposes, 
emphasis on 
courses, 
appraisal 
emphasises 
managerial 
setting and 
monitoring of 
objectives, 
focus on job 
Training to 
develop skills & 
competencies, 
emphasis on 
continual learning, 
appraisal 
emphasises 
negotiated setting 
and monitoring of 
objectives 
Development seen 
more than just 
current task, but 
whole person 
development and 
for future 
opportunities. 
Coop  Multiple concurrent job roles requiring training in each 
one. Development of skills more important than personal 
progression. 
Direct Progression through developing multiple role skills. 
Sideways moves encouraged to facilitate this. 
Trust Development within current role to enable progression to 
next role in structure. 
 238 
 
Strategy-
making 
Performed by 
top 
management, 
with the aid of 
strategy experts 
Top management 
provide ‘vision’ or 
strategic intent, 
strategy 
developed 
through 
interaction with 
other levels 
Employees 
encouraged to be 
involved and 
participate in 
strategy 
development. 
Employee voice 
enabled at the 
highest levels of 
the organisations 
able to influence 
the strategy. 
Coop  Strategy created and endorsed by whole body of 
members, a fundamental aspect of cooperatives. 
Direct Created by senior management in conjunction with 
employees. Can be questioned directly with 
management. 
Trust Created by senior management, who are then held 
accountable for it. Can be questioned through the 
communication channels. 
Culture Rule based, 
emphasis on 
authority, task 
focus, mistakes 
punished 
Shared values, 
emphasis on 
problem-solving, 
customer focus, 
learning from 
mistakes 
Encouraged to try 
things out and 
failure is allowed. 
Significant 
emphasis on 
customer. Values 
widely shared. 
Employees 
empowered to take 
responsibility for 
situations. 
Coop, Direct, 
Trust  
Covered in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
Structure Layered 
hierarchy, top 
down influence, 
centralization, 
mechanistically 
bureaucratic 
(rigid)  
Flat hierarchy, 
organic & mutual 
(top-down/bottom-
up) influence, 
devolution, 
organically 
bureaucratic 
(flexible) 
Cross 
communication 
widely encouraged 
irrespective of 
grade structure.  
Coop  Flat structure in coops. 
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Direct Servant leadership observed. 
Trust More hierarchical, however communication and 
involvement available at all levels. 
Work/job 
design 
Deskilled, 
fragmented 
jobs, 
doing/thinking 
split, individual 
has single skill, 
direct control of 
individual by 
supervisor 
Whole, enriched 
jobs, 
doing/thinking 
combined, 
individual multi-
skilled, indirect 
control with semi-
autonomous 
teams 
Team working 
encouraged. 
Enriched jobs 
through role 
sharing and multi-
skilling. 
Coop  Enrichment through multiple roles/skills. Team working. 
Direct Personal innovation encouraged, team working. 
Trust Less personal freedom but team working encouraged. 
Employment 
relations 
Adversarial, 
collective, 
win/lose, trade 
unions tolerated 
as inconvenient 
or used as 
intermediaries 
between 
managers and 
employees 
Mutual, individual, 
win/win, unions 
avoided or 
involved with 
partnership 
relations 
Trust, respect and 
honesty. Where 
unions were 
present they were 
often seen as 
secondary to the 
participation that 
employees already 
had. Mutuality 
apparent in 
ownership rewards. 
Coop  Direct participation, expected to be involved in all 
important decisions. 
Direct Easy personal access to management and mutual goals 
negated need for union involvement. 
Trust Devolved involvement with management and mutual 
goals negated need for union involvement. 
Table 8.15 High/Low Commitment HRM applicable to EOBs (Watson 2006, p425) 
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 Different aspects of high performance working can also be seen in 
Pfeffer's (2008) list of seven aspects of best practice regarding HR strategy. 
These can be directly applied to employee ownership (see table 8.16 below).  
Best Practice Application in EOB Evidence in EOBs 
1. Employment 
Security 
Redundancy avoided, 
wherever possible. 
Emphasis on hiring 
permanent employee 
than temporary 
workers. 
Primary goal within 
coops was to provide 
employment now and 
for future generations. 
People retrained and 
redeployed. 
2. Selective hiring Selecting people on 
cultural fit as well as 
technical ability. 
9-month probation 
periods and 
acceptance by entire 
membership in coops. 
Assessment centre 
techniques used even 
for shop floor machine 
operators. 
3. Self-managed 
teams or team 
working 
Empowered team 
working, trusted to 
perform or resolve 
issues on their own. 
Used throughout EOBs 
where the collective 
was seen as stronger 
than the individual. 
4. High Pay 
contingent on 
company 
performance 
All employee owners 
received a bonus 
directly relating to the 
profitability of the 
organisation, from 
being a shareholder in 
the company. 
All EOBs shared the 
profit gained, albeit in 
different ways. 
5. Extensive 
training 
Job rotation and direct 
training in current role, 
to provide stimulation 
and better customer 
experience. 
Weekly experience in 
coops of both office 
and shop floor working. 
Providing development 
opportunities to 
experience new roles, 
including overseas. 
6. Reduction of 
status difference 
Capping pay 
differentials and setting 
equal pay levels. Open 
plan offices with easy 
access to management.  
Limiting pay 
differentials in Trust1 
and equal pay in coops. 
Uniforms that were 
consistent across all 
levels. 
7. Sharing 
information 
Access to 
organisational 
information, freely 
provided. 
All organisations 
provided information or 
enabled access to the 
information. 
Table 8.16 HR Best practice (Pfeffer 2008) 
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 Through the tenets of employee ownership (possession, influence and 
information, (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991) a high commitment culture is 
fostered and this was observed in the field. 
8.4 HR role in an EOB 
The HR function varied across the spectrum of ownership, from a more 
traditional role (for example within Trust1) to a highly-marginalised role with 
significant levels of devolution (see Direct1). Davis (2004, p3) provides various 
aspects of an HRM approach and these are reviewed below, specifically 
relating to EO. 
HRM Approach (Davis 
(2004) 
Implementation within EOBs 
Devolving the responsibility 
for the implementation of 
employment policies and 
strategies to line 
management, thus enabling 
the HRM function to be slim. 
Within the trust based ownership, devolution 
to line managers was the norm, however 
cooperatives did not necessarily have line 
managers so the devolution was to all 
members instead and with Direct1, the 
devolvement was so extreme that it removed 
the HR department entirely. Specialist skills 
(e.g. employment law was outsourced when 
required).  
HRM is responsible in 
consultation with the CEO for 
facilitating senior 
management succession 
planning and recruitment. 
Within cooperatives, senior management 
may well be appointed by election from within 
the membership body. Elsewhere employee 
owners can have a significant voice with 
regard to senior appointments. This was the 
case in Direct1 where twenty owners from 
the organisation made the final choice of MD 
and the owners also can remove senior 
management (an elected body from Trust1 
vote on the competence of the MD twice a 
year). 
HRM remains the focus for 
ensuring regulatory 
EOBs frequently saw legal requirements as 
being the minimum level required and 
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compliance with all 
employment legislation such 
as minimum wages, equal 
opportunities, termination of 
employment, health and 
safety. 
deliberately chose to exceed that, so that the 
legal levels became irrelevant. This was 
observed in setting wage levels, gender 
equality and health and safety. 
HRM is responsible for 
drawing up employment 
budgets, head counts and 
remuneration strategy. HRM 
emphasizes remuneration 
strategies based on individual 
performance rather than 
collective bargaining. 
By definition, EO provides a level of 
collective remuneration, although the direct 
ownership type is more individual and some 
organisations choose to use performance 
related pay in addition. EO allows for greater 
transparency of pay systems and employee 
owners therefore have involvement in the 
remuneration strategy. 
HRM emphasizes a unitary 
model of the organization, 
which implies no (or very 
limited) roles for trade unions 
or for employment standards 
derived from external labour 
market regulation. 
The influence ordinary employee owners 
have within their organisation typically 
removed the need for active union 
involvement. Trust1 did not prevent their 
employees from being union members (in 
sector that is frequently low paid and benefits 
from union protection) but they perceived that 
the overall voice available was greater than 
could be obtained by an external union. It 
was the same at Coop1 as well. 
HRM emphasizes the 
management of culture and 
communications as important 
levers for performance 
management. 
Pierce and Rodgers (2004) agree that a 
“psychology of ownership” needs to be 
developed (see also John Lewis Partnership 
(2008)). The communication of information 
and influence are key aspects of EO (Pierce, 
Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). Specifically 
within the for-profit sector performance is 
emphasised for the collective benefit of 
financial reward and employment security. 
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Being joint owners typically fosters the 
collective desire to achieve. 
HRM sees motivation arising 
primarily as a result of 
intrinsic elements in the tasks 
being undertaken and 
emphasizes strategies such 
as job enrichment through 
multi-skilling and multi-
tasking. 
Job enrichment was evidenced in numerous 
cases across all ownership types. Particularly 
regarding what can be described as highly 
monotonous roles (e.g. component 
manufacturing or sales assistant). The 
employee was valued (as a person and co-
owner) rather than just a resource so there 
was an emphasis on job rotation and 
continual on the job learning. This made work 
flow planning a highly complex task, requiring 
considerable effort. 
HRM emphasizes greater 
flexibility in, and dilution of, 
the employment contract. It 
makes greater use of part-
time workers, annual hours 
contracts, flexible working, 
shift working, job sharing, 
temporary and fixed term 
contracts and outsourcing. 
EO provides a different perspective to that 
advocated by Davis. As employee owners, 
maintaining a role within the organisation that 
they own is given a higher priority, so the 
right to employment is strengthened. This 
was observed across all the types but most 
obviously in the cooperatives where 
significant effort was exerted in keeping 
members rather than making them 
redundant. The utopian desire was to provide 
long term employment for employees rather 
than use temporary or fixed term contracts, 
recognising the dignity of work and the 
benefits it brought to the employee. Flexible 
working based around the employees needs 
rather than the “employers” was also 
common place. 
HRM attempts to ensure a 
high degree of functional 
integration around the 
realization of the overall 
EO sees the corporate mission to be both 
providing personal gain (through possession 
of a profitable business) and ongoing long-
term employment (through avoiding 
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corporate mission in the 
development of its strategies 
and policies. 
redundancy and respecting the owners). 
Hence EO sits at the heart of the 
organisation and should influence strategies 
and policies. 
Table 8.17 HRM implementation within EOBs (Davies 2004, p3) 
Therefore EO can be seen to touch on the entire range of HR tasks 
(recruitment, learning and development, performance, reward, employment law, 
organisational development and engagement (CIPD 2016a)) and should be 
considered in all aspects of HRM. A significant emphasis was placed on 
recruiting people with the right values and subsequently investing in training 
(seen across all types) rather than simply filling resource “holes” with bodies. 
Hence this is more akin to “soft” HRM rather than “hard” HRM (Ridley-Duff and 
Bull 2015). 
For employees carrying out an HR role in an EOB or those considering 
transferring into EO, the findings regarding culture have relevance in how the 
HR function is carried out, these are now discussed. 
 For those considering a move into EO, the issues of trust, openness and 
fun leading to high commitment should be considered. Openness provides 
relevant, timely information (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991) in a manner 
that is easily accessible, as well as understandable. This will require 
investigating numerous channels of communication, for example verbal, online, 
notice boards, group meetings, awaydays and physical 
newsletters/noticeboards. This may in turn require training in how to best format 
the message and in how to deliver it as well. (Some managers may feel 
uncomfortable in presenting to large audiences (observed at Trust1) so will 
benefit from being mentored in how to do it). Communication needs to be an 
ongoing process and will therefore require staff to ensure that it can happen and 
that the information is up to date. The content and depth of the communication 
should also be considered and this can be done through the involvement and 
influence of the employee-owners by asking them what they would like to know 
(Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). 
However, the information is of little value if it cannot be trusted. To what 
extent is there trust in the organisation? If there are low levels of trust, then 
 245 
 
which aspects, personal, strategic and/or organisational (Galford and Seibold 
Drapeau 2003) are missing and what can be done? This again may involve 
training line and senior managers to understand what brings about trust (Hurley 
2006) as well as influencing the recruitment and performance processes to 
encourage recruiting high trust employees and improving the way in which trust 
is encouraged. 
 Do employees enjoy work? Is it fun (Bakke 2005)? If not, why not and 
what can be done about it? Fun can be at the individual, team, corporate and 
societal level. Although the actual work might be quite mundane, policies that 
allow for job enrichment (Herzberg's 1968a, Hackman and Oldham, 1976) and 
variety through job rotation can help alleviate boredom and provide motivation. 
Teamworking can provide scope for fun through shared tasks and social 
interaction, similarly at the corporate level, celebratory events can be organised, 
which do not have to be expensive (for example Coop2) but bring people 
together in a positive way. Fun can also be had through interaction with the 
wider society, for instance being involved with charities practically (redecorating 
an old people’s home) or raising charitable funds in imaginative ways. 
Removing any aspect of trust, openness or fun is likely to be detrimental 
to the overall high commitment culture. An employee survey could be 
undertaken to understand whether employees, at all levels, feel that trust, 
openness and fun are part of their employment. In all three aspects care would 
be required to clarify exactly what is meant by each one, as well as sensitivity to 
the how the results are collected. This would be particularly important where 
employees were responding on how trustworthy their line manager is for 
example. 
8.5 Conclusion. 
This chapter has specifically looked at what is common, regarding performance 
and reward, to all the employee ownership models researched. This is then 
reflected in a model of the components of culture that are common across all 
the EOBs, leading to a high commitment culture based around core values of 
trust, openness and fun.  
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 The following chapter investigates the “dimensions of cultural difference” 
across the ownership types. That is, aspects of employee ownership that are 
seen repeated across the types, however their implementation is different 
across the different ownership types. This then leads onto suggestions 
regarding HR practise within the different types and EO in general.  
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Chapter 9 - Dimensions of cultural difference 
9.1 Introduction.         
The previous four chapters have focused on what cultures were observed in the 
different ownership types using performance and reward management to 
illuminate them. It has looked to answer the first two research questions (Q1 & 
Q2). This chapter now focuses on the third research question which is: 
Q3) What guidance can be given concerning HR practices with 
regard to cultures of performance and reward in EOBs in general 
and individual ownership types?  
Looking at EO organisations how does EO affect the HR focus for each 
individual type (cooperative, direct and trust)? 
 The previous chapter reported on themes that were observed to be 
common amongst all the ownership types. However, the application of the 
themes was not necessarily consistent across the three types. This chapter now 
looks at how the ownership type (cooperative, direct and trust) appears to 
influence the themes identified. The observations made are based upon the 
organisations researched, which clearly cannot represent the entire spectrum of 
EOBs in total, however the inferences were observed in the data collected. 
 It is recognised that some EOBs will be very uncomfortable with the 
notation “Human Resources”, preferring “Human Relations” instead and some 
EOBs will not have an HR department at all (for example Direct1). However, 
the traditional functions of an HR department (recruitment, development, 
administration etc.) will still be performed somewhere (CIPD 2016a); either 
centrally, devolved or out-sourced if necessary, so they are still relevant to all 
the EOBs investigated (Davis 2004).  
 All the different dimensions are shown in the following table (9.17) below 
and then grouped items are discussed in the following sections. Areas that were 
consistently applied across all the types are not included in the table. For some 
topics the expression of the types is more clustered and in other cases, the 
expression is divergent. The table is designed to illustrate the relative 
differences between the types rather than be a quantitative replication of 
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empirical data. From this the different practices due to the ownership type are 
drawn out. 
Area “Lower” boundary           
“Upper” 
boundary 
9.2 - Salary               
Salary - wage 
differential 
Low 
differential 
Coop Coop       
High 
differential Direct Direct 
   
      Trust  
Process for 
increasing pay Individually 
        Coop 
Collectively  Direct    
Trust         
9.3 - Financial reward from possession 
   
      
  
Dividend / bonus 
distribution 
Dependent on 
the individual 
      Coop   Dependent 
on the 
collective 
Direct     
      Trust   
Dividend / bonus 
importance Low 
    Coop     
High   Direct Direct Direct 
      
 Trust 
Share value 
importance Irrelevant 
Coop         
Relevant     Direct 
Trust         
Bonus due to 
Length of service 
Not 
recognised 
    Coop Coop Coop 
Recognised   Direct Direct  
Trust         
Reward horizon Zero horizon 
Coop         
Long 
horizon 
    Direct 
  Trust       
9.4 - Organisation 
  
          
  
Organisational 
structure Hierarchical 
        Coop 
Flat   Direct Direct  
Trust         
Stress from being 
an owner 
Low 
        Coop 
High   Direct Direct  
Trust         
Size Small 
Coop Coop       
Large   Direct Direct  
      Trust Trust 
Growth of 
organisation Replication 
Coop Coop       
Expansion    Direct Direct 
    Trust Trust  
9.5 - Employee lifecycle 
  
          
  
Selection / 
Probation approval 
Manager 
determined 
        Coop 
Collectively 
determined 
 Direct    
Trust         
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Performance 
Appraisal 
Manager 
determined 
        Coop 
Peer 
discussion 
  Direct   
Trust         
Flexible working Inflexible 
        Coop 
Flexible    Direct  
    Trust     
Use of personal 
skills Unused 
        Coop 
Used    Direct  
    Trust     
Ability to influence 
staff retention No influence 
  Coop       
Influential    Direct  
      Trust   
9.6 - Influence               
Voice Low involvement 
        Coop 
Full 
participation 
  Direct   
      Trust   
Decision making Exclusive 
        Coop 
Inclusive   Direct   
      Trust   
9.7 - Conformity               
Uniformity Corporate 
        Coop 
Extreme 
individuality 
  Direct   
Trust         
Gender, sexual 
equality Recognised 
        Coop 
Promoted   Direct   
    Trust     
9.8 - Trust               
Equality Unequal 
        Coop 
Equal   Direct   
 
 Trust       
Fairness Unfair 
      Coop   
Fair   Direct   
        Trust 
Trust (Honesty) Organisational 
        Coop 
Personal   Direct   
Trust         
Table 9.18 Different implementation of common themes across ownership types. 
 For ease of reading each of the sub-tables are repeated below along with 
their subject area. 
9.2 Salary 
 
Coop Coop
Direct Direct
Trust
Coop
Direct
Trust
Salary - wage differential
Process for increasing pay
High differential
Collectively
Low differential
Individually
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All the EOBs fulfilled their legal obligation of paying a salary to the employees 
(Shields 2007). The difference observed amongst the ownership types was the 
way in which the base salary levels were determined. Both direct and coop 
were seen to set the base salary to the highest level they could afford (what the 
CIPD (2015b) refers to as the ‘ability to pay’) whilst maintaining a viable 
organisation. This either meant that they paid above (e.g. Direct1, Coop1 and 
Coop2) or below the market rate (e.g. COOP_Service). Specifically, for direct 
organisations the emphasis appeared to be on personal profit maximisation, 
which then funds a “desirable” life outside of work (e.g. holidays, hobbies, 
pension, family etc.) but for coops the emphasis was to do with the whole of life, 
so that being in work was a part of the larger jigsaw of life. Therefore, 
employment security, cooperative values and contributing to the community 
(physically through volunteering and financially through gifts and taxes paid) 
were part of the total reward package (Kaplan 2005). Potentially Coop members 
(Coop1 and Coop2) also have to accept that members doing vastly different 
work will still receive the same levels of reward leading to possible feelings of 
‘reward inequity’ (Shields 2007). This was what Rothschild and Whitt (1986) 
found to be the case in their research. Salaries could be maximised to provide 
the greatest return to all members, with no, or limited, external shareholders 
negating the need to maximise shareholder value (MSV). The desire was to 
maximise pay, with a smaller bonus rather than the other way around. This 
helped maintain a more predictable income, which was useful in obtaining 
mortgages and loans for members. 
 Trust based organisations used the prevailing market or union rate for 
the role as the determinant and chose not to set the base pay at the maximum 
possible level leaving a significant number of employees earning less than the 
“living wage” (Living Wage Foundation 2016) (e.g. approximately 66% of 
employees in Trust1 were paid below the living wage). This created a greater 
wage differential amongst employees of the same organisation however the 
deeds of Trust1 specify a maximum amount that the ratio can reach before it 
has to be reapproved by the elected representative body. This level however, is 
considerably less than is common place in traditional firms (Armstrong 2012). 
CEO’s of trust organisations can take a longer-term view of the organisation so 
are not desperately trying to maximise shareholder value at the expense of the 
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employees, since all the employees are the shareholders as well. The 
alternative, as Willmott and Veldman (2014), point out is 
“The focus on MSV has led to a rapid divergence between the rewards 
received by those at the top and those at the middle and the bottom of 
firms. As a result, the rewards from productivity gains during the past two 
decades have gone to top management and shareholders rather than to 
employees in the form of wages and benefits.” 
 Increases to salary were determined on an individual basis for trust and 
direct EOBs using performance related pay schemes which are dependent 
upon the relationship with the line manager. For coop members, without line 
managers, wage increases were approved centrally by the body. This can lead 
to tension for cooperative members who want, or need, their pay to increase but 
have less personal control over it, causing them to leave if necessary, as was 
seen by Rothschild and Whitt (1986) where cooperatives were stepping stones 
to other organisations. 
9.2.1 HR involvement in salary 
Determining salary levels, even if not quantified by HR personnel has a 
significant impact on the HR function, as it aims to recruit, motivate and retain 
key staff. The HR function within cooperatives may have very little control of 
starting salary, if it is set uniformly across all employees (Coop1 and Coop2). 
COOP_Service had different salary levels within the coop, to be able to attract 
the engineering staff that the whole service was built around, without whom 
there was no service. To be a viable cooperative, this salary was set at a lower 
rate than the going market rate, therefore there had to be additional benefits to 
attract appropriate staff so it was the total reward that mattered, not just the 
financial (Kaplan 2005). These additional rewards needed to be communicated 
effectively, which was usually by word of mouth rather than advertisements. 
Therefore, the existing members who could extol the benefits of a cooperative 
organisation became the greatest asset in recruitment (Davis 2004). Increments 
to the salary were collectively defined, rather than by any specific individual, so 
again HR involvement was limited. Progression up through the structure of an 
organisation often facilitates an increase in pay but where the cooperative have 
a flat structure, this is not applicable either. 
 Direct and trust HR personnel appeared to have greater flexibility to 
specify the starting salary, although the emphases were different. Trust 
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appeared to want to minimise the starting salary, whereas directly owned 
wanted to pay the maximum that the organisation could afford. This meant that 
potential new recruits could be attracted for different reasons and so needed to 
be selected appropriately. Were applicants for directly owned applying simply 
because the wage was higher than competitors and if so, is this a sufficient 
reason to want to employ them? For trusts, was the potential of increased future 
earnings sufficient to keep someone in post? Progression within direct and trust 
was more appropriate, with trust organisations utilising a rigid procedure and 
direct organisations being more flexible around experience and ability. 
 In all the ownership types the rewards from possession (Pierce, 
Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991) can be used to offset a negative mind-set towards 
the actual salary. Although it was frequently commented by newer employees 
that when they applied they were unaware that the organisation was EO and did 
not understand what implications it had. Therefore better communication around 
being employee owned could aid recruitment. This lack of information is one of 
the barriers that Nuttall (2012) highlights. Davis (2004, p50) similarly agrees 
“Being a cooperative is one of the advantages you have of attracting 
people who are committed to sustainable development and justice.” 
and this needs to be explained to potential members. 
9.3 Financial reward from possession 
 
All the EOBs paid a financial reward to the employees that owned the business 
but the way in which it was determined varied (EOA 2012b). Trust and 
cooperative employees received a bonus dependent on the overall profit of the 
organisation. For the trust organisations (Trust1 and Trust2) this was paid as a 
Coop
Direct
Trust
Coop
Direct Direct Direct
Trust
Coop
Direct
Trust
Coop Coop Coop
Direct Direct
Trust
Coop
Direct
Trust
Low
Long horizon
High
Relevant
Recognised
Dependent on the 
collective
Irrelevant
Not recognised
Zero horizon
Dependent on the 
individual
Dividend / bonus importance
Share value importance
Reward horizon
Dividend / bonus distribution
Bonus due to Length of service
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percentage of the employees’ wages, therefore those on higher wages received 
a larger amount even though the percentage was the same for everyone. 
Cooperative members either received a portion of the profit dependent upon 
specific personal variables (for example length of service, hours worked) or a 
flat amount was given to everyone irrespective of any individual variation. 
However the most significant factor was that of being a member of the 
cooperative, which all members were, so the bonus was primarily a collective 
bonus (Co-operatives UK 2015b). 
 Direct employee owners received a share dividend, which was 
dependent on the rolling profit levels and directly related to the number of 
shares each employee held. Thus the amount each employee received was not 
necessarily related to any other employee and could be influenced by the 
employees themselves. 
 Trust employees saw the bonus scheme as a very important part of their 
reward, and were highly motivated to maximise it. Clearly this was a significant 
form of motivation and an example of expectancy theory (Porter and Lawler 
1968). For Trust1 the bonus had been as high as 24% but more recently it had 
dropped to 15% and subsequently lower. If it continues to fall then the valence 
of the reward will cause the motivation to reduce as well, unless it is managed 
appropriately (Shields 2007). 
 For Coop members the emphasis was placed on higher wages rather 
than increased bonus, so the bonus was seen more as a “nice to have” rather 
than an essential part of the job. Along with the emphasis on secure 
employment (part of the 3rd principle of the worker co-operative code (CO-
OPERATIVES UK  2012)), this allows for longer term planning for individual 
members and access to better mortgages (typically based on a multiple of 
annual pay), thereby improving the quality of life. 
 Trusts either allocated the bonus on a simple one employee - one share 
system (Trust1 & Trust2), in which case length of service was irrelevant once 
they had passed the qualifying period, or employees could increase their 
notional shareholding through seniority or length of service (TRUST_Service), 
thereby increasing their bonus. Cooperatives also devised their own bonus 
allocation algorithms, which could be a flat rate for all members (irrespective of 
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service or hours worked - COOP_Service) or taking into account service 
duration and hours worked (Coop1 and Coop2). Length of service was also 
indirectly relevant to direct employees as typically the longer an employee had 
worked for the organisation, the greater the number of shares purchased. The 
opportunity to purchase was an annual event and employees built up their 
portfolio, little by little as money was available. Often interest free loans were 
used to purchase a tranche of shares and once that was paid off, another loan 
was taken out to purchase more. In this way, the salary deduction was barely 
noticeable allowing a larger portfolio to be acquired but at a greater personal 
financial risk. 
 Direct employees received a dividend entirely dependent upon the 
number of shares held. The more shares acquired, the greater the dividend and 
the quantity of shares varied from employee to employee. This meant that the 
importance of the dividend also varied, from irrelevant to significant depending 
on the shareholding. Within Direct1, examples were given where the annual 
dividend ranged from a take-away pizza and bottle of wine up to three foreign 
holidays a year and more. 
 The value of the shares is irrelevant to trust members and coops (that 
used a notional £1 or “par value” share) as there is no option to sell the 
company and reap the benefit although this is what happened during the de-
mutualisation of building societies in the 1980s (Ridley-Duff and Bull 2015). The 
value of the shares for direct employees is of paramount importance though, as 
this is regarded as a personal investment or a provision for retirement. 
 For trust and cooperative employees, the bonus stopped on cessation of 
employment. Similarly for direct employees that resigned they had to sell back 
their shares immediately however some direct organisations allowed retired 
employees to keep their shares for a defined period (for example, up to five 
years for DIR_Manuf). This then has a bearing upon the decisions that 
employees made that had a long term impact. For example, DIR_Manuf chose 
to purchase the building that they had previously rented, this had a significant 
impact on the profit level whilst the mortgage was being paid off over a five year 
period, however on completion of the mortgage, the profits were restored and 
therefore the share value increased. Employees who knew that they were about 
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to voluntarily leave the organisation, forcing them to sell their shares, could 
have therefore voted against the purchase knowing that their final share value 
was going to be affected. For retiring employees who could wait up to five years 
for the lull to pass, their decision might have been different (for an illustration of 
this see McCarthy and Palcic (2012)). Therefore the reward horizon can have 
an impact on decisions that are made. McDonnell, MacKnight and Donnelly 
(2012) refer to this as the “horizon problem” but feel that it is diluted by the 
significant commitment that is required by employees in choosing whether to 
leave or retire in the first place. 
 Direct shares were also seen as a long-term option (Pendleton and 
Robinson 2011). The selling of shares was actively discouraged, except in the 
case of hardship or to fund significant purchases (for example house extensions 
or new cars). The underlying assumption was that shares were an additional 
form of pension provision and therefore that the reward was deferred until 
retirement. 
9.3.1 HR involvement in rewards due to possession  
Determining the profit share within coops was a contentious issue, with 
members having different opinions on exactly how it should be calculated. 
Therefore HR personnel could cost and propose a new system (see (Cohen 
2006) for illustrative advice from the CIPD), but it would always be down to the 
members to approve any such changes. Details of the profit share within trusts 
were recorded in the deeds of the trust, it was simply the amount that changed 
each year, and therefore involvement was bureaucratic rather than meaningful. 
Similarly for employees in directly owned, the reward from share dividends was 
a calculation and not a variable, although all the schemes carry an 
administrative cost (Pérotin and Robinson 2002, Greene 2014). 
 The way the profit share was communicated was important and could 
easily be overlooked by HR personnel. (Cohen (2006) sees communication as 
“key to the success” of a share ownership scheme). This varied from stopping 
the whole organisation to announce it and inviting the local/national press in 
(Trust1) or simply adding the money to the payslip and not telling anyone why it 
was there - leading to phone calls asking why someone had been “overpaid”? 
This was usually a highpoint of EO, if the profit levels created a meaningful 
bonus and could be used to reinforce that employees were owners too (Pierce 
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and Rodgers 2004). This helps employees to talk positively about “their” 
company and is beneficial towards an organisation becoming an employer of 
choice (Leary-Joyce 2004). 
 After the initial probationary period, service duration had little impact on 
trust bonuses but more so in direct and cooperative EOBs. Therefore HR 
personnel in direct and cooperatives had greater leverage in encouraging 
employees to remain with the organisation, aiding with staff retention levels and 
reducing turnover (Wright 2009) leading to greater organisational performance 
(Shaw 2011). As Storey (2007, p12) concurs 
“the ability to attract and hold on to talented employees is the single most 
reliable predictor of overall excellence.” 
 Conversely in directly owned EOBs, employees might end up “locked in” 
to employment because of their personal share acquisitions but not wanting to 
be there, leading to a de-motivated employee who does not want to leave 
(Sengupta, Whitfield and McNabb 2007). Using the appraisal system could be a 
method of managing them out or alternatively paying them to leave (see for 
example Ridley-Duff (2010)). These options would require specialist HR 
knowledge to not fall foul of the law and enable a case of “unfair dismissal” to 
be raised against the organisation (CIPD 2016b). 
 Benefits from coop employment ceased when the membership stopped. 
For trust employees, the trust may have specific provision for retired 
employees, for example on-going health care (Trust2). For direct employees 
that could keep their shares (albeit only for a limited period), there was still an 
annual dividend and the option to sell them back to the organisation. Hence a 
longer-term relationship needs to be maintained with ex-employees of trust and 
directly owned organisations, involving appropriate communication and 
distribution of share dividend. 
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9.4 Organisation 
Trust based organisations demonstrated the greatest adherence to a 
hierarchical structure, with multiple levels of increasing power but with an 
emphasis on the immediate line manager (Bratton 2015). Directly owned, were 
also hierarchical but with fewer levels and a greater emphasis on servant 
leadership (Greenleaf 1998), hence an upside-down pyramid. These structures 
are in line with the findings of Lampel, Bhalla and Jha (2012, p11) that  
“EOBs delegate more initiative to first-line and middle management, and 
are less preoccupied with maintaining standard operating procedures.” 
 Cooperative structures were flat, although members had different and 
multiple roles within the organisation, authority was shared equally amongst the 
membership. This also led to greater levels of personal stress (Rothschild and 
Whitt 1986), as members were directly responsible for running the organisation, 
whereas in trust organisations the stress increased as employees progressed 
up the pyramid. Uniquely, in direct organisations, employees could be anxious 
about their personal share ownership and trying to avoid the share price falling, 
particularly as they approached retirement and were looking to sell their shares 
to provide for their future. 
 Although the average size of a coop was very small (seven people 
according to Cornforth et al. (1988)), success for coops did create issues 
around the size of the organisation. To maintain a truly democratic process, with 
face to face contact in all member meetings and personal involvement in 
decisions, there is a physical limit on how many people can be involved (Gross 
(1998) suggests a limit of 100 people for an EOB). This was an issue for Coop1 
with around 150 members, who had already moved to off-site meetings to get 
the entire membership into one room. Clearly, technology provides alternative 
ways of communicating (for example Webinars or Skype) and online decision 
Coop
Direct Direct
Trust
Coop
Direct Direct
Trust
Coop Coop
Direct Direct
Trust Trust
Coop Coop
Direct Direct
Trust Trust
Flat
High
Expansion
Large
Hierarchical
Low
Replication
Small
Organisational structure
Stress from being an owner
Growth of organisation
Size
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making (e.g. Loomio) but there was a desire to maintain the personal 
interaction. Coop2’s espoused growth strategy was to replicate itself in new 
locations but as distinct, wholly separate, new coops, thereby allowing the local 
population to form its own cooperative, rather than being an off-shoot from a 
different location. The trust organisations looked to grow bigger by replicating 
themselves in different locations but all under the same umbrella of the trust, 
hence a more corporate approach with a consistent look and feel. The direct 
organisations looked to grow through innovation, (a feature of EOBs recognised 
by Matrix Evidence (2010) and Lampel, Bhalla and Jha (2012)) and 
diversification. This could lead to a larger organisation or wholly new EOBs, set 
up under the same ethos but still completely distinct organisations. 
9.4.1 HR involvement in the organisation 
The flat structure associated with a cooperative, and to a lesser extent with the 
directly owned organisations, means that influence should be devolved to all 
employees. Part of this is enabling all employees to have access to a wider 
variety of information than is usually available in traditional organisations 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). Therefore a more comprehensive 
communication strategy is required (Cohen 2006), along with providing 
necessary training to be able to understand the information provided (Birchall 
2011). Simply delivering it is not enough. Owners need to be able to understand 
it and apply it, which may be challenging for some employees. 
 Organisations have legal duties “to reduce and where possible prevent 
work-related stress impacting on the health of their employees” (CIPD 2010). 
Work related stress was most obvious within the cooperative structure as also 
found by Rothschild and Whitt (1986). Recognising stress throughout the 
organisation and knowing how to advise on handling it, would therefore be an 
important role within cooperatives for HR. 
 Although there are examples of very large coops in the UK, they typically 
have multiple membership types (for example workers and consumers). Pure 
worker cooperatives are generally smaller in nature. Therefore an HR person 
wanting to grow their career through exposure to larger organisations or 
international businesses might be forced to move away from the cooperative 
sector in order to gain the relevant experience.  
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 Growth of an EOB is also handled differently within the types. Coops 
expressed a preference for replicating the model in a different location but the 
coop itself being a wholly new organisation. In this case HR personnel would 
help the new coop to establish itself, perhaps providing technical assistance, 
under the cooperative principle - “Cooperation amongst cooperatives” (ICA 
2014). Trust owned would either grow organically or also replicate itself but 
staying within the same organisation. Hence here there is more potential for HR 
personnel to be involved in an expanding organisation as well as at a directly 
owned organisation. 
9.5 Employee lifecycle 
 
Recruitment by values was common across all of the EOBs (CIPD 2015c); 
however transferring from probation status to accepted was different across the 
types. In Trust1, there was no probationary period. Once the manager had 
selected, interviewed and recruited the new employee, they became a full 
employee and there was no explicit probationary period. Authority was 
delegated to the manager through the hierarchy. New employees were 
subjected to the standard appraisal system, which judged their performance 
and could potentially lead to disciplinary procedures, but this was the same for 
existing employees too. Hence the hiring manager had sole discretion on the 
status of an employee, whether to hire or not. 
 The direct organisations had a probationary period, after which the line 
manager, in conjunction with the employee’s peers conferred on the continuing 
employment of the recruit, considering their congruence with the espoused 
values Griseri (1998). Cooperatives took a collective decision on the continued 
employment of a recruit, typically at an all-member meeting. Demonstrating the 
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cooperative principles (ICA 2014) was a key requisite and everyone voted as to 
whether the person should become a full member. Up to this point, they were 
not considered a member of the coop, simply an employee. If membership was 
not approved, then the employment was terminated, to avoid having long term 
non-member employees. 
 Poor performance within trust organisations was handled formally; firstly, 
through the appraisal route and then via the disciplinary procedure, in line with 
the corporate policy (Armstrong 2015). Poor performance within Direct1 was 
dependent upon what was meant by “poor”. There was recognition that if the 
organisation was to be innovative, not everything that was tried would work 
(which could therefore be deemed as “poor”) however, it was almost celebrated 
and encouraged, to attempt to push the boundaries of knowledge back. Poor 
performance, in terms of lateness or lacking effort (in effect free-riding (Kurtulus, 
Kruse and Blasi 2011)), would typically be picked up by colleagues who could 
apply social pressure to correct the behaviour. This also happened within 
cooperatives as well, but was also tempered by the mantra of not being able to 
tell someone else what to do, in which case emotional pressure was brought to 
bear (for example shame, guilt). 
 Performance appraisals followed a similar pattern, with a more collective 
voice for cooperative members and a singular managerial voice within the 
trusts. Direct could include both perspectives. Cooperative appraisals were 
perhaps less valued than in other ownership types, as the underlying belief was 
that individual members were responsible for their own performance and there 
was resistance in being told what to do. 
 As equal owners of the business, cooperatives members had the 
greatest emphasis on flexible working, sometimes having multiple roles (for 
example customer facing, shop floor, administrative) that were performed on a 
frequent basis, perhaps weekly. This helped to equalise levels of responsibility 
whilst paying people an equal salary Rothschild and Whitt (1986). Direct 
organisations also saw flexibility as important, but over the longer term and that 
employees could move sideways across the organisation, since there are 
minimal layers, with no loss of status. Pendleton and Robinson (2011) observed 
the link between share ownership and enhanced investment in development, 
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because of the increased inclination to stay with the organisation. Trust 
organisations promoted people up through the hierarchy so there was less 
emphasis on flexibility and more on the requirements of the current role. 
Similarly cooperative and direct organisations allowed greater self-expression 
(as opposed to corporate standards) and welcomed the use of personal skills to 
aid the organisation (for example teaching ballroom dancing during lunch 
breaks to colleagues at Direct1). 
 Even with very low staff turnover rates, cooperatives that paid equal pay 
to all members could not alter it to keep staff. Instead job flexibility (hours 
worked, shift patterns, term time working etc.) were more likely to be used to aid 
retention. Direct and trust organisations had greater flexibility with wages to be 
able to try and retain key staff. Bizarrely according to CIPD (2015c) research, 
“increased pay” was seen as both the most and least effective retention 
method. Presumably in cases where employees were leaving purely to increase 
their pay, then a greater offer would encourage them to stay, whereas for 
employees that were fed up with the organisation the offer of increased pay 
made no difference whatsoever. 
9.5.1 HR involvement in the employee lifecycle 
Selection and probationary approval within trust and direct organisation is more 
manager led, therefore the responsibility falls on fewer shoulders. Ensuring that 
these employees are trained in relevant aspects of employment and 
discrimination law would be a necessary objective of HR personnel (CIPD 
2015c). Within the coop structure and its collective approach to appointing and 
approving staff, there will still need to be HR involvement in the process to 
ensure that current legislation is followed and discrimination is not practiced 
however all members will need to be conversant with the principles. 
 The collective nature of the performance appraisal system demonstrated 
in the coops is very different to the more individualistic approach taken 
elsewhere. HR personnel had a responsibility to collate all the feedback on a 
member, anything from fifteen people to the whole organisation, and present 
the consolidated information back to the recipient. Therefore HR personnel 
were involved in every performance appraisal, sometimes carrying out more 
than one a week, so this was a significant part of the role (Armstrong 2015). In 
direct and trust, once the procedure for doing appraisals had been defined, it 
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was line manager led. In the trust organisation, HR took an overseeing role to 
ensure that the correct process was being followed, but within Direct1, there 
was no further involvement. The appraisal was between the employee and their 
manager and the only feedback was on the process and not the individual. 
 An important aspect of cooperative working for the members was the 
flexible working pattern. Coop members had more support, and were 
encouraged, in requesting flexible working patterns to suit their individual life 
style as well as applying for extended periods of unpaid leave (Kaplan 2005). 
Therefore there was a role to ensure that there were sufficient employees 
available at the right time, able to carry out the necessary tasks. The scheduling 
required was not a trivial task (see figure 9.18 below which shows the timetable 
for employees at Coop1 for the upcoming two weeks). Ensuring that there were 
sufficient employees overall, allowing for growth and absence was therefore 
more complex due to the non-standard working patterns, making forecasting 
harder. This was seen as an HR function. 
 
Figure 9.18 Employee work allocation rota for Coop1. 
Within trust and direct organisations, there was still a degree of flexibility to work 
however the overall work patterns were much more structured and predictable, 
requiring less effort in planning. 
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 Alongside the varied roles, more prevalent in coop and directly owned, 
there was a need to maintain a register of peoples’ skills and experience, so 
that they could quickly be redeployed if an opportunity arose. Again with the 
more structured approach exhibited in the trust organisations, the stiffness of 
the organisation did not easily facilitate such a fast response. 
 HR personnel had greater opportunity to input into staff retention at trust 
and directly owned rather than in the coops. The former had more flexible pay 
arrangements (for example performance related pay) and could discuss 
individuals pay levels which was not available in the coops that had consistent 
pay schemes across the board for all members. The opportunity for promotion 
within a cooperative may not simply exist so members wanting to specialise in 
HR may not be able to progress and therefore choose to leave to gain greater 
experience. 
9.6 Influence 
Employee voice and decision making are related, without being able to express 
a voice, decisions cannot be influenced (Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). 
Cooperatives demonstrated commitment to complete democratic decision 
making, with members being required to take part in all-member meetings 
(Ellerman 1997). The ultimate sanction was to have membership status 
removed if necessary, although this would then create a situation where an 
employee was not a member, which was an undesirable state. Training was 
invested in enabling new recruits to learn how to express their opinion in robust 
debates and emails/text messages were frequently used in discussions. 
 Trust EOBs used more formal processes to progress opinions upwards 
through the organisation and decisions were made by committees representing 
a group of employees. Informal contact with managers was also encouraged. 
Direct organisations were less formal with staff being encouraged to talk to their 
line manager or directly to the managing director. However employees had less 
direct involvement in the managerial decisions made but with access to 
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information (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991) both trust and direct 
employees were able to understand why decisions had been made and hold the 
management accountable for them because of their openness (Clark & Payne 
2006). 
9.6.1 HR involvement in employee influence 
With all the organisations being EO, employee influence through voice and 
decision making was a key aspect that was clearly demonstrated throughout 
(Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). HR involvement as such was to do with 
encouraging participation and facilitating the channels through which this could 
happen. There was also a policing role to ensure that it did happen and that 
people were not excluded from the process. 
9.7 Conformity 
Trust organisations applied the greatest level of control with regard to 
conformity to a standard of dress and appearance; making people appear the 
same was important (Griseri 1998). Whereas, coops allowed the free 
expression of someone’s personality through what they wore whilst staying 
within the limits of Health and Safety requirements (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). 
Direct organisations appeared to mix both, allowing formal and informal wear. 
Direct and trust were neutral regarding diversity however diversity along with 
gender and sexual equality were actively celebrated and promoted within the 
coops. In Coop1 the elected management executive had to be an equal male to 
female ratio. Also, the exclusion, or simply omission, of a group of people 
reduced the quality of the democratic organisation, since a section of society 
was missing and therefore unrepresented whereas cooperatives explicitly have 
an open and voluntary membership (Cooperatives 2012). 
9.7.1 HR involvement in conformity 
Within the trust organisations, HR personnel had a role in creating a uniform 
policy or ensuring adherence to it. This was not applicable to the cooperatives 
where people expressed themselves through what they wore each day at work. 
In this sense the cooperatives were a much more relaxed, less bureaucratic 
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place to work. The emphasis was on values rather than laws, character over 
legalism (Mcleod 2009). Written HR procedures may not exist until they are first 
required, as demonstrated by COOP_service therefore for HR personnel being 
able to work in a less structured environment will be an asset. 
 Cooperatives actively promote gender equality (Cooperatives 2012), 
creating processes that enforce equal representation on boards, whereas the 
trust and directly owned gave opportunity for both sexes to thrive and let the 
best person succeed, which does not necessarily lead to gender equality. This 
example illustrates the difference between equality and fairness, observed in 
the different ownership types. 
9.8 Trust 
 
In some cases, coops ensured equal pay, regardless of role and everyone had 
an equal vote. In addition, everyone had an equal right to express themselves in 
their own particular dress. Uniform policy within the trust organisations gave the 
appearance of equality but there was not equality within the governance. 
Elected employees voiced their personal opinion, on behalf of a group of people 
that they represented, even those that voted against them. In direct EOBs the 
dividend amount was an equal amount per share but the share distribution was 
unequal, so some people received more than others. This could be seen as 
unfair where two co-workers work side by side with equal effort but one receives 
more depending on the initial number of shares purchased. Performance 
related pay can be a fair process, rewarding high performing employees but it 
does not lead to equal pay for a role (Kauhanen and Piekkola 2006). Hence 
each ownership type had a different approach to equality and fairness, which 
influenced the various aspects of employment. However treating people with 
respect was common across all the EO types, which is an attribute of fairness. 
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 Trust within the coops had to be personal without the layers of 
management in place (Hurley 2006).  Ensuring adherence to the cooperative 
principles (ICA 2014) prior to taking someone on as a full member, helped to 
ensure that the common cooperative values were agreed to. For direct and trust 
owned, trust with line managers and further up the organisational structure was 
a key aspect of working, as managers had power over their team members 
(Galford and Seibold Drapeau 2003). 
9.8.1 HR involvement in trust 
Determining the bonus allocation in a fair way, with both procedural and 
distributive justice (Shields 2007), is a critical role to be done without reproach. 
HR can have a significant role in helping to build trust, primarily through the 
communications that they provide (Cohen 2006). Ensuring that they are seen to 
be open and not deliberately withholding information (Pierce, Rubenfeld and 
Morgan 1991); answering employee questions in a timely and complete 
manner. They can champion trust within the organisation and provide relevant 
training to managers so that they understand their role in being trustworthy and 
how to build trust with their teams. As Hurley (2006, p56) points out, 
“Companies that foster a trusting culture will have an advantage in the 
war for talent: Who would choose to stay in a stressful, divisive 
atmosphere if offered a productive, supportive one?” 
9.9 Implications for HR practitioners’ summary 
From the above it can be seen that the HR function in the different ownership 
types have different areas of control and emphasises. For clarity, these are now 
reproduced and summarised in the table below (table 9.18). For an employee 
looking to work in this function, perhaps moving from a traditional organisation, 
it helps to highlight the different aspects that they will or, perhaps more 
importantly, will not be able to be involved with. 
Area of HR Involvement by 
Coop 
Involvement by 
Direct 
Involvement by 
Trust 
Starting salary 
and increases. 
Limited input, 
collectively 
determined 
instead. Not 
Involved, flexible 
pay increases 
and non-linear 
progression. 
Involved, more 
rigid structure to 
determine pay 
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involved with 
progression. 
increases and 
progression. 
Profit/bonus 
share allocation. 
Involved with 
negotiating 
calculation but 
cannot specify. 
Bureaucratic, 
determined by 
share price. 
Bureaucratic, 
determined by 
trust deeds. 
Profit/bonus 
share 
communication. 
(Cohen 2006). 
Key role. Key role. Key role. 
Bonus due to 
length of 
service. 
Could be used to 
aid retention. 
Could be used to 
aid retention. 
n/a 
Removing de-
motivated staff 
locked into 
share dividend. 
n/a Via appraisal 
system or paying 
people to leave. 
n/a 
Reward horizon. Communication 
stopped on 
leaving the 
organisation. 
Continued 
communication 
concerning share 
price and 
dividend. 
Continued 
communication in 
line with trust 
benefits. 
Organisational 
structure. 
Ability to work in 
a flat 
organisation. 
Able to work in a 
service role to 
front line staff. 
Ability to work in 
a structured, 
hierarchical 
organisation. 
Stress from 
being an owner. 
Significant role in 
recognising and 
advising on 
handling it 
Less applicable. Less applicable. 
Size. Typically 
expected to work 
within a small to 
Potential to work 
in a wider variety 
of different sized 
organisations. 
Potential to work 
within larger 
organisations. 
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medium sized 
organisation. 
Growth. Collaboration 
with new 
cooperatives 
using the same 
model. 
Potential for 
existing 
organisation to 
grow unbounded 
or replicate. 
Collaborate with 
replicas of 
existing model 
still within the 
same 
organisation 
Selection / 
Probation 
approval. 
All staff to be 
trained in current 
legislation. 
Key staff to be 
trained in current 
legislation. 
Key staff to be 
trained in current 
legislation. 
Performance 
Appraisal. 
Significant 
involvement in 
collating large 
amount of 
feedback and 
then delivering it 
to the recipient. 
Very little 
involvement. Left 
to line manager. 
Policy definition 
and then policing 
role to ensure 
procedures 
followed. 
Flexible working. Significant effort 
required to 
ensure sufficient 
employees 
available to carry 
out wide variety 
of work. 
Managed by line 
manager for their 
team, low effort 
required. 
Managed by line 
manager for their 
team, low effort 
required. 
(Employee’s) 
use of personal 
skills. 
Maintaining skills 
record to allow 
staff to be quickly 
redeployed. 
Maintaining skills 
record to allow 
staff to be quickly 
redeployed. 
Less relevant in 
comparison. 
Ability to 
influence staff 
retention. 
Little influence 
regarding pay, 
greater influence 
due to flexible 
working patterns. 
Influence through 
performance 
related pay and 
setting individual 
pay levels. 
Influence through 
performance 
related pay. 
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Influence 
through voice 
and  decision 
making. 
Facilitating the 
expression of 
voice and 
ensuring 
involvement in 
the agreed 
decision making 
process. 
Facilitating the 
expression of 
voice and 
involvement in 
the agreed 
decision making 
process. 
Facilitating the 
expression of 
voice and 
ensuring 
involvement in 
the agreed 
decision making 
process. 
Uniformity. Champions of 
diversity and free 
expression 
celebrated. 
Flexible 
approach. 
Policing role 
ensuring 
consistent 
application of 
rules. 
Gender, sexual 
equality. 
Enforced through 
processes and 
actively 
encouraged. 
Equal opportunity 
given. 
Equal opportunity 
given. 
Equality, trust, 
fairness 
Treating 
everybody the 
same. 
Treating 
everybody 
differently. 
Treating 
everybody 
differently. 
Table 9.19 Summary of HR involvement in EO by type. 
This table demonstrates a “Best Fit” approach to HRM (Purcell 1999), where the 
HRM practice is contingent upon the EO type. Application of HRM is not 
consistent across the three types so it could not be called “Best Practice”. 
 Employees wanting to fulfil the HR role will require different strengths 
and abilities depending on which ownership type they work within. HR 
practitioners within coops specifically may find that they also have another role 
as well so will not be working full time in just HR. It may also be necessary to 
accept that the CIPD qualifications and experience do not provide additional 
salary benefits from other members who have widely disparate roles. 
 To answer the third research question, regarding advice for HR 
personnel considering EO, the case for whether EO is appropriate was 
discussed in chapter two. This research looks more specifically at what advice 
can be given regarding the type of ownership and these are now taken in turn. 
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9.9.1 HR advice for cooperatives 
Worker cooperatives have the highest levels of participation (Ridley-Duff and 
Ponton 2013) with whole membership voting being a regular occurrence. This 
requires organised communication so that all members are effectively briefed 
and can make an informed decision. Where members are reluctant to take part, 
some form of enforcement may be required. Therefore organisations 
considering transitioning into a worker cooperative should consider how 
involved the employees are prepared to be and how they would find robust 
decision making since, as Ridley-Duff and Ponton (2013) found, not everyone 
wants full participation. Members need to be able to confidently make a point in 
a debate. If these aspects are not welcomed, then this might not be the best 
ownership type or at least, allowances need to be made for them. 
 The need to manage stress also appeared to be a greater concern within 
worker cooperatives than the other forms of ownership. Although coops had the 
greatest desire to make the divide between work and life seamless, there was 
significant risk of stress due to burnout (excessive involvement in the 
organisation) or conflict over having to make decisions with colleagues/friends. 
Monitoring staff (which could be an anathema within coops anyway) for stress 
and dealing with the consequences would be beneficial (CIPD 2010). 
 An emphasis on shared values has the potential downfall of creating a 
mono-culture leading to a lack of diversity as seen by Rothschild and Whitt 
(1986). This should be monitored by HR personnel, however it was not 
observed within the research coops and instead there was significant diversity 
of nationalities, races and gender in line with cooperative principles of equal 
access (CO-OPERATIVES UK 2012). 
 The cooperative profit share scheme caters for short term workers, 
enabling them to receive a reward as an owner (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan 
1991), however the emphasis is on secure employment. Therefore short term 
workers were taken on as temporary employees (with no bonus expectation) 
rather than members. Hence HR personnel need to be able to accommodate 
both types of employees, members and non-members. 
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9.9.2 HR advice for directly owned 
The potential increase in share value that is only possible with direct ownership 
was primarily seen as a long-term provision (measured in years, if not 
decades), typically for retirement. This can also help to “lock in” employees 
aiding with retention issues (Sengupta, Whitfield and McNabb 2007). As such it 
is helpful to be able to give financial planning and advice to employees, 
although this may need to be contracted out to an independent financial advisor 
for legal reasons. For organisations that expect to have a transitory workforce, 
this form of ownership might not be as appropriate since employees would not 
reap the benefit. Instead direct ownership fosters a long-term relationship with 
the organisation, so seasonal or temporary workers would not benefit.  
 Creating a flexible workforce, by actively developing employees is 
important. This can be done via the performance appraisal system, work 
allocation and job rotation. Maintaining a list of employee’s skills allows for fast 
redeployment when new tasks emerge within the organisation. This assumes 
that employees will want to be flexible and enjoy different challenges; again if 
this is not correct then direct ownership might not be the best option. Direct 
ownership is capable of scaling with the organisation and therefore does not set 
an upper limit upon the size of the organisation, although the administrative 
costs will increase (Pérotin and Robinson 2002, Cohen 2006). 
 Performance related pay (Armstrong 2015) was seen to reward and 
encourage individual performance, although other bonuses (for example sales 
commissions) were avoided as simply being part of the job and dependent upon 
the whole organisation to fulfil, not just the individual. This can make attracting, 
motivating and retaining sales staff, in particular, very difficult. 
9.9.3 HR advice for trust owned 
The more structured and protective culture found in trust owned EOBs require 
explicit policies and procedures to be created and maintained. Therefore an 
enforcing and legalistic approach is more appropriate for trust based HR 
personnel rather than a laissez-faire one. The structure means that employees 
do not need to have extroverted personalities (as preferential within 
cooperatives), instead it provides a more formal route to express employees' 
voices. This therefore has a bearing on the requirements of potential recruits 
that prefer an elected body to represent them. A clear working knowledge of the 
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trust deeds and their implications are required in order to implement and 
enforce them. 
 Short term workers can benefit from the rewards in a trust where the 
bonus is calculated as a percentage of overall wages, so this allows for 
temporary workers. Longer term rewards can be achieved through pay 
increases due to performance related pay, so this can be used to help retention 
and to build a long-term relationship with employees. Trust organisations can 
grow to be very large (for example John Lewis Partnership (2014)) so this give 
scope to develop a career within HR but still within the same organisation. 
9.9.4 HR advice for EO in general 
Ensuring that EOBs utilise the potential benefits that an EO culture can bring is 
a key aspect of the HR role. To obtain the high commitment culture, trust and 
openness are required. Trust at all three levels (line manager, senior managers 
and organisation - (Galford and Seibold Drapeau 2003)) needs to be 
encouraged. Understanding the factors behind trust (Hurley 2006) should 
enable relevant training to be provided to managers at all levels. This has to be 
backed up with managers and information being open and available, which 
requires recognition that it takes time to have informal, spontaneous 
conversations so it should be allowed for in work allocation. Consideration 
should also be given to whether trust and openness should be included within 
any form of performance appraisal although this may be hard to assess where 
there are low levels of trust and, therefore, the need is actually the greatest. 
 Creating a fun workplace where employees want to come and work 
requires consideration at many levels. Attention needs to be paid to the physical 
work environment (decoration, furnishings, cleanliness etc. although these are 
more likely to be Herzberg's (1968b) hygiene factors) however the primary 
focus need to be on the employees, enabling them to use all their personal 
skills and creativity. Alongside encouragement for innovation, there needs to be 
a tolerance for mistakes. A blame culture will inhibit employees trying new 
ideas, but this must be balanced with taking reasonable risks, as Terri Kelly 
(2012) CEO of Gore & Associates (an EOB) said 
“if you want to punch holes in the ship do it above the waterline!” 
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 Celebrations of achievement reinforce the positive message of EO to the 
employees. This need not be expensive but should be inclusive rather than 
exclusive as ownership is shared across the workforce. Arranging appropriate 
events could be an HR role, which needs to be done with sincerity (Bolton and 
Houlihan 2009). 
 Effectively communicating what EO is to potential employees as well as 
current employees is a frequently overlooked role of HR (Cohen 2006). This 
could involve networking with the local community and press, as well as with the 
candidate pool for future employees (Leary-Joyce 2004) to become an 
employer of choice. Lack of information regarding EO was recognised as a 
significant barrier to the expansion of EO in the UK (Nuttall 2012) so actively 
promoting it is required. 
9.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has illustrated how features that are common in all the ownership 
types have different HR implications in the three types. This leads to unique HR 
strategies for each ownership type and suggests a best fit approach to HRM, 
rather than a best practice one (Purcell 1999). HR within worker cooperatives is 
primarily supportive with actual policy implementation decisions being taken by 
the collective membership, therefore the role is very advisory. At the other end 
of the spectrum, in trust based organisations HR personnel dictate the policies 
and then police their application. Direct organisations were somewhere between 
the two extremes. Employees that fulfil the HRM role will have different career 
expectations and limitations imposed upon them by the type. Progression may 
not be possible in cooperatives which remain, on average, quite small. 
 The final chapter of this thesis brings together all the contributions to 
knowledge that this research has made to the area of cultures of performance 
and reward within EOBs. It briefly reviews the whole process and looks to the 
future with suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 10 - Contributions to knowledge 
10.1 Introduction. 
This research set out to discover how employee ownership impacts on the 
organisational culture of employee owned businesses. To expose the 
underlying beliefs and assumptions of the cultures (Schein 1992) performance 
and reward management (Armstrong 2012, 2015) were appropriate conduits 
through which the culture would be revealed. The specific research questions to 
be answered were: 
Q1) What can we understand about culture in EOBs with regard to 
the different ownership types?  
Q2) What cultures of performance and reward are observed in EOBs 
within the different ownership types? 
Q3) What guidance can be given concerning HR practices with 
regard to cultures of performance and reward in EOBs in general 
and individual ownership types?  
 The remainder of this chapter summarises the contributions to 
knowledge and practice that arose, fulfilling the initial objectives of the research 
which were: 
1. To promote deeper awareness and provide guidance to HR 
professionals and managers with regard to performance and reward 
management practice within EOBs. 
2. To inform academic and practitioner debates, within the context of the 
proposed expansion of the EOB sector, with regard to organisational 
culture. 
3. To promote academic awareness of the dialectical relationship between 
performance and reward management practice and organisational 
culture in the different ownership types of EOBs.    
With hindsight, consideration is then given to limitations of the research and 
what future research could be done to follow on and further develop this theme. 
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 The standout contribution to knowledge that this thesis brings is a unique 
ground-breaking study of organisational culture across different forms of 
employee ownership, that has not been done before (Caramellie and Briole 
2007). It treats the three ownership types (cooperative, direct and trust) with 
equal respect; in the past worker cooperatives have been ignored or 
marginalised (BIS 2011, EOA 2015a). Culture within a type (for example 
Rothschild and Whitt’s (1986) research into worker cooperatives) has been 
done but not a comparative study across types. Hence this research offers a 
new perspective of organisational culture within employee ownership as well as 
building incrementally upon existing research (Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
The contributions to knowledge arising from this research are fourfold: 
Firstly, in the area of employee ownership, how the ownership type 
influences the culture (Rothschild and Whitt 1986) and highlights a common 
culture across employee ownership in general (Section 10.2). EOBs in general 
were found to have a high commitment culture, based on the foundations of 
trust, openness and fun. For each ownership type, additional facets of culture 
through emphasised values were identified. In worker cooperatives the values 
were: a whole life perspective, shared values, self-owner, self-control and 
secure employment. In direct culture the values were: personal reward, 
personal development, founder’s input of values and limited servant leadership. 
In trust culture the values were: protective, structured and effort and reward 
linked. This is summarised in Figure 10.19 below. 
Secondly, in the area of performance (Armstrong 2015), how the 
ownership type influences the execution of performance management (Section 
10.3). Literature on performance management (Legge 2001, Watson 2006) 
does not necessarily include the effect of employee ownership and its relevance 
to high commitment performance, including low staff turnover, motivation, role 
flexibility and managing poor performance. All these aspects are influenced by 
the employees being owners. 
Thirdly, in the area of reward (Greene 2014, CIPD 2015a), how the 
priority and type of reward are influenced by the ownership type (Section 10.4). 
For-profit EOBs share their surplus with their employees but the ownership 
types perform this in different ways, leading to different emphasises. Worker 
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cooperatives emphasised higher wage levels but with a long-term view on 
providing secure employment for generations yet to come. Direct EOBs also 
have a longer-term perspective with the emphasis on building up a personal 
share allocation to be sold on retirement. Trusts emphasise financial reward 
with a faster payback in the effort-reward bargain (Kessler 2005). 
Fourthly, in the area of methodology, this research provides a method for 
comparing cultures (Section 10.5). It illustrates an analysis technique for 
ethnographic data in order to provide a comparison between cases building on 
work by Thomas (2006) and Braun and Clarke (2008). 
The research also provides contributions to practice for HR personnel that work 
or are considering working in an EOB (Section 10.6). Each of the contributions 
is now explained in turn.  
10.2 Culture within EO contribution 
This is the first study to pinpoint nuanced differences in culture, performance 
and reward in different ownership types of EOBs. It provides insight to the 
background culture that was observed across all the forms of EO as well as 
highlighting the subtle differences that the ownership types bring (cooperative, 
direct and trust). It therefore adds to the employee ownership literature in a 
unique way as Caramellie and Briole (2007) point out that it this gap needs 
filling. It also adds to the ethnographic literature by providing rich descriptions of 
time spent within a number of EOBs settings (Frost et al. 1991, Monaghan 
2002, Kunda 2006). 
10.2.1 Cooperative culture 
This research adds to the body of knowledge regarding worker cooperatives, 
specifically by illustrating the underlying culture found within (Kalmi 2007). It 
therefore builds on the work of Rothschild and Whitt (1986) and Whyte and 
Whyte (1988) providing a more up to date account, as well as one based in the 
UK. In addition, the size of the worker cooperatives researched are all 
significantly bigger (from 32 to 150 members) than the average size (just seven 
members) suggested by Cornforth et al. (1988).  
Five key themes of cooperative culture were identified that were not shared with 
both direct and trust owned EOBs. They are: 
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1. A whole life perspective. 
2. Shared values 
3. Self-owner 
4. Self-control 
5. Secure employment. 
 As such it is probably the most complete expression of employee ownership as 
defined by Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991), with the highest levels of 
possession, influence and information but it also comes at a personal cost of 
involvement and potential stress (CIPD 2010). 
 For the significant majority, being a member of a cooperative was much 
more than just being an employee, instead it was part of a way of life. The 
cooperative model provided for the greatest opportunity to personally manage 
the work/life balance, primarily because there was no actual division between 
the two; work fundamentally is simply a subset of life rather than a discrete “add 
on” to be held in check. The values and identity of a person transferred 
effortlessly over into being a member. People were able to express their whole 
selves through active democratic participation at work, taking a step towards 
fulfilling Ellerman’s (1997) desire for economic democracy. Flexibility around 
work scheduling was seen as a significant benefit (Kaplan 2005) and strongly 
supported in order to enable employment and life to co-exist. This could be via 
term-time only working, shift work or extended holiday periods. As such, being a 
cooperative member has a whole of life perspective when it comes to work 
rather than a compartmentalised view. Therefore of the three types, the 
cooperative culture had, by far, the greatest emphasis on work-life balance, or 
perhaps more appropriately, work-life integration. 
 Members exhibiting shared values were common place. Specifically, 
regarding the cooperative principles specified by the ICA (2005, 2014); it was 
required to pass probation and obtain membership. However shared values 
were also extended to similar attitudes to other aspects of life, for example the 
environment, the local community, workers’ rights and gender equality. This has 
the potential to create a homogenous workforce, potentially leading to a mono-
culture (Rothschild and Whitt 1986); however diversity within the workforce (for 
example nationality, ethnicity and gender) was celebrated and actively 
 278 
 
championed. This aligns with Sobering, Thomas and Williams’ (2014) research 
that found that cooperatives promoted gender equality but did not necessarily 
achieve it but for historical reasons rather than for ownership reasons. 
 Being the actual owner was most strongly demonstrated by cooperative 
members. The highest form of participation, level five according to Ridley-Duff 
and Ponton (2013), was the normal practice. Hence every member had direct 
involvement and a personal responsibility for the running of the organisation as 
well as being able to voice what they thought. This could lead to elevated levels 
of personal stress, leading to burnout or breakdown as was also found by 
Rothschild and Whitt (1986). Role rotation and permitted absence from work 
(paid and unpaid) helped to alleviate stress. 
 Alongside the participation in decision making, members were expected 
to be responsible for their own contribution, since they self-managed 
themselves. This therefore required considerable self-control, to consistently 
work at a high level. Being told directly what to do at a micro-management level 
was not expected to happen and could be taken quite offensively.  
 Overriding even profit, maintaining secure employment was a key theme, 
not just for the current workforce but future employees yet to come. At times this 
required sacrificing personal reward (for example taking pay cuts) for the long-
term future survival of the coop. Hence there was an obvious communitarian 
perspective to the cooperatives. Securing long-term employment is different to 
Vanek’s (1975) proposal that wage maximisation of the members is the primary 
goal.  
 Looking at the list of strong characteristics of a worker cooperative, it is 
unclear why the UK government (BIS 2011) and the EOA (2015a) choose to 
hold them with lower regard than trust, direct or hybrid forms. It may be due to 
the average size being quite small but this is still larger than the average SME 
in the UK which is only 3 people (BEIS 2016). The political ideology of the 
current government may not favour cooperatives and therefore choose not to 
sponsor or promote them. This research adds to the debate by treating 
cooperatives equally to the other two specified forms of ownership and not 
neglecting it. 
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10.2.2 Directly owned culture 
This research adds to the employee ownership literature by uniquely providing 
an ethnographic account whilst seeking to understand the culture of direct 
ownership. Four key themes of directly owned culture were identified that were 
not shared with both cooperative and trust owned EOBs. These are: 
1. Personal reward 
2. Personal development 
3. Founder’s input of values 
4. Limited servant leadership. 
 Employees in directly owned organisations hold variable amounts of 
personal shares that provide a dividend and can fluctuate in value. As such this 
makes the actual financial reward very individualistic. For those with a large 
shareholding, compared to those with a small amount, the implications will be 
significant and hence the motivation across the workforce will also be different 
since the valence of the reward is different (Shields 2007). This form of EO 
does not necessarily reduce wealth inequalities within the organisation 
(McDonnell, Macknight and Donnelly 2012), since wealthier employees can 
obtain a greater reward, irrespective of ability or effort; however within society 
as a whole, it can raise the average wage levels as the profits are shared with 
the workforce. 
 Employees were encouraged to develop themselves personally. Effective 
demonstration of a diverse skill set was seen as the reason for promotion rather 
than duration of employment or size of department managed. Sideways moves 
were encouraged and viewed positively for gaining more experience. The aim 
was to construct an agile workforce that could be deployed as required, rather 
than as dictated by job title. 
 Each of the direct organisations researched had been placed into direct 
ownership by their founder(s). This created a significant legacy of values that 
became part of the initial EOB culture passed onto subsequent generations 
(Schein 1992). These could be idiosyncratic and highly individual. This research 
provides ethnographic examples of this. 
 The management structure observed was not flat like a cooperative or 
heavily hierarchical but had limited layers, with an emphasis on servant 
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leadership (Greenleaf 1998) as well. The management’s role was to serve the 
front lines, who were the ultimate producers for the organisation rather than 
building an empire. In this way employees were freed up to perform to their 
upmost for the own benefit as well as the organisations. 
10.2.3 Trust owned culture 
Again, this research provides an ethnographic account of trust based EO 
culture that is compared to cooperative and direct, that has not been done 
before. Three key themes of trust owned culture were identified that were not 
shared with both cooperative and directly owned EOBs. These are:  
1. Protective 
2. Structured 
3. Effort and reward linked. 
 Trust based EOBs provide a level of protection to all staff through the 
deeds of the trust. Ownership is shared across all employees but the 
responsibility is held at trust level. This is the lowest form of personal risk 
(financially and emotionally) compared to the other types and therefore provides 
a more protective environment for ownership. (Direct ownership has a risk of 
personal financial investment and cooperative has a greater emotional 
investment). Significant benefits were included within the deeds for the well-
being of staff and their families, even beyond employment into retirement. Trust 
deeds could also explicitly state that the organisation could not be sold, 
ensuring that the trust held the transfer rights (Gates 1998), protecting the 
employees from a management group seeking its own personal gain or a 
hostile bidder. With no change of ownership possible, it allows for a long-term 
view to be taken and for the primary reason for the business not to be profit but 
the continued employment and benefit of its employees. 
 Along with protection, there is a greater emphasis on structure within 
trust owned organisations. Significant dependence is put upon the hierarchical 
structure and the importance of the line manager to manage their subordinates. 
This is further controlled through the use of uniform policies and highly defined 
procedural working. 
 The bonus share mechanism was defined within the trust deeds and 
applied consistently across all employees regardless of role. This enabled a 
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clear line of sight between effort and reward and employees were motivated by 
the profit share to work harder. The organisations also used appraisals to 
increase pay depending on the performance, as measured against the specified 
criteria. This required year on year improvements in order to receive a pay 
increase, with no increase given to poor or insufficient progress. Hence 
employees were again able to see the link between their individual effort and 
the reward given. 
10.2.4 Combined EOB culture 
The underlying culture within EO that was observed in all ownership types was 
one of high commitment based on the foundations of trust, openness and fun. 
Employee-owners demonstrated trust with colleagues, line managers, senior 
managers and the EOB itself (Galford and Seibold Drapeau 2003). This was 
facilitated by openness, with regard to access to information, availability of 
management and involvement or full participation in the decision-making 
process (Ridley-Duff and Ponton 2013). Where it was not full involvement, 
managers were able to be held accountable for the decisions that were made 
because of the trustworthy information available to all employees (Pierce, 
Rubenfeld and Morgan 1991). 
 Employee owners enjoyed the financial benefits of possession whereby a 
portion of the surplus was retained by them. In addition, being able to get 
involved with decision making meant that employees could enjoy their work too. 
Maximisation of external shareholder values was not the exclusive priority 
(Willmott and Veldman 2014). Employees were able to express their opinion on 
how they wanted to work and the organisations celebrated their co-ownership. 
These factors are all illustrative of a high commitment culture, as described by 
Watson’s (2006) model which has been enhanced to show how the different 
ownership types impact upon it (see table 8.15). This is also in line with Pfeffer’s 
(2008) model of best practice however within each type, the implementation is 
different, which actually suggests a best fit approach is more appropriate 
(Purcell 1999). 
 All the different EOB types provide a significant level of mutuality (Boxall 
and Purcell 2010). From the most obvious example of the cooperative where full 
employee participation (level 5 of Ridley-Duff and Ponton’s (2013) 
involvement/participation scale) is expected through direct ownership’s servant 
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leadership and onto the protective nature of the trust ownership. Mutuality was 
demonstrated through shared rewards, values, openness, trust, enjoyment, 
respect, care and personal effort. 
 The figure below (figure 10.19) summarises all the different aspects of 
culture relating to the individual ownership types as well as the underpinning 
EOB culture observed. 
 
Figure 10.19 Combined EO culture with different types illustrated. 
10.3 Performance within EO contribution 
A significant contribution that this research makes to the literature, is that it 
considers the influence of employee ownership upon the performance of an 
individual (Armstrong 2015). Frequently this aspect of an employee’s 
circumstance is not directly addressed. For example, Watson’s (2006) models 
of high and low commitment does not refer to ownership. Legge’s (2001) search 
for the silver bullet of HRM that will create a high-performance work system, 
does not pause to consider who owns the organisation and what that entails. In 
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reviewing motivation, Mullins and Christy (2016) do not include the impact of 
being an owner. Hence this thesis provides an unfamiliar perspective. 
 EO can be mapped directly onto Watson’s (2006) commitment models, 
to demonstrate a high commitment environment is congruent with EO (see table 
8.15). Similarly, Porter and Lawler’s (1968) definition of commitment is also 
compatible with EO and was observed in the field. Both models can therefore 
be expanded to include the influence of EO on commitment and hence 
performance. Low levels of turnover within the EOB was also observed so that 
employees stayed working for the same organisation longer, enabling them to 
gain an enhanced experience and reducing the loss of human and social capital 
(Taylor 2008). 
Ownership was clearly seen to motivate employee owners to perform to 
receive the benefits that ownership brings. This was exhibited through 
expended effort as well as care taken in performing a role. Employees could 
understand the link between possession and a reward, so this motivation is best 
described by expectancy theory (Shields 2007). Flexibility of role was accepted; 
there was an emphasis on being one team (one EOB), trying to achieve a 
common goal so it was less important who did the work rather than that the 
work was getting done. This multiplicity of roles was most apparent within the 
worker cooperatives where members often had numerous roles that they 
fulfilled (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). 
 The handling of poor performance or free riding (Bohr 2014) was directly 
affected by EO. Employees expressed a frustration that “their” company (or 
even just “their” bonus) was being harmed when colleagues did not perform at 
an appropriate level although the ownership types expressed it differently. 
Trust’s used the hierarchical power, within the organisational structure, whereas 
direct employees felt free to point out unacceptable behaviour in their 
colleagues. This could also happen in cooperatives too, but social pressure (for 
example exclusion) could be used as well (Armstrong 2015). In extreme cases 
this could be construed as workplace bullying (Lee 2002), although this was not 
actually observed. 
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10.4 Reward within EO contribution 
This research contributes to the reward literature by highlighting the impact 
ownership and specifically, how the different types of ownership influence 
reward strategies. 
 All the employees of the EOBs, gained a reward directly because of their 
possession, although the method of distribution and emphasis was different 
within each type. Cooperatives maximised their wages, with less regard for a 
bonus but with concern for long term employment of the cooperative in the 
years to come. Direct EOBs paid a share dividend which made for a long-term 
reward, that might not be realised until retirement or leaving the organisation 
hence the line of sight to the reward was not immediately clear. Trusts placed 
greater emphasis on the annual bonus (profit share) enabling a faster payback 
(Pendleton and Robinson 2015). 
 In worker cooperatives, being employed was a reward itself. Work was 
an important aspect of life, enabling a member to express their democratic 
rights (Ellerman 1997) and help to build a democratic economy, since the desire 
was for society and not just the actual organisation. Hence employment was 
protected, through avoiding redundancy and by actively planning for future 
members to gain similarly from employment. Benefiting the community was an 
intrinsic reward, with a specific desire to build a better world, by reducing 
poverty and increasing equality in line with cooperative principles (ICA 2014). 
 Although this research did not set out to compare EOB with non-EOBs, 
the scale of rewards identified during the research is potentially significant 
(CIPD 2015b). As well as the ownership bonus/dividend, examples of care for 
an employee’s well-being and family were notable, such as generous pensions 
(15% non-contributory), healthcare for the whole family, holiday homes, 
celebrations and generous leave allowances. These all helped to establish the 
EOBs as employers-of-choice (Leary-Joyce 2004) and contrasts with traditional 
organisations that fail to pay even the minimum wage (BBC 2016). The 
workplace was also considered a fun environment to be in, an intrinsic reward 
itself, even when carrying out repetitive manufacturing tasks. This agrees with 
Bakke’s (2005) view that work should be fun and numerous examples of it are 
provided. 
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10.5 Methodological contribution 
This research provides a contribution to methodology by illustrating a 
systematic method of comparing cultures across organisations. An 
ethnographic (Hammersley 1992) approach was taken. This provided a richer 
picture than semi-structured interviews could do alone, from which the resulting 
data corpus was analysed using a thematic approach (Thomas 2006, Braun 
and Clark 2008). All the ownership types were coded together so that nodes 
could actively be looked for in all the types ensuring that nodes were not 
prejudged as being irrelevant for a particular type. This requires the coding 
exercise to be carried out at least twice. From this master model, individual 
models relating to each of the ownership types (based on the data sources) 
were created, this finally allowed the different models to be compared for 
differences and commonality allowing the themes to be created. 
10.6 HR practice contribution 
This research contributes to the HR literature (Taylor 2008) by providing an EO 
account of how HR is carried out and specifically what differences the 
ownership types make. EO touches on all aspects of HRM (see section 8.4) and 
needs to be considered when creating an HR strategy (Kaarsemaker and 
Poutsma 2006)  but can be overlooked (for example Legge (2001)). The 
summary of HR involvement is shown in section 9.9. It illustrates that HR 
personnel in each of the three ownership types will have different emphasises 
and remits, therefore the recommendation is for a best fit approach (Purcell 
1999). However it also shows that EO is compatible with all Pfeffer’s (2008) 
seven aspects of best practice. This research also builds on Watson’s (2006) 
model for low and high commitment HR strategy to show that EO fits 
appropriately with the high commitment strategy.  
 This research shows that the role played by HR personnel in each of the 
EO types will be different in the following key areas: Salary (starting salary and 
how increases can be applied); Reward from possession as an owner 
(allocation and use as a retention tool); Organisational structure (size and 
shape); Employee lifecycle (recruitment/probation, performance appraisal and 
flexible working/role); Influence (through voice and decision making); 
Conformity of people (diversity and equality) and Trust. 
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HR personnel can play a key part in helping to build the high commitment 
culture observed, by fostering trust, openness and fun. This starts with 
recruiting employees, then developing and rewarding them. This should be 
done sympathetically to the ownership type. In fact, their role may be much 
wider than HR management and include some other non-related functions, 
particularly if they work in a cooperative. 
10.7 Reflection on limitations 
This research project has taken nearly four years to complete and has been 
self-funded. During that time, the EO landscape has progressed and the 
economy has moved out of recession (and back in again). This section looks 
with hindsight as to some of the difference and what could have been improved 
with the research. 
• Within the time constrains and the access given by the EOBs taking part, 
the research is meaningful, however more time could have been spent 
during the ethnographic phase, in particular within worker cooperatives. 
By its nature, the contacts made were a semi-random sample of the 
organisation. There could also be some benefit in carrying out a 
quantitative electronic survey amongst all employees, based on the 
findings, within the selected organisations to gain a greater breadth of 
response. • The organisations were selected for their specific ownership type (coop, 
direct and trust). Should a greater emphasis have been placed on the 
hybrid model, which became more apparent following phase one? • At the time of the research, all the organisations investigated were 
positive about the future, looking to expand and grow rather than losing 
staff or making a loss. Would the findings be the same in a negative 
economic situation? Would there be the same levels of trust and fun? • All of the EOBs within phase 2 were selected from the north of England. 
Is there a difference due to the geographic location of the EOB? For 
example in Scotland or London. Would a larger number of EOBs give a 
different perspective? Having EOBs from more diverse sectors of 
commerce could have been beneficial. Other factors to consider could 
include the size of the EOBs; the age of the organisation; the average 
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age of the employees; transition method into EO and the justification for 
transition into EO. 
10.8 Future research 
Once already embroiled in the research it became clear that the simplistic view 
of distinct ownership types was too naïve and that a finer level of granularity of 
hybrid types is possible. This research places an important stake in the ground 
on culture within ownership types but the model could be refined further, taking 
into account hybrid models more. Do hybrids of direct and trust provide the 
greatest opportunity for employee owners to receive both a protected bonus as 
well as gamble their own personal wealth for even greater gain? 
 As for almost any qualitative research, more and longer data collection is 
always possible. More EOBs could have been researched and longer spent in 
the field at each and every one, so there would always be merit in extending the 
process having learnt from this experience. Also could the findings from this 
inductive research now be tested deductively, perhaps using a large scale 
quantitative electronic survey across multiple EOBs? 
 Recruiting primarily on values, agreed with the employees, has the 
potential of creating a mono-culture, albeit for the good of the employees. 
However it can still be exclusive and by definition omit a group of people, who 
therefore cannot benefit from the advantages of EO and it also remove the 
potential skills, experience, diversity that they have. It excludes people from the 
economic democracy, which in its self is not democratic (Ellerman1997). Is 
there a risk of becoming so entrenched in one particular cultural view that it then 
becomes harmful or toxic? Further research into diversity within EOBs and 
promoting inclusion would be helpful. 
 The stress of being a co-owner, most apparent within the worker 
cooperatives, is also worthy of further research (Rothschild and Whitt 1986). 
Does co-ownership necessitate particular personality traits in order for it to be a 
healthy place to work or do the work-life balance advantages negate the stress? 
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10.9 Personal reflection 
Looking back over the production of this thesis it is worth reflecting on how it 
has changed me as a person. Throughout the process I have become more 
aware of the master/servant relationship (Erdal 2011) within the standard 
employment contract but also encouraged that it does not have to be that way. I 
have spoken to employees who are passionate about their work and their 
future. I have seen the potential that a more democratic economy (Ellerman 
1997) could bring to our society with an emphasis on the reduction of the 
current wage inequality. This has been an inspiration to me and motivated me 
to act for change. 
 My research skills have also improved. I am more aware of how 
important it is to ask the right questions and the fragile beauty of the 
ethnographic experience. My knowledge has also grown through the literature 
and the whole experience. I intend to use this to enable me to teach about EO 
at undergraduate and postgraduate level as well as having an active role within 
the EO community. I would consider undertaking ethnography research again 
and would like to continue researching into culture. The secondary knowledge 
gained through this research has already been used in creating a conference 
paper and further journal papers are expected. 
 Finally, returning to Cathcart’s (2009, p3) quote from chapter one, 
 “For many people work is boring, oppressive, unjust, inequitable, 
alienating, divisive and poorly recompensed”  
and in a week when a national retail chain has been accused of “not treating its 
workers like humans” (BBC 2016), employee ownership can be fun, open, have 
reduced inequality, be respectful and be better recompensed. Therefore, I still 
think there is much to celebrate but more research regarding EOBs to be done 
(Nuttall 2012).   
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Appendix 1 - Systematic literature review 
The following appendix illustrates the systematic literature reviews that were 
carried out as part of the overall literature review process. It evidences the lack 
of literature that is to be found with regard to the intersection of employee 
ownership and “performance management” or “reward”23. 
A1.1 EO and performance management 
The figure (A.20) below shows the number of articles returned from the 
Sheffield Hallam Library gateway when searching for “Employee Ownership” 
and “Performance management”, which is 20 and of these only 14 are peer-
reviewed journals. 
 
Figure A.20 Library search for EO and performance management 
On closer inspection, two are duplicate entries; fourteen are USA based, the 
rest being Canadian, Danish and one joint UK - Dutch collaboration. Only three 
journals cover both EO and performance management (Henry (1989), 
Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) and Pierce and Rodgers (2004)) the rest 
only dealing with one or other of the terms. 
 Google Scholar was also used to search for articles. Although it implies 
that many articles are to be found (1040 when using the above search criteria), 
their relevance was of questionable value. It typically found articles that 
included the search criteria as text and not as the subject of the article. For 
example “All organizations seek employee ownership of performance 
management procedures” (as displayed on Google from Moravec (1996)), 
                                               
23
 The screen prints included were taken in July 2016. 
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however on closer inspection the text did not exist in the article. Hence greater 
confidence was placed in library searches. 
A1.2 EO and reward management 
A similar search was done from the Sheffield Hallam Library gateway looking for 
“Employee Ownership” and “Reward”. Of the initial 211 entries returned only, 17 
actually related to EO or ESOP, again a very small number. This is shown 
below in figure A.21. These were all investigated in turn for their actual 
relevance to the study and included if appropriate. 
 
Figure A.21 Library search for EO and reward 
A1.3 EO, performance, reward and culture 
Mathematically speaking, the intersection of two areas cannot be larger, than 
the largest area, therefore by adding an additional requirement the number of 
elements cannot increase. See figure A.22, which shows a nil return from the 
library search looking for ownership, performance, reward and culture. 
 
Figure A.22 Library search for EO, performance, reward and culture 
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Appendix 2 - Phase 1 interview questions 
 
The list of interview questions used during phase 1 is shown below. Note that 
this is the final version (dated 7th January 2014) and includes incremental 
changes from the previous two versions (4th and 5th December). Not all 
questions were asked and the order not enforced. As they were semi-structured 
interview there was freedom to adapt as I saw fit. 
------------------------------------------ 
What form is the employee ownership? 
• Is the ownership direct, indirect or a coop? • What is the total number of employees in the organisation? • How many employees own a share of the organisation? How much share 
does each owning employee have? • How many employees do not own shares? • Does anyone else own shares? If so, who? • Can you accumulate more shares? • Does an employee pay for the shares? If so market value or nominal 
value?  
What is the history of employee ownership? 
• What is the history of the organisation with regard to EO? • How long has the organisation been an EOB?  • What form of ownership were you in before (if applicable)? • What level of risk does an employee have? 
Organisational Culture 
• To what extent do employees have a sense of ownership? • Does employee ownership benefit the organisation? If so, how? • Does employee ownership impact negatively on the organisation? If so, 
how? • How can employees express their voice (opinion, thoughts, and 
suggestions)? 
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• Do employees participate in taking major decisions (acquisitions, major 
investments, closures etc.)? • Can you describe the organisational structure? • To what extent is information shared within the organisation? • Are there sub-cultures within the organisation related to ownership? (E.g. 
owners and non-owners) • What are the values of the organisation? • Does your culture or values impact on your recruitment process? If so, 
how? 
Performance Management 
• How do you do formal performance management? (E.g. annual 
appraisals, disciplinary methods) • Is there informal performance management between colleagues? If so 
how? • Do you manage performance at individual, team and organisational 
levels? If so how? • How do you develop people? 
Reward Management 
• Do you have a reward strategy? If so what? • What extrinsic forms of reward do you use (pay, pensions)? • To what extent is reward shared amongst employees (e.g. ratio of 
highest to lowest paid)? • Specifically, do employees receive a dividend or bonus as a result of 
ownership? How is it calculated? • What forms of intrinsic reward do you use? (E.g. recognition, increased 
responsibility, training)? • How does your reward management help with work/life balance (eg 
health care, flexible working)? • Are you seen externally as an employer of choice (i.e. are people 
queuing up to work for you because of who you are rather than it just 
being a job)?  
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Appendix 3 - Phase 2 interview questions 
 
The list of interview questions used during phase 2 is shown below. This 
version was used in Direct1, the first EOB within phase 2. It was revised whilst 
on site (this is version 3 - 17/2/14) and then revised again to be used at the 
other ownership types. Irrelevant questions relating specifically to the type were 
replaced with appropriate ones. This question sheet was used during 
spontaneous ethnographic interviews, so not all questions were asked and the 
order not enforced. Detailed question (based on the ones below) were created 
for planned interviews, for example with managing directors and with HR 
personnel.  As they were all semi-structured interview there was freedom to 
adapt as I saw fit. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Below is a list of general questions to be used in phase 2 - the ethnographic 
stage.  
Personal choice? 
• How did the organisation being EO effect your choice of it as being an 
employer? • How does it compare to previous employers? • How much did you know about the culture before you joined? 
Organisational Culture 
• What are the values of the organisation? • How would you describe the culture here? • Do you have access to all the information you want about the 
organisation? (E.g. financial performance, new plans etc. ) • Could you get it, if you wanted to? • How do you express your opinion, thoughts, and suggestions? • Are there sub-cultures within the organisation related to ownership? (E.g. 
owners and non-owners, different sites?) • What are the benefits of EO? • What are the downsides of EO? 
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Share ownership 
• Have you bought more than the minimum? Why? • Is it part of a retirement plan or some other plan? • To what extent is the dividend an incentive for you? • Do you think the investment is a risk?  
Performance Management 
• Have you had any formal performance management? (E.g. annual 
appraisals, disciplinary methods).  • What do you think about the new performance appraisal system? • Is there informal performance management between colleagues? If so 
how? (E.g. switch the lights off!) • Is it low control? 
Reward Management 
• What forms of reward do you get? Praised, thanked, recognised? • How does working here help with work/life balance (e.g. health care, 
flexible working)? • Do you get involved with any charitable or community work directly 
related to the company?  
